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ABSTRACT
Internal audit is an important internal control system that contributes to the
success of an organisation by enhancing the quality of corporate governance through its
oversight role. It also improves the control and monitoring environment of an
organisation and mitigates fraud risk. However, the recent corporate collapses in
developed countries such as the US and UK as well as increased corruption and
fraudulent activities in corporations in developing countries such as Indonesia have
raised doubts about the effectiveness of the internal audit function within organisations.
Given this background, this study aims to investigate the internal audit practice in an
Indonesian public State Owned Enterprise (SOE) using the case study method and
institutional theory. More specifically, this study attempts to describe how external
pressures which consist of coercive, normative and mimetic shape the practice of
internal audit functions in an Indonesian public State Owned Enterprise (SOE).
A public SOE was selected for this case study for a number of reasons. First,
SOEs are very important institutions for the Indonesian government as they account for
a significant part of government revenue. Second, the effectiveness of the internal
auditing practice in SOEs is being questioned due to a number of reported corruption
cases involving CEOs of government institutions including SOEs. Third, internal
auditing practice of SOEs is subjected to rules and regulations of the government as
well as local and international professional bodies.
The study was conducted in a public SOE after it agreed to participate in the
study voluntarily. Data for the study was collected using semi-structured interviews
from the internal auditors within the internal audit department of this SOE, including
the head of the internal audit unit. Publically available data and direct observations
made during company visit were also used to collect the data while the qualitative
content analysis was employed for data analysis. Furthermore, the responses of the
internal audit unit to various institutional pressures were examined using the strategic
response framework developed by Oliver (1991) using the approaches recommended by
Fogarty (1996).
The study identifies the existence of formal and informal coercive pressures
applied to the internal audit unit in a public SOE. Formal coercive pressure comprises
the Capital Market Regulatory Body and Financial Institution (Bapepam-LK) or
Indonesia Financial Services Authority (OJK), the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprise,
the Supreme Financial Audit of Indonesian Government (BPK), the Financial and
Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP) and the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX).
Informal coercive pressure encompasses the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX), the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations (COSO),
and the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO26000). This study found
that the internal audit unit responded to the regulations by officially adopting the
regulations in the Internal Audit Charter (Charter). For the formal coercive pressures
from Bapepam-LK/OJK, the responses of the audit unit consist of four different
xiii

strategies and tactics: acquiescence strategy with comply tactic; compromise strategy
with pacify tactic; avoidance strategy with conceal tactic; and defiance strategy with
dismiss tactic. For the regulations issued by the Ministry of SOEs, the audit unit
responded to the pressures by using various strategies and tactics such as acquiescence
strategy with comply tactic, compromise strategy with pacify tactic, and avoidance
strategy with conceal tactic. In terms of the pressures from BPK regulations, the internal
audit unit undertook a compromise strategy and pacify tactic. The acquiescence strategy
and comply tactic was found to be used by the internal audit unit in response to the
BPKP and IDX regulations. The study also found evidence of the audit unit responding
to less formal coercive pressures. In this regard, the unit adopted the compromise
strategy and pacify tactic to respond to the expectations of the Institute of Internal
Auditors (IIA)/the Indonesian internal auditor associations. The internal audit unit
adopted an acquiescence strategy and imitate tactic in responding to Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (SOX) 2002 expectation. Regarding the expectations of the Committee of
Sponsoring Organisations (COSO), the unit responded by using acquiescence strategy
and imitate tactic. In the case of requirements of ISO 26000, the audit unit adopted a
compromise strategy and pacify tactic.
The normative pressures are found arise from professional bodies such as
IIA/Indonesian internal auditor association and encompass education and training
systems, due professional care and continuing professional development. In responding
to these normative pressures, the audit unit uses compromise strategy and pacify tactic.
In respect to mimetic pressure, the study found that there were a number of
uncertainties faced by the internal audit unit, such as an appropriate technology-based
internal control system, the application of ICoFR review and the usage of COSO
guidelines in conducting the audit activity. The response of the audit unit to the pressure
was indicated by using acquiescence strategy and an imitate tactic.
The study raises a number of policy implications. First, the government should
consider making the internal audit unit report directly to the board of directors rather
than to the CEO. Second, the government should pay close attention to the report
produced by external auditors including the assessments made by the independent
assessors on the quality of internal audit activities. Third, the government should
continuously up-date the recommendations published by the IIA and adopt them into
the regulations to ensure the practice of internal auditing is in line with best standards.
Fourth, the government should ensure that their monitoring mechanisms are effective as
this study identifies the absence of strong monitoring and inspection mechanisms as one
of the main reasons for the internal audit unit’s failure to fully comply with government
policy requirements. Fifth, the government should monitor and evaluate the
qualifications of the auditors in SOEs regularly and take appropriate actions to
encourage SOEs to educate their internal auditors.
Furthermore, a number of implications for managers are also highlighted. First,
the manager of the audit unit needs to consider the fairness of opportunities for all
internal auditors to participate in a professional development program. Second, the
xiv

manager of the internal audit unit should recruit new internal auditors as the existing
number of internal auditors is not enough to tackle all internal audit activities. Third, the
manager of the audit unit should improve the independence and objectivity of internal
auditors conducting the internal quality assurance review. Fourth, the manager of the
internal audit unit needs to fully understand the changing role of internal auditors and
make efforts to provide them opportunities to improve the competencies that are
demanded by the newer roles. Five, the manager of the internal audit unit needs to
consider the perspectives from different auditors when responding to institutional
pressures.
The study contributes to the auditing literature by providing a rich description of
internal audit practices of a publicly listed SOE operating in Indonesia that has not
previously been subject of a comprehensive study. In this respect, this research
contributes to the domain of internal auditing confirms the validity of the application of
institutional theory as a lens to examine organisational responses toward various
institutional pressures. This study also broadens the level of examination by undertaking
a two level examination as suggested by Fogarty (1996). Also, this study has broadens
the examination by looking at both formal and informal coercive pressures which have
led to responses affecting the internal audit practice. In addition, this study draws up a
comprehensive picture of internal audit by covering broader aspects of internal auditing
and by involving the activities of all levels of auditors in the internal audit unit.
Moreover, this study answers ‘how’ questions through an interpretative case study to
fill the gap in the literature highlighted by Humphrey (2008) who argues that there is a
lack of qualitative research in examining internal audit issues. The fact that this study
adopts a qualitative case study approach and takes into account the views of various
levels of internal auditors and uses a variety of sources for data collection adds to the
validity of the findings.
The study has some limitations. First, since a single case study has been
conducted to examine the internal audit practice in a public SOE in Indonesia, the
findings of the study are subject to the common criticisms of the single case study
method such as concerns about the methodological rigour, researcher subjectivity, and
external validity. Second, since this study investigated the practice of internal audit in
the context of a public SOE in Indonesia, the results of this study may not be relevant to
other internal audit units that operate under different contexts and institutional
environments. However, despite the above mentioned limitations, this study provides an
empirically-rich, context-specific, holistic account of the institutional pressures faced by
an Indonesian SOE and describes how such pressures affect the internal audit practice
of the Indonesian public SOE examined.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1. Statement of Problem
Internal audit functions play an important role in organisations by adding value
and improving their efforts to achieve set objectives through a systematic and
disciplined approach to control and evaluate operations. However, with corporate
governance and accounting scandals in the US and UK in recent years, the effectiveness
of the audit functions has been questioned (Allegrini et al., 2009; Schneider, 2003).
Similarity, the effectiveness of the internal audit functions in Indonesian companies has
come under scrutiny in recent years due to an ever increasing number of corruption and
fraud cases within Indonesian companies. As identified by prior research (Diansyah et
al., 2012; Umar, 2011; Wicaksono, 2009) ineffective internal audit functions has
contributed to the increase in fraud and corruption in government institutions as well as
in State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). During the years of 2001-2004, over 6,000
suspected corruption cases were reported by BPK (the Supreme Financial Audit of
Indonesian Government), and more than 700 cases involving corruption were reported
by the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP), a government internal
audit department (Oxford, 2004). In addition, many Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of
the SOEs were convicted by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) on
corruption scandals (Umar, 2011).
In response to this situation, the government of Indonesia introduced the
Government Regulation No 60 of 2008 to improve the role of internal audit functions in
the government sector. As for the State-Owned Enterprises, the government of
Indonesia issued regulation No: PER-01/MBU/2011 that requires the SOEs to improve
the effectiveness of the internal audit functions.

Despite the importance of internal audit functions and the public knowledge about
its ineffectiveness, there has been no prior study investigating the practice of internal
audit functions in Indonesian SOEs. As a result, as Power (2003, p. 379) suggests very
little is known about the practice of internal audit functions in companies. Furthermore,
Mihret et al. (2012) highlight the importance of investigating the practice of internal
audit functions using institutional theory as it would enable researchers to decode
motives for adopting particular practices or design features of the internal audit unit.
Humphrey (2008) also laments the lack of qualitative research in examining internal
audit issues despite the fact that audit functions are socially constructed. This means
that internal audit functions and its processes are affected by diverse aspects of
behaviour and institutional environments (Flint, 1988). In order to understand the
reasons for internal audit functions practiced, it is necessary to adopt a theoretical
framework that views institutional phenomena as its domain (Ball, 1989 cited in Seal,
1993). Given the basic belief of institutional theory that the institutional environment is
socially constructed, institutional theory is considered as the most appropriate theory to
evaluate and to understand the practice of internal audit functions in SOEs in Indonesia.
Given the above background, this study aims to investigate the audit functions of a
State-Owned Enterprise in Indonesia with a view to answering a following question:
How does the practice of internal auditing in an Indonesian SOE react to the
coercive, normative and mimetic pressures coming from the environment?
1.2. The Significance of the Study
This research question is worth investigating for two significant reasons. On the
practical side, the audit findings of the Supreme Financial Audit on the SOEs show that
most internal control systems employed by the SOEs are weak and breach various
regulations. Since the internal audit function is part of the internal control system,
therefore, an ineffective practice of internal auditing may in turn contribute to the
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weaknesses of the internal control system. Therefore, an understanding of the practice
of the internal audit function is necessary in order to improve it. That in turn will
strengthen the internal control systems, impact on the higher performance of the SOEs
and assist companies reduce malpractices, fraud and corruption.
On the theoretical side, as the literature on internal audits show there is a gap in
research on internal audit functions, especially in developing countries. The research of
internal audit functions using institutional theory mainly deciphers motives for the
adoption of internal audit functions in organisations and the features of the internal audit
department. Thus, as Mihret (2012) points out, the practice of internal audit functions
needs to be studied further. Power (2003) also stated that only a few research focuses on
the practice of the internal audit functions, particularly using the qualitative research
(Humphrey, 2008). Hence, this study attempts to fill the gap by investigating the
practice of internal audit functions in Indonesian SOEs and contributes to the literature
by extending the institutional theory to explain the state–owned enterprises in the
context of a developing country.
1.3. The Aims and Scope of the Research
The study aims to investigate the practice of internal audit functions in an
Indonesian SOE from the perspectives of institutional theory. Hence, the end product of
this study will provide evaluation and feedback for the internal auditor, the CEO, the
audit committee, the Ministry of SOE, BPK, BPKP, and other stakeholders so that the
practice of internal audit functions can be enhanced.
In addition, internal audit functions are socially constructed to meet the needs of
society which seeks information about the performance of others (Flint, 1988;
Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Whittington and Pany, 2008). Internationally, the
functions of internal audits have evolved as a response to the enactment of many
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regulations, such as the US Income Tax Law in 1913 (IIA, 2015); the US Securities Act
in 1933 and 1934 (IIA, 2015); the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977 (USSEC,
2014), the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. It has also evolved in response to the
encouragement of numerous professional bodies to implement their guidance such as:
the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting published the guidance of
internal control over financial reporting in 1985 (Treadway et al., 1987); the Committee
of Sponsoring Organisations released the internal control framework in 1992 (COSO,
1994), the UK Cadbury Committee Working Group on Internal Control issued the
internal control guidance in 1994 (Vanasco et al., 1995) and the Institute of Internal
Auditors (IIA) issued the Standards of Internal Auditing from 1947 to 1999 (Mousa,
2005).
In 1999, the IIA issued a definition of the functions of internal auditing
classifying them into two categories, assurance, and consulting. In 2006, the IIA
introduced the other function of internal audit namely catalyst function which is
presented in the paper issued by the IIA with the title “Organizational Governance:
Guidance for Internal Auditors” (Burnaby et al., 2009). The application of these three
functions was based on the new paradigm of the internal audit which places the
customers of an internal auditor as partners. Hence, the implementation of such
functions has impacts on all features of internal auditing and raises potential conflicts
concerning independence, professional proficiency, the scope of work of internal
auditing, the performance of the audit work, and the management of the internal audit
department. However, the IIA also published the Internal Audit Standard as guidance
for internal auditors in performing their duties.
However, the practice of internal audit functions within the companies can also
be influenced by the environment in which a company operates. This research will look
4

at the practice of internal audit functions in a public State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) in
Indonesia. Specifically, the study investigates such practices within the institutional
environment, which consists of government legislation, professional bodies and the
uncertain business environment. The SOEs are one of several income sources for the
government; therefore all the SOEs are expected to be effective and efficient in their
operations to create high financial performance. To meet these expectations, the
Ministry of SOEs and the Capital Market Regulatory Body and Financial Institution
(Bapepam-LK) or Indonesia Financial Services Authority (OJK) set in place a number
of regulations concerning internal auditing. Such regulations provide guidelines for the
internal auditors to be effective in achieving the objectives of their functions, one of
which is assisting top management achieve the SOE’s goals by improving operations in
terms of its controls, risks management and its corporate governance process. As
professionals of internal auditing, internal auditors are required to follow the
International Professional Practices Framework (IPPF) issued by the IIA, which is
acknowledged as the worldwide organisation for the internal auditors’ profession. The
IPPF contains Definition of Internal Auditing, a Code of Ethics, International Standards
for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (Standards), Position Papers, Practice
Advisories and Practice Guides. However, there are some conditions which are not
regulated by the regulations nor by the IIA’s IPPF, such as the technical procedures for
audit of information technology, which motivate the internal auditors of the SOE to find
a benchmark to enhance their work performance. Thus, the internal audit functions are
expected to be legitimated that is, the functions must be performed to standards as
expected by legislation, the Standards of Internal Auditing, as well as business society.
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In conclusion, the scope of this research is to look at the practice of internal
audit functions in a public SOE in Indonesia. Specifically, this study will focus on how
the legislation, the IIA and the uncertain business environment shape such practice.
1.4. Contribution to Knowledge
This research provides practical and theoretical contributions. It makes three
practical contributions. Firstly, this study will provide a rich understanding concerning
the practice of internal audit functions within an Indonesian SOE which has certain
characteristics in terms of the environmental context. Secondly, this research uses the
new institutional theory perspective to understand the relevance of the institutional
forces in influencing the practices of internal audit functions. Thirdly, this study may
assist other SOEs in identifying and addressing issues associated with internal audit
functions of their organisations.
The theoretical contribution of this study is to extend the application of
institutional theory to explain the practice of internal audit functions in an Indonesian
public SOE.
1.5. Brief Research Methodology
A research methodology should be determined before further research is carried
out (Bisman, 2010). Bisman (2010) further explains that the ontological and
epistemological assumptions are a researcher’s guide to choosing a paradigm and theory
for study. Ontology deals with the nature of reality (Collis and Hussey, 2003; Creswell,
1998; Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). It consists of two questions: whether reality is
socially constructed which means it is a product of people’s consciousness and should
be treated subjectively, or whether reality is independent and thus should be treated
objectively (Creswell, 1998; Eriksson and Kovalianen, 2008). This study perceives that
the internal audit functions are socially constructed by the actors to gain legitimacy.
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Epistemology is concerned with the process of how knowledge is derived
(Bisman, 2010; Collis and Hussey, 2003; Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). Since a social
constructionist approach is an ontological assumption used in this study qualitative
research is an appropriate epistemological assumption. According to Guba and Lincoln
(1998), in order to capture a clearer picture, qualitative research demands researchers
lessen their distance from the object being studied (Creswell, 1998). Based on the
ontological and epistemological standpoint mentioned above, this study adopted the
interpretive paradigm. According to Neuman (2006, p.88), the interpretive paradigm is
defined as “the systematic analysis of socially meaningful action through the direct
detailed observation of people in natural settings in order to arrive at understandings and
interpretations of how people create and maintain their social worlds”.
To determine a research strategy, the researcher should consider the type of
research questions, level of control over the situation of object being investigated by the
researcher, and whether the research focuses on contemporary events or not, as
suggested by Yin (2003). Furthermore, according to Yin (2003), a case study approach
is an appropriate strategy when the research meets three conditions. Firstly, the form of
research question consist of ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions. Secondly, the researcher is not
required to control the behavioural events. Thirdly, the research focuses on
contemporary events. Based on these arguments, a case study design is the most
appropriate research strategy for this research. A single-case study was conducted to
investigate the practice of internal audit functions within the institutional environment
of an Indonesian public SOE context.
An investigation of internal audit function in an SOE is important for a number of
reasons. First, SOE plays a significant role in the national economy as one of the main
income earners for the government, and in recent years the poor performance of
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Indonesian SOEs has created financial difficulty for the government. Therefore, a
thorough investigation of its audit function can shed some lights into the systematic
issues of SOEs. Second, there is a general perception that some SOEs are involved in
corrupt practices as a number of corruption cases were reported against the SOEs by the
Supreme Financial Audit of Indonesian Government (BPK), and the Financial and
Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP) during 2001 – 2004 in government
institutions including SOEs (Oxford, 2004). Furthermore, several CEOs of SOEs were
convicted in corruption scandals by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK)
(Umar, 2011). These incidents raise doubts about the effectiveness of their internal audit
practices requiring a comprehensive investigation of such practices. Third, there is a
question about the effectiveness of the regulation of government and professional
bodies that govern the internal audit practices of SOEs. This is because the internal
audit function has not been able to prevent the amount of reported cases of
misappropriations of funds by the SOEs. This also requires an investigation of the audit
function of SOEs.
This study is conducted using an inductive approach, by which themes and
categories are obtained from the data following the method suggested by Zhang and
Wildemuth (2009). Data in this study is collected primarily from open-ended interviews
in order to explore the experience, understanding and interpretations of the participants
relating to the issue being investigated. Documents and direct observation are other data
sources used in this research to increase both reliability and validity of qualitative
research, as suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994). The analysis of the data follows
the following process; (1) employ qualitative content analysis to understand the nature
of the investigated phenomena and to interpret the responses of the research participants,
(2) analyse the data obtained using the methods suggested by Oliver (1991) and Fogarty
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(1996) to see whether the auditing practices identified in the audit charter are adopted
and implemented
1.6. Organisation of the Thesis
This thesis is organised into seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides an overall
introduction to the thesis, containing a statement of the problem and the research
questions, the significance of the study, its aims and scope, research contributions to
knowledge, and a brief research methodology. Chapter 2 presents a critical review of
internal audit functions and the theoretical framework. Chapter 3 provides the
philosophical foundations of the research; the ontology, epistemology, methodology and
the method; and the research approach used. Chapter 4 gives a historical account of
State-Owned Enterprises in Indonesia and the relevant legislation on internal auditing.
Chapter 5 depicts the practice of internal audit in an Indonesian State-Owned Enterprise.
Chapter 6 discusses the practice of internal audit using the lens of institutional theory.
Chapter 7 presents concluding remarks of this research and the potential for further
research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1. Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to investigate how the practices of internal audit
functions is shaped by institutional pressures. This is based on the argument that the
practice of internal audit function is necessary to understand in order to facilitate the
improvement of the practice. The internal audit functions are socially constructed by the
environment surrounding them, therefore, the practice of internal audit can be
investigated by understanding the institutional environment which consists of
government regulations, professional bodies and the uncertain business condition.
A thorough understanding can be obtained by exploring the existing literature and
research findings, so the gap in conceptual issues is clearly identified. This will lead to
an understanding of the development of the Internal Audit Function (IAF), the concept
of IAF and its nature contained in such a definition as well the practice of IAF; all of
which will address three key questions investigated in this study focusing on the
institutional pressures shaping the practice of internal audit functions.
2.2. The Development of the Functions of Internal Audit
In order to understand how internal audit functions are shaped by institutional
pressures, it is important to trace the development of internal audit functions. The
functions of internal audit have evolved. Humphrey and Moizer (1990, p. 219) mention
that internal audit functions were “socially-constructed, contextually dependent
phenomena, capable of serving a variety of roles and functions”. In this case, the
socially-constructed of internal audit functions has occurred to meet the needs of
business, governmental and non-profit organisations (Whittington and Pany, 2008).

This argument is strengthened by Flint who declares:
[a]udit is a social phenomenon. It has no purpose or value except in its practical
usefulness. It is wholly utilitarian. The function has evolved in response to a
perceived need of individuals or groups in society who seek information or
reassurance about the conduct or performance of others in which they have an
acknowledged or legitimate interest (1988, p.14).
Therefore, the social construction of functions of internal auditing can be traced
through the evolution of internal auditing. The auditing was initially applied in Europe
by the Greeks and Romans before the birth of Christ (BC) (IIA, 2015) for public finance
systems (Ramamoorti, 2003). These early audits focused on “... an examination of the
correctness of accounting records and an evaluation of the propriety of activities
reflected in the accounts” (IIA, 2015, p.10). This audit activity stressed the
improvement of management control over the activities of the entity (IIA, 2015). In
1913, the Sixteenth Amendment of Income Tax Law was passed by the US Congress
which had a direct impact on internal auditing (IIA, 2015). Further, this law required all
companies, including small ones, to maintain the accounting records for income tax
purposes. This condition meant “a need for more accountants and internal auditors –
who had to review travel and business expenses for income tax returns and who would
respond if the Internal Revenue Service solicited audit reports during their examinations”
(IIA, 2015, p.29). Therefore, during early 1900s, the auditing profession was viewed by
outsiders as more clerical than professional since they concentrated on the accuracy of
book-keeping detail through examining all vouchers and verifying all footings (IIA,
2015), and were focused on financial and accounting matters (Whittington and Pany,
2008). These internal audit activities stemmed from the demand to perform verification
for a number of purposes, such as reduction of errors of record-keeping, asset
misappropriation and fraud in business and non-business organisations (Ramamoorti,
2003; Whittington and Pany, 2008). In terms of fraud, the internal auditors were
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expected to discover fraud more quickly than public accountants who conducted an
annual audit, which transformed the function of the internal audit to a search for
criminal activity (IIA, 2015; Ramamoorti, 2003).
In the early 1930s, the internal audit concept changed. This was driven by a public
swindle scandal committed by Ivar Kreuger that was discovered in 1932 (IIA, 2015). He
founded and headed Kreuger & Toll Inc. which was listed in New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) in the US. Kreuger operated a giant pyramid scheme where the dividend
payments came from capital rather than profits. This scheme was hidden from the
investing public by a failure to audit the company’s financial statements. During this
period, NYSE had not mandated audited reporting for listed companies. The scandal
then led to the issuing of audit requirements for listed companies by the NYSE as well
as the publication of the Securities Act (1933) and the Securities Exchange Act (1934)
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in US in 1933 and 1934
respectively (IIA, 2015). These acts required the firms to be willing to register with the
Stock Exchange to provide audited financial statements (Gupta and Ray, 1992). These
SEC Acts encouraged all public companies to be responsible for their financial
accounting through the maintenance of an internal control system. This control should
be audited annually by an independent auditor while the responsibility for more detailed
analysis of such control generally falls on the internal audit function (IIA, 2015;
Whittington and Pany, 2008). The legislation resulted in the expectation of the internal
auditor to work under, as well as assist, the independent auditors in performing financial
audits effectively (Gupta and Ray, 1992). For that reason, during 1930s, the internal
audit functions in most corporations were perceived as a shadow of independent
auditing (Gupta and Ray, 1992).
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One decade after that, the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) was established in
the United States in 1941 to signal the critical importance and relevance of the internal
auditing to business (Ramamoorti, 2003) as an administrative control (Thurston, 1950)
and to control function (Whittington and Pany, 2008). In this period the activities of
internal auditing covered, for example, reviewing financial statements or performing
accounting-related functions, such as bank reconciliations (Ramamoorti, 2003). This
was also reflected in the definition of internal auditing published by the IIA in 1947, as
follows:
[i]nternal auditing deals primarily with accounting and financial matters but may
also properly deal with matters of an operating nature (Mousa, 2005, p.40).
The definition indicated that the internal auditor had a limited responsibility in the
managerial orbit (Moeller and Witt, 1999), even though the fundamental purpose of the
role lay in the management control area (Milne, 1945 cited in Ramamoorti, 2003).
However, the shift to a war economy in the early 1940s triggered the expansion of the
internal audit scope beyond the traditional financial audit (IIA, 2015). The expansion
was driven by the increasing of size, scope and complexity of business activities which
then resulted in the emergence of the need for management to overcome operational
problems (Whittington and Pany, 2008). In addition verification of accounting
information started to be used for evaluation of business performance and employees as
well as decision making (Ramamoorti, 2003). The companies responded to the
condition by officially establish the internal audit unit to enable top management to
track significant business development through collecting an informative reporting of
selected business facts (Mautz, 1964). Furthermore, the internal auditors began directing
their efforts towards assisting management to be more concerned with adherence to
production scheduling, quality of the product, shortages of materials and labourers and
compliance with regulations as well as cost reporting (IIA, 2015; Whittington and Pany,
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2008). This indicated that the activities of internal auditing were not merely financial
statement auditing, but also included operating auditing (Whittington and Pany, 2008).
Thus, the function of internal auditing has gradually expanded from an appraisal of
whether authorised accounting and financial policies have been followed to an
assessment of the compliance of all operating policies and procedures of the company
as well as the soundness and effectiveness of control over all operations (Whittington
and Pany, 2008). In other words the internal auditor initially performed audit activity for
management which centred on verification of financial transactions, and then gradually
emphasised auditing of management approach (Reeve, 1990). The extended function of
internal auditing resulted in the requirement of an internal auditor to possess specialised
knowledge such as economics, law, finance, statistics, computer processing,
engineering, and taxation (Whittington and Pany, 2008).
In 1957, the IIA changed the emphasis of the responsibility of internal auditing to
any phase of business activity. This was demonstrated in the new definition of internal
auditing issued by the IIA in 1957 as follows:
[i]A is an independent appraisal activity within an organisation for the review of
accounting, financial and other operations as a basic service to management. It is a
managerial control, which functions by measuring and evaluating the
effectiveness of other controls (Mousa, 2005, p.40).
In addition, external audit failures, as indicated by lawsuits in many countries, led
to widespread public concern and subsequent legislative and regulatory attention on the
internal auditing profession (Verschoor, 1991). Some of this legislation and regulation
has been critical to the evolution of the internal audit function. In 1977, the US
published the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) which prohibited “the payment of
bribes to foreign officials to assist in obtaining or retaining business” (USSEC, 2014).
The law was enacted by Congress as a response to cases of bribery of foreign officials
to obtain business of US corporations (Vanasco et al., 1995). Therefore, the FCPA
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obliges US public companies to document and review their systems of internal
accounting control to provide reasonable assurances for all transactions (Kintzele et al.,
1993; Loebbecke and Zuber, 1980; Vanasco et al., 1995; Whittington and Pany, 2008).
However, the opinion of independent auditors on compliance with the internal control
provision of the Act (AICPA, 1991) was not required. In terms of internal auditing, this
legislation affects the establishment of internal audit departments in many companies in
order to ensure the compliance with the FCPA (Whittington and Pany, 2008). This
means the FCPA created a framework for strong integrity of internal auditing (Sawyer,
1988). Furthermore, legislation has greatly changed the function of internal auditing
(Reeve, 1990; Vanasco et al., 1995). In this respect, the internal audit units shifted their
focus from the accounting quality control to the internal audit control with
responsibility to the audit committee of the board of directors rather than the controller
(Vanasco et al., 1995).
The enforcement of FCPA was strengthened by the SEC through issuing a new
rule for all public corporations in 1979. These companies were required to declare
whether the internal accounting control system of the company provided reasonable
assurance for the accomplishment of the FCPA’s objectives (Kintzele et al., 1993;
Loebbecke and Zuber, 1980; Vanasco et al., 1995). Thus, the FCPA along with the SEC
constructed the function of internal auditor as the evaluator of the adequacy of internal
accounting controls (Courtemanche, 1986).
Increasing business and audit failures in the 1980s prompted the founding in 1985
of an independent body, the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting,
also known as the Treadway Commission. This Commission was established by five
professional bodies, namely American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the
American Accounting Association, the Institute of Internal Auditors, the Financial
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Executive Institute, and the Institute of Management Accountants. The Commission
emphasises that investors have the right to know the extent of responsibilities of
management toward the financial statements and internal control of the company.
Therefore, in 1987, the Commission recommended to all top management of public
companies to “maintain internal controls that provide reasonable assurance that
fraudulent financial reporting will be prevented or subject to early detection” (Treadway
et al., 1987, p. 11). It is a broader concept than the internal accounting controls set by
the FCPA. Moreover, the Commission advocated that all public companies should
strengthen their internal control structure (Treadway et al., 1987) by saying:
[p]ublic companies should maintain an effective internal audit function staffed
with an adequate number of qualified personnel appropriate to the size and the
nature of the company ... The internal audit function ... is an important element in
preventing and detecting fraudulent financial reporting (Treadway et al., 1987,
p.37).
The Treadway Commission provided a more detailed explanation regarding
criteria of the effectiveness and objectivity of internal audit function as follows:
[t]he internal auditor’s qualifications, staff, status within the company, reporting
lines, and relationship with the audit committee of the board of directors must be
adequate to ensure the internal audit function’s effectiveness and objectivity. The
internal auditor should consider his audit findings in the context of the company’s
financial statements and should, to the extent appropriate, coordinate his activities
with the activities of the independent public accountant (Treadway et al., 1987,
p.11-12).
In addition, the internal audit function performs “an appraisal function within the
company to examine, analyse, and make recommendations on matters affecting the
company’s internal controls” (Treadway et al., 1987, p.20). The Commission also
provided a recommendation to the SEC to set a regulation for all public companies that
they publicly report responsibilities for maintaining an effective internal control system
(Treadway et al., 1987). In this case, the Commission recommended that companies
take into account the risks from internal and external environments when planning audit
activities (Jeffords et al., 1992; Vanasco et al., 1995).
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In 1988, in response to the recommendation by the Treadway Commission, the
SEC required that annual reports contain a statement by management regarding
management’s responsibility over the company’s internal control system and its
effectiveness assessment (USSEC, 1988). Meanwhile, the IIA also responded to the
Treadway Commission’s recommendation by issuing the publication, “Control in
Internal Auditing” (Barrett and Carolus, 1986) which centred on controls assessment
and its conceptual framework. In terms of the SEC requirement on the effectiveness of
assessment over the control system, the IIA explained that there was no generally
accepted measurement criteria for the effectiveness evaluation (IIA, 1989). Moreover,
the IIA was concerned that the SEC regulation could impact on more financial
statement-oriented reviews of internal audit activity (IIA, 1989).
In response the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations (COSO) of the Treadway
Commission developed a common reference of internal control definition and its
effectiveness criteria (Bishop et al., 1992; Treadway et al., 1987; Vanasco et al. 1995).
Thus, in 1992, COSO announced its report of Internal Control-Integrated Framework
which was then followed by the similar report in 1994. This report contained the
definition of internal control as follows (COSO, 1994, p.3):
[a] process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management, and other
personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of
objectives in the following categories:
• Effectiveness and efficiency of operations
• Reliability of financial reporting
• Compliance with applicable laws and regulations
The definition of internal control issued by COSO pointed out the broader scope
of objectives than internal accounting control which covers operational, financial
reporting and compliance (Kintzele et al., 1993; Vanasco et al., 1995). The COSO
report provides a common ground for management and internal auditors to identify
changes within an entity’s business environment and take necessary actions to manage
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risks (Kintzele et al., 1993; Vanasco et al., 1995). COSO (1994) focused on five
components of internal control systems that should be addressed in the internal control
report: control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and
communication and monitoring. In terms of internal auditing, COSO report gave an
opportunity to the internal auditors to participate in:
• defining internal control and related objectives;
• establishing internal control and its components;
• determining appropriate evaluation tools in measuring adequacy and
effectiveness of internal control; and
• monitoring internal control continuously and periodically to ensure its
objectives are being achieved.
(Rezaee, 1995, p.8)
Therefore, as internal auditors were required to be experts in these areas they were
expected to understand the implications of COSO and other professional and legal
requirements and analyse developments in such fields (Vanasco et al., 1995; Wallace
and White, 1994). The COSO report expanded the traditional role of internal auditors by
identifying the weakness of internal controls and by recommending a new proactive role
of internal auditors (Rezaee, 1995).
Meanwhile, the IIA also contributed to the growth of the internal audit function by
publishing a definition of internal auditing, indicating its nature, objective, scope,
responsibility and independence as well as developing international standards of
internal auditing (Sawyer et al., 2003). The definition, issued for the first time in 1947,
was revised six times before 1999 reflecting the expansion of the internal audit function
(Sawyer et al., 2003). The definition indicated that the functions were developed from
both simple functions which only focus on the accounting and financial matters and
complex functions that provide a wide range of assurance and consulting services to the
management of organisations (Morgan, 1980; Whittington and Pany, 2008). The
definition also reveals significant changes in the scope of internal audits from fraud
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detection and financial records examination to the economical, efficient, and effective
assessment of organisational activities as well as the evaluation of the achievement of
organisational objectives (Gupta and Ray, 1992). These changes were highlighted and
summarised in Mousa’ study (2005) as presented in table 2.1.
Table 2.1. The changes of internal auditing definition (Mousa, 2005, p. 40-43)
Year

Definition of Internal Auditing

1947

IA deals primarily with accounting and financial matters but may also properly deal with
matters of an operating nature.
IA is an independent appraisal activity within an organisation for the review of accounting,
financial and other operations as a basic service to management. It is a managerial control,
which functions by measuring and evaluating the effectiveness of other controls.
IA is an independent appraisal activity within an organisation for the review of operations as a
service to management. It is a managerial control, which functions by measuring and
evaluating the effectiveness of other controls.
An independent appraisal function established within an organisation to examine and evaluate
its activities as a service to the organisation. The objective of IA is to assist members of the
organisation in the effective discharge of their responsibilities. To this end, IA furnishes them
with analyses, appraisals, recommendations, counsel and information concerning the activities
reviewed.
An independent appraisal function established within an organisation to examine and evaluate
its activities as a service to the organisation. The objective of internal auditing is to assist
members of the organisation and on the board, in the effective discharge of their
responsibilities. To this end, IA furnishes them with analyses, appraisals, recommendations,
counsel and information concerning the activities reviewed
An independent appraisal function established within an organisation to examine and evaluate
its activities as a service to the organisation. "The objective of IA is to assist all members of
organisation in the effective discharge of their responsibilities. To this end, IA furnishes them
with analyses, appraisals, recommendations, counsel, and information concerning the activities
reviewed. The audit objective includes promoting effective control at reasonable cost. The
members of the organisation assisted by IA include those in management and the board of
directors.
IA is an independent and objective assurance and consulting activity that is guided by a
philosophy of adding value to improve the operations of the organisation. It assists an
organisation in accomplishing its objectives by bringing a systematic and disciplined approach
to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of the organisation's risk management, control, and
governance processes.

1957

1971

1981

1991

1997

1999

In 1994, the Cadbury Committee Working Group on Internal Control in the UK
issued guidance of internal controls. The guidance concerned the need to express an
opinion on the effectiveness of the internal control system – for which there is no
specific legal requirement (Vanasco et al., 1995). In this case, the internal auditor
gained the attention of the public eye when the listed companies published reports of the
effectiveness of their internal control system.
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In 1999, the Turnbull Guidance on internal control in the UK was published. This
was prepared by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales to assist
companies in implementing their internal control systems in accordance with the
requirements set by the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (Arena et al., 2006).
The Turnbull Report of 1999 created a new perception of the internal audit function by
placing the internal auditors as consultants. This is indicated by the request to give
recommendations on the potential implementation of new systems and procedures by
operational departments (Page and Spira, 2004). The Turnbull Guidance was revised by
the Financial Reporting Council and re-published in 2006 (Cosec, 2007). This revision
aimed to improve the standards of risk management and internal control for listed
companies (Cosec, 2007). The re-definition of internal control within the Turnbull
Guidance led to a broader scope of work of internal auditors since the broader approach
of internal control gives opportunities for them to have expertise in risk management
(Spira and Page, 2003). Spira and Page (2003) further concluded that the Turnbull
Guidance has developed the functions of internal auditors as experts in risk
management within the corporate governance framework.
Another trigger for internal audit function development occurred in 2002. The
collapse in 2001-2002, of a number of large corporations, such as Enron Corporation
and MCI Inc. (formerly WorldCom) was primarily due to accounting fraud which
demolished the public confidence. The scandal indicated the weakness of the internal
audit’s role as one of control mechanisms which was important in detecting fraud or
misuse of corporate assets (Arena and Azzone, 2007). Arena and Azzone (2007) explain
further:
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[i]n the WorldCom case, the internal audit department highlighted the improper
recording of large profits from 1999 to 2002. In other cases, such as Enron and
Parmalat, the control mechanisms failed to identify existing problems and no
evidence of the current situation was provided by internal audit departments
(Arena and Azzone, 2007, p. 92).
The scandal of those corporations above led to increasing public demand for
better corporate governance, which ultimately affected the development of internal
auditing within the organisation (Burnaby et al., 2009). In 2002, to restore public
confidence in publicly traded corporations the US Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (SOX 2002). This law specified a number of requirements for reporting,
transparency, accounting practice and accountability of those in positions of corporate
responsibility. Moreover, the SOX 2002 had an impact on internal auditing, particularly
with Section 302 (Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports) and Section 404
(Management Assessment of Internal Controls). Section 302 stipulates that financial
reports submitted to the SEC have to be previously certified by the principal executive
officer and principal financial officer. Section 404 (Management Assessment of Internal
Controls) requires annual internal control reports which:
(1) state the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an
adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting and
(2) contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal year of the issuer,
of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the
issuer for financial reporting (SOX, 2002, p.789).
In a similar vein, Gramling et al. (2004, p.196) highlighted a number of items of
the SOX 2002 which indirectly enhanced an opportunity for internal audit function to
meet the public demand for implement a better corporate governance. These items
consisted of:
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(1) ... the effectiveness of disclosure controls and procedures with respect to the
quarterly and annual reports,
(2) ... to document, evaluate and report on the effectiveness of internal control
over financial reporting, and requires external auditor to evaluate and opine
on management’s assessment of internal control,
(3) ... to establish a whistle[-]blower program[me] to allow for reporting of
potential financial accounting problems,
(4) ... disclosure about the adoption of a code of ethics.
The SOX 2002 changed the emphasis of internal auditing in three aspects: the
services of auditing, the approaching style, and the audit method (Hass et al., 2006).
Hass et al. (2006) further explained that the services of internal auditing moved away
from detection to prevention, by putting a greater focus on the consulting activities,
such as designing the control system. Also, the internal auditing shifted its approach to
management from a confrontations style to one where the parties were seen more as
partners, and also switched from a controls-to a risk-based approach to the auditing
(Hass et al., 2006). Moreover, the SOX 2002 drove the internal auditing towards
compliance auditing for publicly listed companies, in particular to concentrate on
documenting and testing key internal control over financial reporting (ICoFR) (Hass et
al., 2006; Whittington and Pany, 2008).
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) US responded to SOX 2002 by
demanding all publicly traded companies have an internal audit function (Cohen et al.,
2004; Stewart and Kent, 2006). Also, the internal audit activity of the public companies
was required to conform to the SOX 2002 and the statement of Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) on internal control (Burnaby et al., 2009). Thus,
both the SOX 2002 and NYSE led to listed companies having an internal audit
department and placed internal auditing in an optimum position to deliver the required
service. According scholars such as Allegrini et al. (2006), Cohen et al. (2008), Cooper
et al. (2006), Paape et al. (2003), corporate governance regulation is considered a
trigger of changes in the internal audit activities in the US, Europe, Australia and Asia.
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This regulation has an impact on the wider scope of works of internal auditors. For
instance, the internal audit function is transformed from predominantly an appraisal into
consulting (Ahlawat and Lowe 2004, Bou-Raad, 2000; Mihret et al., 2010; Mihret and
Woldeyohannis, 2008; Yee et al., 2008; Zain, 2005;), from a traditional or compliance
audit to a value added internal audit (Bou-Raad, 2000; Cooper et al., 2006; Gramling et
al., 2004; Nagy and Cenker, 2002; Roth, 2002; Stern 1994; Yee et al., 2007). These
transformations are through improving the control systems, analysing risks, providing
consulting services and reducing the cost of external audits (Burnaby et al., 2006).
Three other prominent scholars, Courtemanche, Sawyer, and Brink, have also
examined the changes in internal audit functions. Courtemanche (1991) divided the
evolution of internal auditing into two levels: the fundamental concept and the actual
practice by audit departments. Courtemanche (1991) further explained an example of
fundamental concept that at the conceptual level, from 1947 to 1990, the Statement of
Responsibilities issued by the IIA has shown few changes of profession, except for
defining the client of an internal audit, from “management” to “organisation”. However,
on a practical level internal auditing has changed dramatically. This was indicated by
the growth of internal auditing in three stages as follows:
(1) traditional auditing offered financial compliance and fraud auditing services
to the controller (and, more recently, to the board audit committee),
(2) Modern internal auditing offered internal control ... and internal consulting
services to management,
(3) Neo-modern internal auditing ... views its true master as the organisation
itself and interacts with its various components in a manner designed to
benefit the whole. (Courtemanche, 1991, p. 107, 109).
In a similar vein, Sawyer (1991) differentiated two aspects of the development of
internal auditing - the profession and the practice. In terms of the profession of internal
auditing he describes it as dealing with searching for and the achievement of legitimacy.
It was related to the “... acceptance or recognition of the true function of modern
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internal auditing and the commodity we seek to purvey...a gradual fading of the ancient
stereotypes, to be replaced by respect and a call for help” (Sawyer, 1991, p. 38). In the
practical aspect of internal auditing there was a greater concern with professionalism.
This included two meanings as follows:
• performing work that is technically difficult and that is rooted in the acquisition
of relevant knowledge through systematic study and long training – a
knowledge that is proved by adherence to standards of performance set by a
professional body.
• subscribing to certain ethical values and being objective and fair in all dealings
– key attribute of professionalism.
(Sawyer, 1991, p. 38)
Sawyer (1991) also explained that internal auditing “shifted the focus from the
analysis of accounting control to the evaluation of both the adequacy and effectiveness
of internal control throughout the organi[s]ation” (p. 41). Sawyer (1991) further stated
that for modern auditing this means:
[t]o anticipate control problems, to visualize and recommend improvement, and to
propose preventive action. The emphasis is on protection, rather than detection ...
Yet the step into operational auditing is but a way station to a still deeper and
broader form of internal auditing as managerial auditing ... as the review and
analysis of controls and operations through the eyes of a management consultant
(Sawyer, 1991, p. 41).
Brink (1991) summarised the changes in internal auditing as consisting of four
levels of enhanced capabilities. At the first level, internal auditing is focused on
protection, which means putting greater emphasis on “compliance of accounting and
operational procedures, verification of accuracy of calculation, and protection of assets
from physical and human forces, and detection of fraud” (p. 9). At the second level,
internal auditors have moved away from the image of feared policemen to valued
employees “who understand the problems of management and are capable of providing
needed controls and problem-solving skills” (p.10). At the third level, internal auditors
have shifted from the accounting department to reach a higher level of organisational
status and become part of the management team in terms of influence. At the final level,
24

internal auditors make an adjustment by applying new technology to auditing
procedures (Brink, 1991).
Burnaby et al. (2009) concluded that the evolution of internal audit functions
indicates that:
[w]hile internal auditing is a global profession and the IIA’s Standards and
certifications are the same for all countries, the growth of the internal auditing
profession has been influenced by new national legislation, stock exchange
requirements, and corporate governance standards (p. 858).
Additionally, Vanasco et al., (1995) put forward another conclusion that:
[g]enerally, governmental influence in auditing is far greater in developing
countries. Government agencies in developing countries by and large are more
conservative with regard to their fiscal methods, disclosures, and internal control
reporting than their counterparts in the USA, the UK, Canada and other developed
countries (p. 31).
It can be said that the growth of internal audit functions indicates the socially
constructed aspect of internal auditing. In this matter, the government plays a significant
role by issuing a number of regulations with impacts on internal auditing. Also,
professional bodies set standards for internal auditing which contribute to the
development of the internal audit.
The understanding of the current concept of internal auditing and its nature is
presented in the next section.
2.3. The Concept of Internal Auditing
The IIA issued an International Professional Practices Framework (IPPF) which
includes the Definition of Internal Auditing, Code of Ethics, International Standards for
the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (hereafter: the Standards), Position Papers,
Practice Advisories, and Practice Guide (IIA, 2013). The IPPF, particularly the
Standards constitute guidance for internal auditors worldwide to perform internal
auditing activities in a professional manner (Whittington and Pany, 2008).
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The concept of internal auditing is contained in the definition of internal auditing
as follows:
an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value
and improve an organisation’s operations. It helps an organisation accomplish its
objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve
the effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance processes (IIA,
2013, p. 2).
This definition of internal auditing was first officially published in June 1999 by
the IIA (Nagy and Cenker, 2002). The definition and the Standards are the authoritative
references for the internal auditor in undertaking the practice of internal audit
(Abdolmohammadi, 2009; Bou-Raad, 2000).
The definition clearly mentions the aims of internal auditing as to add value to the
entity by improving the information quality for decision-making (Bou-Raad, 2000). For
this purpose, it needs to involve the internal auditor in all operations of the organisation
to create and maintain an effective internal control by providing assurance and
consulting activities (Bou-Raad, 2000; Driessen and Molenkamp, 1993). These
activities must be conducted in an independent and objective manner (Brody and Lowe,
2000; Messier and Schneider, 1988; Rittenberg and Purdy, 1978; Siddiqui and Podder,
2002). Furthermore, the activities of an internal audit include risk management, and
control and governance processes that are carried out using a consultative approach and
focus on efficiency and the effectiveness of operation (Bou-Raad, 2000). Consequently,
current practice of internal audit requires an internal auditor to have broad competence.
Thus, the definition of internal auditing contains some important components,
such as the independent and objective nature of the internal auditing activities, the scope
of work, the performance of audit work and the professional proficiency of the internal
auditor. These elements are presented in next subsections.
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2.3.1. Assurance and Consulting Activities, and the Independence and Objectives
of the Internal Auditor
The activities of internal auditing are divided into two main activities, namely
assurance and consulting activities. The IIA (2013) defines assurance services as “an
objective examination of evidence for the purpose of providing an independent
assessment on governance, risk management, and control processes for the organisation”
(p. 42). Similarly, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)
through its Special Committee on Assurance Services (Elliot Report) provides a broader
meaning of assurance services as “independent professional services that improve the
quality of information or its context for decision makers” (Elliott and Pallais, 1997 p.48).
The assurance activities consist of customary internal audits, such as financial audits,
performance audits and quick response audits (Anderson, 2003), whilst the IIA provides
instances of such services as “financial, performance, compliance, system security, and
due diligence engagements” (IIA, 2013, p.42). In terms of the assurance audits, the most
important role of internal audit is to provide objective assurance (PwC, 2005).
Regarding consulting services, the IIA (2013) provides a description as follows:
[a]dvisory and related client service activities, the nature and scope of which are
agreed with the client, are intended to add value and improve an organisation’s
governance, risk management, and control processes without the internal auditor
assuming management responsibility. Examples include counsel, advice,
facilitation, and training (IIA, 2013, p. 42).
Essentially, the consulting activities have long been performed as part of the
internal audit function’s work (Anderson, 2003). These services could include
“conducting internal control training, providing advice to management about the control
concerns in new systems, drafting policies, and participating in quality teams”
(Anderson, 2003, p.106). However, recommendations are given by the internal auditors
to management, and it is the right of management to accept or reject the
recommendations (Bou-Raad, 2000). Performing as a professional consultant, the
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internal auditor’s task is only to make recommendations (Bou-Raad, 2000). Burnaby et
al. (2009) mentioned another function of the internal auditor as a catalyst for change.
The catalyst function is “…advising, or advocating improvements to enhance the
organisation’s governance structure and practices” (Burnaby et al., 2009, p.838). The
description of the function is presented in the paper published by the IIA with the title
“Organi[s]ational Governance: Guidance for Internal Auditors” (Burnaby et al., 2009).
Both assurance and consulting services are the value-added activities of internal
audits that contribute to the success of an organisation (Hass et al., 2006). However, this
can only be accomplished if the services focus on the achievement of the objectives of
the organisation (Bou-Raad, 2000) and assist the units within an organisation in
managing risk and identifying problems as well as providing appropriate
recommendations (Allott, 1996). In a similar vein, Cooper et al. (1996) explain that
current internal auditing is a value added service to organisations since it provides
broader consulting services to management on the complexity of business rather than
only an internal control review. Similarly, Burnaby et al. (1994) describe internal
auditing as providing added value by playing a key advisory function in creating and
monitoring reliable control systems as well as by being consultants to management in
strategic planning. Therefore, the audit function should be strategically aligned with the
objectives of the key stakeholders - the audit committee, top management and the
external auditor - but must remain independent and objective (Hass et al., 2006).
However, Bou-Raad (2000) argues that a value-added approach requires that
internal auditors be adaptable and flexible in their practice, and that management accept
the function of internal auditors. The internal auditing may fail to provide a value added
activity if top management cannot appreciate or understand the value of the internal
audit function (Flesher and Zanzig, 2000). This attitude means audit services will be
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underused and audit recommendations will be ignored (Flesher and Zanzig, 2000).
Therefore, attitude of top management determines the functioning of the internal audit
(Vinten, 1999; Xiangdong, 1997). The degree to which the audited organisation and the
internal auditors accept and understand the internal auditor’s dual roles will also
determine the expansion of the functions of internal audit (Morgan, 1980).
Many researchers have conducted studies on the implementation of assurance and
consulting services and their impact on the independence of internal auditors.
Rittenberg and Purdy’s study (1978) found no negative impact on the independence of
internal auditors in 47 large corporations in the USA who were involved in the
development and implementation of enterprise systems design. However, according to
other scholars (Bou-Raad, 2000; Christopher et al., 2009; Cooper et al., 1996), the
implementation of assurance and consulting services creates potential conflicts which
may impair the independence of the internal audit. This is because the dual functions of
internal auditors, as both monitor and advisor, have different orientations, objectives
and characteristics (Brody and Lowe, 2000; Morgan, 1980). Furthermore, Morgan
concluded that:
…combined control-advisory role...can only be successfully achieved at the cost
of surrendering certain elements of the controllership role and some of the claims
to formal authority which go along with it (Morgan, 1980, p.168).
Indirectly, Morgan states that the internal auditor’s functions as controller and
also adviser cannot be run simultaneously. Similarly, Nagy and Cenker (2002)
discovered that increasing the level of consulting services provided by an internal
auditor decreases the level of assurance services provided. Additionally, Brody and
Lowe (2000) found that when internal auditors apply new functions, both as the
assurance provider and the consultant, this has a number of negative impacts. Firstly, it
complicates the independence and objectivity of the internal audit. Secondly, it
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diminishes the role of the internal auditor within the relationship between the internal
and external auditors. It also reduces the external auditor’s trust in the internal auditors’
work, resulting in higher external audit fees. Thirdly, it can also decrease the trust of
shareholders who expect the internal auditor to conduct his work in an independent and
objective manner, otherwise the company could end up facing legal problems.
Glenn (1973) cited in Bou-Raad (2000) noted that expansion of the internal audit
services compromise the independence of an internal auditor both in fact and in
appearance. Therefore, an “internal auditor will need to address the boundaries of
acceptable behaviour and not engage in activities that will likely undermine professional
competency” (Bou-Raad, 2000, p.184). Thus, the optimum benefit of internal auditing
to an organisation can be accomplished if the internal audit function is independent in
fact and in appearance and not directly involved in the process of decision making
(Bou-Raad, 2000; Vinten 1999).
Despite contrary arguments on the operation of dual functions of internal audit as the assurance provider and also a consultant - independence of internal auditing is a
key concept (Al-Twaijry et al. 2003; Chun, 1997; Hughes, 2004; Messier and Schneider,
1988; Rittenberg and Purdy, 1978). As mentioned by Rittenberg and Purdy (1978, p.51);
“the auditor’s independence ensures an unbiased review which enhances the auditor’s
reporting credibility”. The independence of the internal auditor provides an effective
internal audit service for management, since it gives an objective and unrestrained
evaluation, provides an audit report and audit recommendations (Bou-Raad, 2000;
Mihret and Yismaw, 2007; Vinten, 1999).
Independence is defined as “the freedom from conditions that threaten the ability
of the internal audit activity to carry out internal audit responsibilities in an unbiased
manner” (IIA, 2013, p.43). Scholars interpret the independence of the internal auditor
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from different angles. Independence can mean that the internal auditors are free from
conflicting duties (Messier and Schenider, 1988), free from the intimidation of top
management (such as limitations on audit scope, audit procedures, time restrictions,
personnel management process, and resources (Dittenhofer, 2001a; Peursem, 2004)),
free from the activities being audited and personnel involved (Bou-Raad, 2000; Chun,
1997; Courtemanche, 1986). Being independent means that the internal auditors are able
to express their opinions without any prejudice or threat to their position (Chun, 1997;
Sawyer et al., 2003).
The independence of internal auditing comprises organisational independence
(also known as the organisational status of an internal audit department within the
overall organisation) and objectivity of internal auditors when they undertake audit
works (Bou-Raad 2000; Chun, 1997; Courtemanche, 1986; Dittenhofer, 2001a;
Driessen and Molenkamp, 1993; Harrell et al., 1989; Hughes, 2004; Suwaidan and
Qasim, 2010). According to Dunn (1996), organisational independence is related to
supervision of the internal audit department as well as the confirmation of the audit
findings. Organisational status confers sufficient power to the internal auditors to enable
them to carry out their work effectively (Courtemanche, 1986). Sufficient status within
the organisation is important for the internal auditors to be able to fulfil their obligations
(Vinten, 1999).
Meanwhile, the objectivity refers to “... a state of mind permitting someone to
perceive reality as it truly is” (Courtemanche, 1986, p.37). It is fundamentally
performing the duty with intellectual honesty which is reflected in the absence of a
conflict of interest (Carmichael et al., 1996). Similarly, Bailey et al. (2003, p. 235)
define objectivity as “a state of mind in which biases do not inappropriately affect
assessments, judgements, and decisions”. The objectivity of internal auditors shields
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them from the emotional biases, fears, loyalties, and ambitions when they appraise the
activity being audited (Courtemanche, 1986). Objectivity of internal auditor also relates
to freedom from auditee and management pressures (Courtemanche, 1986). Therefore,
auditors have to maintain their objectivity by decreasing their interest to auditee and
lessening the power of top management to fire the auditor (Moizer, 1991). Besides,
professional ethics require an auditor to report truly regardless of the consequences
(Moizer, 1991). Therefore, objectivity of an internal auditor is key to providing
recommendations impartially (Vinten, 1999). All these arguments demonstrate the
fundamental reasons for maintaining and increasing the independence of internal audits.
According to the scholars, there are various important factors relate to the
independence of internal auditing as follows:
• Support from top management in terms of providing sufficient financial support as
well as qualified and experienced staff (Adam, 1994; Cohen and Sayag, 2010; Mihret
and Yismaw, 2007; Stocks et al., 1988), permitting the auditors to think freely, and
assuring the implementation of recommendations (Courtemanche, 1986; Driessen
and Molenkamp, 1993; Sawyer et al., 2003).
• Delivery of internal audit reports to the highest management level, the board of
directors and the audit committee, in an unrestricted way (Adam, 1994; Al-Twaijry
et al., 2004; Braiotta and March, 1992; Burnaby et al., 1994; Courtemanche, 1986;
Driessen and Molenkamp, 1993; Hughes, 2004; Sarens, 2009).
• Ensuring internal auditors have unlimited access to all necessary information when
undertaking audit activities, such as all physical reality, records and people
(Courtemanche, 1986; Sawyer et al., 2003), all activities, decisions and projects of
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Finance Officer (CFO) and other top
executives (Hughes, 2004).
• The internal auditors must be free from conflicts of interest. There must also be a

qualified audit committee (Bou-Raad, 2000; Driessen and Molenkamp, 1993).
• The internal audit unit should be located in the higher hierarchy of an organisation as
these results in direct responsibility to the board of directors (Bou-Raad, 2000;
Driessen and Molenkamp, 1993).
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• The functions of internal audit and its responsibilities should be contained in the
Internal Audit Charter (Adam, 1994; Courtemanche, 1986; Hughes, 2004).
• Formal meetings should be scheduled between the audit directors and the CEO and
CFO as well as the audit committee (Stocks et al., 1988).
Maintaining the independence of internal audit could be triggered by internal or
external motivations of an organisation. The internal motivation is driven by an
understanding of top management of the benefits of the independent internal audit to the
organisation (Moizer, 1991). The external motivation could be activated by government
regulations or professional bodies, such as the Institute of Internal Auditor (IIA)
(Christopher et al., 2009). For example, the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977
emphasises the independence of internal audit to assure management integrity in its
internal reporting (Moxey, 1979). However, every country has different regulations on
the internal auditing. Meanwhile, the IIA is the worldwide professional body of internal
auditor but has no legal power to force the implementation of the Standards particularly
those regarding the independence of internal auditors. However, the IIA could
encourage the internal auditors to be independent. Thus the regulations and the IIA may
have an impact on a variety of practices of independence of internal auditors in
companies.
A number of researchers attempt to uncover the independence of internal audit in
practice. Christopher et al. (2009) found some threats to the independence of internal
audit in the corporate sector in Australia. These threats are that top management uses
the internal audit department as a stepping stone for future managers, that top
management is involved in developing internal audit plans, having the budget of
internal audit units approved by the CEO or CFO, and that internal auditors are
perceived as partners by staff members. Furthermore, threats can also be derived from
the relationship between the internal audit unit and the audit committee. For example, if
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the internal audit reports are not delivered to the audit committee, when management
has the power to appoint and dismiss the head of an internal audit unit, and if none of
the audit committee members are qualified in accounting (Christopher et al., 2009).
Similarly, Al-Twaijry et al. (2003) discovered a number of threats to the
independence of internal audits in the corporate sector in Saudi Arabia. These were:
reporting to management; restrictions on the scope of an internal audit and on the
freedom of enquiry; and performing non audit activities. A study by Brody and Lowe
(2000) found that increasing the role of internal auditors to include consultancy made it
difficult for them to function in independent and objective manner. Joseph and
Raghunandan (1994) conducted a survey and found that only 33% of companies
involved their audit committees in the appointment of heads of internal audit, and only
38% involved them in removal decisions in Canadian companies. Thus, hiring and
firing of senior audit staffs are an important area (McHugh and Raghunandan, 1994).
The literature indicates that the implementation of multiple functions of internal
audit as a provider of assurance services and also as a consultant may impair the
independence of internal auditing. To achieve independence of internal auditing a
motive is required. In this case, the understanding of management of the benefit of
independence of internal auditing is an internal motivation. On the other hand, external
motivation could be obtained from government regulations and the IIA pronouncements.
These motivations could be diverse in their application in many companies and
countries, resulting in many different practices of the independence of internal audit.
Besides independence and objectivity of internal auditing, the other important
feature is the competence of an internal auditor. This aspect is presented in the next
subsection.
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2.3.2. The Professional Proficiency of an Internal Auditor
The IIA (2013) describes professional proficiency as follows:
[k]nowledge, skills, and other competencies is a collective term that refers to the
professional proficiency required of internal auditors to effectively carry out their
professional responsibilities (p. 19).
In general, proficiency is also known as competence, which is defined as “the
ability to perform to recognised standards” (Jessup, 1991, p.25), whilst in occupational
terms, it is described as “the repertoire of skills, knowledge and understanding which he
or she can apply in a range of contexts and organisations” (Jessup, 1991, p.25).
The competence of internal auditors should be one of organisations’ top priorities
since it provides plenty of benefits for them (Engle, 1999). First, the audit activities
conducted by internal auditors contribute to the attainment of organisational goals.
Second, external auditors could rely on the works of internal auditors which may reduce
the fees of external audit. Third, internal auditors who understand the audited
organisation are in the best position to give information concerning financial statements
(Engle, 1999). In similar vein, Selim et al. (2014) claim that Chief Audit Executive
(CAE) competence affects the credibility of internal audit function.
Alzeban and Sawan (2013) mentioned that qualified internal auditors are required
to execute audit duties. In this matter, scholars have diverse standpoints on the
components of the internal auditor’s competence. Bethea (1992), Desai et al. (2010),
and Tarr (2002) consider the educational level and professional experience as essential
factors of the competence of internal auditor, whilst Obeid (2010) agrees but includes
training as an additional important element of competence. Other scholars such as
Mulugeta ( 2008), Odar et al. (2006) use professional certifications and continuing
professional development as indicators of the competence of internal auditor. Pickett
(2000) identifies professional qualifications, knowledge sharing between experienced
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senior auditors and junior auditors, external seminars as training media, and reliance on
experts as creating an internal auditor’s competence. Al-Twaijry et al. (2004) state that
the operations, processes and procedures of a company as well as the quality and
quantity of supervision conducted by the internal audit department determine the
competence of an internal auditor. The US Statement of Auditing Standards No 65
(AICPA, 1991) provides seven criteria as guidance for external auditors to assess the
competence of internal auditors as follow:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Educational level and professional experience of internal auditors.
Professional certification and continuing education.
Audit policies, program[me]s and procedures.
Practices regarding assignment of internal auditors
Supervision and review of internal auditors’ activities.
Quality of working-paper documentation, reports, and recommendations.
Evaluation of internal auditors’ performance.
(p. 1807).

In addition, the competence should be relevant to the scope of the internal audit
activities (Driessen and Molenkamp, 1993). Therefore, competence should cover:
accounting and auditing knowledge (Dittenhofer, 2001a; Dittenhofer 2001b);
communication skills (Dittenhofer, 2001a); various technical skills (Siddiqui and
Podder, 2002). The ability of the internal auditors who undertake monitoring and
improving of risk management and internal control systems will be determined by their
education level, their work experiences, professional certifications, training and
development programmes completed, behavioural skills, as well as technical skills
(Sarens, 2009).
Thus, proficiency of internal auditors is created through a number of media, such
as education, working experiences, training and professional certifications, participating
in continuous professional development programmes and skills. These elements are
discussed in more detail in the four next subsections.
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2.3.2.1. Educational Background
There are several studies on the educational background of internal auditors.
Some studies suggest that internal auditors should obtain internal auditing courses
through academic providers to meet an educational qualification. A survey conducted
by Cooper et al. (1994) suggested that Australian chief executives and managers of
internal audit in public and private sectors recognise the importance of having internal
audit courses and programmes in universities. Besides the internal auditing knowledge,
it is crucial for the internal auditors to have an understanding of foundation business
subjects as well as the functions and skills learned in upper level management courses
(Hass et al., 2006). In terms of the internal audit course curriculum, it is important to
identify course objectives, course contents, methods of instruction, the IIA involvement,
and course evaluation which would improve the students’ understanding of internal
audit function (Fernandes et al. (1995).
A number of researchers (Al-Twaijry, 2000; Al-Twaijry, 2006; Asairy, 1993)
conducted studies in Saudi Arabia. As their studies revealed that only two universities
offered internal audit courses, they proposed the inclusion of internal audit as separate
courses in universities in Saudi Arabia. However, participant responses to
questionnaires showed that directors of internal audit units and the staff were well
educated in the corporate sector in Saudi Arabia (Al-Twaijry et al., 2003).
2.3.2.2. Professional Certifications
The robustness of the internal audit process is sustained through ensuring the
continuation of the internal auditors’ qualification (Felts, 1994). The need for quality
could be accomplished by gaining a Certified Internal Auditor (CIA) certification issued
by the IIA. CIA is a certificate for internal auditors as an evidence of expertise in
internal audit (Al-Twaijry et al., 2003). Therefore, if directors and staff of internal audit
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do not have a CIA certificate, then their activities cannot be seen as giving a legitimate
contribution to the organisation (Al-Twaijry et al., 2003). To become a CIA, internal
auditors are required to fulfil a number of requirements, such as possessing a Bachelor’s
degree, passing the professional examinations, having professional experience in the
auditing field, applying IIA's Code of Ethics, and committing to a continuing
professional development programme (Myers and Gramling, 1997).
A number of studies concern the professional qualification. Agrawal and Siegel
(1989) discovered that the motivation of 68% internal auditors in the US taking the CIA
certification was linked to professional advancement. Myers and Gramling (1997) found
that internal auditors who have CIA qualification obtain advantages, in terms of
professional development and promotion. However, Vinten (2004) found that the
professional certification did not contribute to such advancement. Other negative effects
of having professional certification were discovered in Kwon and Banks’ study (2004).
They found that certified internal auditors were less committed to their employers than
internal auditors without professional certification.
Al-Twaijry et al. (2003) revealed that few directors of internal audit units or staff
in the corporate sector in Saudi Arabia have CIA or other professional qualifications.
They suggested that the low level of affiliation to the IIA in Saudi Arabia is the reason.
This is because the professionalism criteria of internal auditors refer to Standard of
Professional Practice issued by the IIA (Ratliff et al., 1988).
2.3.2.3. Continuing Professional Development
To maintain an alignment with changing internal audit functions and the extension
of the areas of involvement in risk management, control and governance processes,
internal auditors need to redesign their skill set and competencies (Arena and Azzone,
(2009). This includes reshaping the foundational knowledge of internal auditors which
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should embrace “an understanding of the business, the competitive nature of the
industry, and the linkages of all functional and operational areas in the company” (Hass
et al., 2006, p. 841). Therefore, the internal auditors should develop the talent necessary
for maintaining effective value adding in their audit activity (Sumners and Soileau,
2008).
In order to face this challenge, the internal auditors need to “undertake continual
professional development to keep up to date with changing business practices and
remain capable of providing a value-added service” (Bou-Raad, 2000, p.183). A
continual professional development programme could be obtained by taking continuous
training, such as updating knowledge of both auditing techniques and organisational
activities (Tarr, 2002), as a member of and participant in a professional organisational,
attending conferences and seminars (IIA, 2013).
Some professional training will lead to certification as evidence for the
qualification of internal auditor, such as CIA. The training aims “to modify attitudes,
knowledge or skill behaviour through learning experience to achieve effective
performance in an activity or range of activities ... [and] ... to develop the abilities of the
individual and to satisfy the current and future needs of the organisation” (Beardwell
and Holden, 2004, p. 336).
There are three kinds of training for the internal auditor: external, on-site and
internal training (Johnson, 1991). Johnson (1991) describes external training as being
held outside of an organisation by professional organisations such as the IIA,
accounting firms and accounting bodies. The material of this training covers a range of
fundamental audit skills, and technical as well as management training. On-site or inhouse training is training performed within an organisation by bringing in external
experts. The internal training is developed by organisations themselves with their
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internal experts who develop the training materials. There are three benefits of training:
it raises confidence and self-esteem, offers great opportunities for networking and
ensures commitment to the profession (Espersen, cited in Johnson, 1991).
Since continuing professional development programmes are important to ensure
the quality of internal audit activities through updating knowledge, skills and
competence of internal auditors, the companies and the internal audit unit should pay
serious attention to the programme. However, a number of studies indicate that internal
audit departments as well as top management of some companies are not aware of the
benefit of professional development programmes. These companies suffer a shortage of
qualified staff as the auditors have few opportunities to participate in training activities
(Ahmad et al., 2009; Ali et al., 2007; Al-Twaijry et al., 2003).
2.3.2.4. Skills
Having multiple skills is important for the internal auditors. The auditor should be
able to demonstrate a wide range of technical abilities to understand the criteria used in
evaluating different types of evidence for proper conclusions (Siddiqui and Podder,
2002). Internal auditors are engaged in a range of activities from beginning to end that
need both planning and implementation and they need to be qualified to perform these
duties. This simply means that the internal auditors must possess certain skills to collect,
analyse, interpret and record information to explain the results. For example, in carrying
out an operating audit, the team of internal auditors ought to possess knowledge of and
experience in accountancy, business economics, information technology, logistics and
behavioural sciences (Driessen and Molenkamp, 1993).
Bou-Raad (2000) highlights that the internal auditors should have capabilities in
logical thinking, research ability and business related skills. This means that the auditors
should understand the business processes that keep changing dynamically in line with
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information technology. This is supported by a number of studies which demonstrates
that internal auditors need to improve their technical skills in areas such as information
security, enterprise risk management, fraud risk management, the Committee of
Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) Enterprise Risk
Management (ERM) framework (Marshall and Magliozzi, 2009), technology oriented
internal audits and information technology (IT) audits (Abdolmohammadi and Boss,
2010). The skill for undertaking information technology (IT) audit requires internal
auditors to blend accounting knowledge with that of implementation, operation, and
maintenance of IT systems (Merhout and Buchman, 2007). Similarly, recently the IIA
(2013) highlighted the importance of knowledge to evaluate the risk of fraud as well as
information technology risks and controls.
The literature indicates that it is extremely important for internal auditors to
possess and maintain competencies which are relevant within their working areas.
Likewise, it is critical for internal auditors to maintain a relationship with the IIA as the
professional body and to follow its published guidance. It would benefit internal
auditors to be admitted as a qualified internal auditor and also enable them to make a
value-added contribution to the organisation. However, enhancing the proficiency of
internal auditors is not compulsory, it is voluntarily in nature since it is encouraged by
the professional body. Moreover, the continuing improvement of competencies of
internal auditors needs high commitment from the internal auditors themselves and also
from top management since this activity needs high investment from the organisation.
The fact that studies are not in agreement over this issue indicates that further
investigation into the practice of internal auditors’ competencies is warranted.
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The competence of the internal auditor is absolutely necessary in the internal
auditing activities. The scope of work of internal auditing will be presented in the next
subsection.
2.3.3. Scope of Work of Internal Auditing
The scope of works cannot be separated from the functions of internal audit. The
expanded scope of work reflects the evolved functions. The extended internal audit’s
works as well as functions are contained in the definition of internal auditing issued by
IIA. The definition demonstrates that there are three major domains of internal auditing
which consist of internal control, risk management and governance process (IIA, 2013).
For this range of works, the functions of internal auditing cover being both provider of
assurance services and consultant as indicated by the definition (IIA, 2013). Moreover,
there is a specific function in the governance context which is known as the agent of
change (Burnaby et al., 2009).
As presented in the previous section, government regulations and professional
bodies, such as the IIA, had an impact on the expanded functions of the internal audit.
However, Courtemanche (1986) argued that the expanded functions of internal audit are
only determined by top management and the internal auditors.
The functions of internal audit and its scope of work have been expanded to cover
more activities (Cohen et al., 2004; Gramling et al., 2004). Traditionally, internal audit
functions focussed mainly on compliance, monitoring, and examining the performance
of line managers. However, the new functions give emphasis to improve corporate
performance, link to risk management and help managers understand the potential
obstacles in achieving a company’s goals (Bou-Raad, 2000; COSO, 2004; Matyjewicz
and D’Arcangelo, 2004). Furthermore, Committee of Sponsoring Organisations (COSO)
stresses the specific scope of internal audit on “... the examination and evaluation of the
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adequacy and effectiveness of the organi[s]ation's system of internal control and the
quality of the performance in carrying out assigned responsibilities” (COSO, 2011, p.
138). Chambers and Odar (2015) argue that internal audit scope should go beyond
compliance, governance, risk management and internal control processes. The internal
auditors should consider “the quality of the inputs to, and the outputs from these
processes, and to identify and report any unacceptable levels of risk” (Chambers and
Odar, 2015, p.46).
Similarly, a number of research findings also reveal radical changes in the internal
audit professions in that internal audit is perceived as both an assurance and a
consulting activity, enabling it to function primarily as the key role in corporate
governance and risk management. Other studies in Australia and USA support this
change (Burnaby and Hass, 2009; Cooper et al., 2006; Hass et al., 2006; Nagy and
Cenker, 2002). Empirical evidence from Europe indicates an increased focus of internal
audit activities on consulting, governance, IT and management audits, but less emphasis
on the fields of compliance and financial audits (Allegrini et al., 2006; Paape et al.,
2003). The change in the internal audit’s orientation towards value-added services and
away from traditional assurance service is presented by the study of Kagermann et al.,
(2008). These changes mean therefore, that the activities of internal audits will spend
less time on operational audits, reviews of financial processes and regulatory
compliance audits (Burnaby and Hass, 2009). Arena and Azzone (2009) suggested that
in order to improve the internal audit value-added service the internal audit functions
could increase their involvement in activities which support risk management and
provide recommendation to vital systems, procedures and processes. It is predicted that
in the coming years, changes in technology and the role changing in the internal audit
departments will have a strong impact on the internal audit function practice (PwC,
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2007). Therefore, having sufficient understanding of these issues is essential in order
that the internal auditing can provide added value to the companies. However,
subsequent research on the changing activities of the internal audit function has been
taken in only a small number of cases (Selim et al., 2009) while changes in the internal
audit environment have been significant (Munro and Stewart, 2010).
According to a number of scholars, the advantages of internal audit functions
consist of reviewing operational efficiency, analysis of the outcomes of a financial plan,
informing business activities to management (Cooper et al., 1996), assisting in the
processes of acquisitions, mergers, systems development and implementation (Brody
and Lowe, 2000), and satisfying business objectives (Bou-Raad, 2000). However, “[t]he
value contributed by the internal audit activity to the organi[s]ation’s success may be
compromised or devalued if the Standards are not followed” (Burnaby et al., 2009, p.
835).
2.3.3.1. Risk Management
The glossary of the IIA (2013) provides the meaning of risk as follows:
[t]he possibility of an event occurring that will have an impact on the achievement
of objectives. Risk is measured in terms of impact and likelihood (p.43).
While their definition of risk management is as follows:
[a] process to identify, assess, manage and control potential events or situations to
provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of the organi[s]ation’s
objectives (IIA, 2013, p.43).
The Standards of internal auditing provide guidance for the internal auditor to
conclude the effectiveness of risk management by assessing whether (IIA, 2013, p. 30):
• Organi[s]ational objectives support and align with the organi[s]ation’s mission;
• Significant risks are identified and assessed;
• Appropriate risk responses are selected that align risks with the organi[s]ation’s
risk appetite; and
• Relevant risk information is captured and communicated in a timely manner
across the organi[s]ation, enabling staff, management, and the board to carry
out their responsibilities.
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Barry (2000) suggested that internal auditors should communicate an annual audit
plan, the objectives of internal audit and its risk-based audit approach to senior
management. In this respect, the communication should cover explanation of the risk,
the risk assessment process, the high-risk areas within the projects and the risk priorities
of internal audit. This means that besides providing objective assurance, the auditor is
also required to give recommendations on risks and controls to senior management and
the board. For this purpose, the Turnbull Guidance 23 of UK (2005) underlined the
important of adequately resourced internal audit function. The proper resourcing of the
internal audit function can provide unbiased information from line managers, monitor
an organisation’s risk profile, improve the risk management processes and emend the
system as a part of consultancy services (ECIIA, 2005; Leithhead, 2000; Lindow and
Race, 2002; Page and Spira, 2004; Spira and Page, 2003).
A number of studies found that there is awareness among internal auditors and
senior management that the internal auditor plays a key function in implementing risk
management (Allegrini and D’Onza, 2003; Gramling and Myers, 2006; Lenz and Hahn,
2015; Nagy and Cenker, 2002; Sarens and Beelde, 2006). Goodwin and Kent (2006);
Leung et al., (2003) also found an increasing frequency of usage of the internal audit
function in the integrated risk management framework among Australian companies. In
addition, Griffith (1999) uncovered that the financial directors of 200 US companies
believed that internal audit operations should extend to risk management and required
qualified internal auditors.
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2.3.3.2. Control
Glossary of the IIA (2013, p. 42) provides the meaning of control as follows:
[a]ny action taken by management, the board, and other parties to manage risk
and increase the likelihood that established objectives and goals will be achieved.
Management plans, organizes, and directs the performance of sufficient actions to
provide reasonable assurance that objectives and goals will be achieved.
The systems of internal control are extremely important for the internal
administration of organisations since the systems aim (Wolnizer, 1995, p. 57):
... to safeguard the property of the firm, to establish levels of accountability and
authority, to differentiate between areas of functional responsibility, to increase
the likelihood that the policies and procedures prescribed by managers are
implemented and followed and to provide documentation of the commercial
affairs of firms”.
The scope of controls refers to the Standards of Internal Auditing cover as follow:
…the adequacy and effectiveness of controls in responding to risks within the
organi[s]ation’s governance, operations, and information systems regarding the
achievement of the organi[s]ation’s strategic objectives, reliability and integrity of
financial and operational information, effectiveness and efficiency of operations
and program[me]s, safeguarding of assets, and compliance with laws, regulations,
policies, procedures, and contracts (IIA, 2013, p.32).
A number of scholars classify the internal control system into financial accounting
and operational controls (Dittenhofer, 2001b ; Shaub and Brown, 1994). According to
Sawyer and Vinten (1996), there are different objectives of internal audits for these two
systems of internal controls. Sawyer and Vinten (1996) further explain that in terms of
financial accounting controls, internal auditors investigate the internal controls support
to validate the financial statement. In respect to operational controls, the internal
auditors examine the internal controls which intend to strengthen the operational system,
as well as ensure the operations are aligned with the expectations of senior management
and the audit committee. The effectiveness of control systems is one of the main goals
of the internal audit work together with assets protection, and accuracy of reporting
systems (Wagonner and Ricketts, 1989).
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The basic reasons for financial auditing and operational auditing also differ. The
auditing of an operational control mostly stems from the demand within an organisation,
whilst auditing of the financial accounting control refers to requirements from outside
the organisation, such as shareholders, banks, and the government (Spraakman, 1997).
In the context of internal audit over financial accounting control, Sherer and Kent (1983)
consider internal auditing as “a bonding cost borne by the senior managers to satisfy the
demands for accountability made by external participants, especially shareholders”
(p.99). In this case, internal auditing acts as an adjunct function of the external audit.
The growth of the internal audit function which is presented in previous sections
indicates that the requirements from government regulations and professional bodies
contribute to the functions of internal auditing in respect of the control system.
Internal auditing is also a feedback mechanism which allows management to
remedy any process which may have significant effects on the internal control system of
the company and its financial condition (Sherer and Kent, 1983). Similarly, other
scholars point out that managers’ need for information relating to economising could be
provided by internal auditing since all operational and financial information can be
pursued by the internal auditors (Williamson, 1985) and they can discover problems at
an early stage (Xiangdong, 1997). Therefore, internal control systems need to be
evaluated by the internal audit function to meet the expectation of the internal and
external parties of an organisation in terms of its effectiveness (Ditternhofer, 2001b),
and to assist organisations meet all its objectives (Whittington and Pany, 2008). Besides,
the assessment of internal control is important since sound internal controls reduce the
risk of producing unreliable financial statements (Wagonner and Ricketts, 1989).
There is a clear relationship between the internal control system and internal
auditing, specifically “the internal auditing function[s] as part of the monitoring
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component of an organisation’s internal control” (Whittington and Pany, 2008, p. 798).
Whittington and Pany (2008) further describe functions concerned with financial
controls as well as the entire internal control of organisation. Assessing the internal
control system of an organisation is one of the principal functions of internal auditing
(Wagonner and Ricketts, 1989). The evolution of internal audit functions proves that the
internal auditing has been recognised and used as an important control technique
(Thurston, 1950).
Professional bodies also stress the function of internal audit to evaluate and
maintain the effectiveness of an internal control system. For instance, COSO (1994)
highlights the important role of internal auditors to monitor the effectiveness of internal
control systems as a consequence of their position and authority in an organisation. It is
also mentioned that the internal control system is dynamic and varies between
organisations and always changes depending on the internal and external environment
of the entity (COSO, 1994). Further, the alteration of the internal control system in an
organisation will affect the internal audit function. For example, the system of internal
control has changed from manual to computerised systems. This transformation
influenced the auditing process, skills of the internal auditors, time needed to complete
the audit and other related aspects. Due to the dynamic nature of internal control
systems, COSO (1994) gives the recommendation that the control system should be
evaluated by the internal auditor to assure its effectiveness. COSO's statement is also
supported by the IIA as the profession organisation of the internal auditor. The IIA
(2013) states that the internal and external environments of a firm vary in aspects, such
as the purpose, size, complexity and structure, as well as in legal and cultural
environments which may require different applications of internal control systems.
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Therefore, the IIA released the Internal Auditing Standards as guidance for internal
auditing work, specifically to evaluate the effectiveness of internal control systems.
The internal auditors are required report on the effectiveness of the entire control
system and also determine whether the control system is adequate to meet
management’s needs by conducting more detailed testing and review of certain business
activities (Vanasco et al., 1995). There were four major purposes of internal control
reporting as suggested by Brink and Witt (1982), which consisted of providing findings
and conclusions, determining the areas needing improvement, giving recommendations
for correcting deficiencies, improving operations and as a basis for taking improvement
actions.
2.3.3.3. Governance
A number of financial reporting scandals prompt the need to improve corporate
governance (Gramling et al., 2004). In this case, the internal audit function is expected
to improve corporate governance by overcoming the failure in the systems of business
reporting, internal control as well as ethical behaviour (Bailey et al., 2003). This
expectation is reflected in the guidance, regulations and various best practices articles
that underline the relationship between qualified internal auditors and parties who are
responsible for maintaining good corporate governance (Gramling et al., 2004). The IIA
also responds the condition of business environment by incorporating corporate
governance as one of scopes of the internal audit activities. This is contained in the
definition of internal auditing as well as in the Standards of Internal Auditing issued by
IIA. Moreover, the glossary of the IIA (2013) provides the meaning of governance as
follows:
[t]he combination of processes and structures implemented by the board to inform,
direct, manage and monitor the activities of the organi[s]ation toward the
achievement of its objectives (p.43).
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Gramling et al., (2004) define corporate governance as “the procedures and
activities employed by the representatives of an organisation’s stakeholders to provide
oversight of risk and control processes administered by management” (p.195).
In terms of components of corporate governance, there are different outlooks
among the scholars. Gramling et al. (2004) explain that management, the audit
committee, the external auditor and the internal audit unit are the main actors involved
in corporate governance. In this case, the internal audit department is a resource for the
other three parties responsible for corporate governance (Rittenberg et al., 1999; Ruud,
2003). Therefore, the quality of the internal audit function will determine its nature and
value as a resource (Gramling et al., 2004). Other scholars, Ridley and Chambers (1998)
define ethics, accountability to owners, creditors, workers, authorities and the public-atlarge as broader elements of corporate governance which demand sound financial and
operational control over the activities of business organisations. Ridley and Chambers
(1998) further state that these parties believe that an effective internal control system
can create and retain good corporate governance since the system could prevent the
problems. The system includes financial and operational control over the activities of
the enterprise (Ridley and Chambers, 1998).
Assuring an effective control system calls for competent and qualified internal
auditors (Ridley and Chambers, 1998). Nonetheless, if management refuses to be
monitored by the internal auditor then the result will be ineffective monitoring (Cohen
et al., 2008). In terms of the audit committee, independent members of the audit
committee create a strong relationship between the internal auditor and the audit
committee (Goodwin and Yeo, 2001) in which it may assist the internal auditors to
implement good corporate governance. Furthermore, professional bodies, such as IIA
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(1989) also include internal auditing as an important factor in the process of corporate
governance and integrity, such as the process of financial reporting.
Internal auditors may improve the governance process by preventing financial
reporting irregularities and employee theft (Christ et al. 2015; Hansen, 1997; Prawitt et
al., 2009; Schneider and Wilner, 1990), and by improving the quality of risk
management and internal control processes (Lin et al. 2011; Sarens, 2009) and by
preventing management misconduct (Ege, 2015; Prawitt et al., 2012). These in turn
result in increasing the performance of the company (Gordon and Smith, 1992). The IIA
(2013) provides guidance for the internal auditor to improve the governance process by
undertaking a number of actions as follow:
[p]romoting appropriate ethics and values within the organi[s]ation; ensuring
effective organi[s]ational performance management and accountability,
communicating risk and control information to appropriate areas of the
organi[s]ation; and coordinating the activities of and communicating information
among the board, external and internal auditors, and management (IIA, 2013, p.
29).
In addition, the internal auditor is also expected to handle whistle-blowing matters
as the auditor has more opportunities to report negative information to top management
and has a more powerful position than others (Near and Miceli, 1985). The powerful
position of internal auditor is also supported by the awareness of senior management of
the important role of the internal audit function in the governance process (Carcello et
al., 2005). The consciousness of management is indicated by demanding the internal
auditors to put strict attention to Standards (Carcello et al., 2005). Thus, internal
auditing contributes significantly in assuring good governance (Griffiths, 1999),
particularly in improving the quality of corporate governance. While the relationship
between internal auditing and the audit committee is important, management and
external auditors also have a role in improving the governance process (Antoine, 2004;
Gramling et al., 2004). However, this argument is in disagreement with other scholars
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(Churchill and Cooper, 1965; Ebaid, 2011; Uecker, et al., 1981) who state that the
activities of internal audit do not affect to corporate governance.
The areas of risk management, control and governance process are within the
scope of work of an internal audit, and are improved by undertaking assurance and
consulting activities. These activities are conducted through an audit process which is
presented in the next subsection.
2.3.4. The Performance of the Audit Work
The internal audit activities should be performed with a systematic and disciplined
approach as presented in the definition of internal auditing (IIA, 2013). A systematic
process of auditing consists of a number of steps, namely audit planning, examining and
evaluating information from fieldwork, reporting findings and following up the audit
recommendations (IIA, 2013). These stages are general guidelines provided by the
Standards for the internal auditors to carry out the auditing activities. Similarly, Sawyer
et al. (2003) states that internal auditors should follow the Standards by performing a
number of actions. Firstly, the head of internal audit department must supervise the
entire auditing process, from planning to completion. Secondly, all the audit works
should be documented in the audit working papers including the evidence of follow-up
procedures and disposition of deficiency findings. Thirdly, the conclusions drawn
within the audit reports should be backed by comprehensive supporting documents and
also competent, sufficient, and relevant evidence. Finally, there should be an archival
system for the working papers. It is important to plan, control and record the work of
internal audits, and internal auditors may use these processes to determine audit
priorities, set objectives and audit resources (William et al., 2001).
Planning activity covers specifying the areas to be audited (Ramadan, 1997),
developing the audit programmes (Haron et al., 2004), supervising internal audit staff
52

(Beale and Bradford, 1993), and setting audit objectives, scope, timing and resource
allocations (IIA, 2013). Furthermore, the IIA (2013) recommends internal auditors
consider a number of matters in the audit planning process as follow:
• [t]he objectives of the activity being reviewed and the means by which the
activity controls its performance;
• [t]he significant risks to the activity, its objectives, resources, and operations
and the means by which the potential impact of risk is kept to an acceptable
level;
• [t]he adequacy and effectiveness of the activity’s governance, risk management,
and control processes compared to a relevant framework or model; and
• [t]he opportunities for making significant improvements to the activity’s
governance, risk management, and control processes (p.32-33).
An annual audit plan should be reviewed by the audit committee together with the
chief internal auditor and the independent public accountant (Treadway, 1987). A
number of studies emphasise the relationship between the internal audit plan and
management. Cooper et al. (1994) found that senior management were willing to
intervene an internal audit plan. This attitude meant senior management may limit the
internal audit functions, by asking the internal auditor to only perform traditional duties
(Galloway, 1995). However, Doyon (1996) and Hubbard (2000) suggested that the
Chief Audit Executive (CAE) could talk to management and determine what
management is concerned about in terms of risky business activities. The audit plan is
undertaken by the internal auditor by collecting data from the auditee as a person or
organisation unit that is audited. The data collected from this fieldwork audit then is
recorded in the working papers as evidence in preparing the audit reports (Ratliff et al.,
1988). The IIA (2013) encourages the internal auditors to identify, evaluate and
document sufficient information to meet the audit objectives when they carry out the
audit plan. Ratliff et al. (1988) describe the benefit of a working paper as consisting of a
source of information for following audits and to evaluate the performance of all
members of the internal auditor team.
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The audit reports should be delivered to a higher level than the CFO in order to
ensure an effective implementation of audit recommendations (Brierley et al., 2001).
The audit reports should also be given to the highest level of management since they are
a main factor underlying effective internal audit work (Cosserat and Rodda, 2009).
Chambers and Odar (2015, p.43) stated that “to be a reliable provider of assurance to
the board, internal audit needs to report for all purposes, including ‘pay and rations’, to
the board or to a chairman of the board”. The IIA (2013) recommends that audit reports
should specify its scope and contain the objectives, the applicable conclusions,
recommendations and action plans which ought to be reported to senior management
and the board of directors.
The criteria for a successful audit consist of the auditee considering the audit
findings, and following up the audit recommendations (Courtemanche, 1986). Therefore,
the IIA (2013) recommends the chief audit executive to “establish a follow-up process
to monitor and ensure that management actions have been effectively implemented or
that senior management has accepted the risk of not taking action” (p.40-41). However,
Courtemanche (1986) argues that organisational status contributes to how easy it is to
obtain proper responses from the auditee, but not from senior management and the
board. In this respect, “[t]hey may or may not ‘respond’ to the findings and they may or
may not accept the auditors’ recommendations” (Courtemanche, 1986, p.43). The
attitude to ignore the audit recommendations could be caused by the perception among
management that internal auditing is a barrier to achieving organisational goals and in
this case such a perception may be detrimental to the company (Flesher and Zanzig,
2000).
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2.3.5. Managing the Internal Audit Department
The Standards require the head of the internal audit unit to manage the internal
audit department effectively. Likewise, the literature underlines a number of important
items to be considered in managing the internal audit unit, such as the internal audit
charter, recruitment of internal auditors, career of the internal auditors, relationship
between the internal auditor and the audit committee as well as external auditors, and
the Quality Assurance Review.
2.3.5.1. The Internal Audit Charter
The IIA (2013) defines the internal audit charter as:
…a formal document that defines the internal audit activity’s purpose, authority,
and responsibility. The internal audit charter establishes the internal audit
activity’s position within the organi[s]ation; authorizes access to records,
personnel, and physical properties relevant to the performance of engagements;
and defines the scope of internal audit activities (p. 42).
The internal audit charter endorsed by the entity’s management is an essential
foundation for the internal audit department to achieve its objectives (Burnaby et al.,
1994). Therefore, the charter must be approved by the senior management and the board
of directors as recommended by the Internal Audit Standards No 1000 (IIA, 2013). The
charter also needs to be reviewed periodically (IIA, 2013). The approval is an indication
of management support of the internal audit functions (Burnaby et al., 1994). However,
the understanding of the importance of the charter is varies across different countries.
This is revealed in a study by Burnaby et al. (1994) that found that India and Italy have
an internal audit charter, whilst Japan has no charter to guide the activities of internal
audit departments, and neither the UK nor Australia place much importance on the
charter. Burnaby et al. (1994) concluded that “... without legal requirements to adhere to
IIA Standards, the need for formalization through a charter of the internal audit
department’s responsibilities is not determined to be important” (p. 253).
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2.3.5.2. Recruitment of Internal Auditor
The number of internal auditors should be balanced with the internal audit
activities, so that they are able to complete all of their duties. Moreover, the number and
qualifications of internal auditors has a relationship with the effectiveness of the internal
audit department (Steam and Impey, 1990). In this case, the head of the internal audit
department should complement the expertise properly by recruiting personnel who can
demonstrate knowledge and skill in all disciplines (Colbert, 2002). Furthermore, Steam
and Impey (1990) suggested that the recruitment process of an internal auditor should
consider three main categories. First, the internal audit department should determine job
descriptions of each position and the scope of work including its responsibilities.
Second, the audit unit ought to set requirements of professional qualifications for all
levels of internal auditors, such as educational background, on-the-job training, skills
and abilities. Third, the unit of internal audit has to decide the kinds of experiences
required to be fulfilled by the internal auditors, such as organisational, professional,
management, as well as clerical and administration.
Moreover, Engle (1999) suggested that the competence of an internal auditor
should be placed as one of the top priorities of organisation since competent internal
auditors are able to provide effective auditing that brings benefits, such as contributing
to the achievement of organisational goals, reducing the cost of external audits, as well
as reducing any disagreement between the external auditors and management over the
application of accounting principles.
2.3.5.3. Career of Internal Auditor
Ratliff et al. (1988) explain that the internal audit department divides the career
structure of internal auditor into four levels: directors, managers, senior and junior
auditors. They further explain that the director is responsible for the entire activity of an
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internal audit department, such as formulating planning, policy and procedures of
auditing, managing the internal auditors, coordinating with external auditors in terms of
the audit work, communicating with the board of directors and audit committee, and
establishing an audit quality programme. The managers of internal audit tackle audit
planning, the auditing works and also coordinate the audit work. The senior auditors are
required to supervise the audit work, while the less complex and more routine audit
work is the responsibility of the junior auditors
A number of scholars highlight the internal audit unit as a training basis for future
managers. The internal audit department is an important step in employees’ careers
since it provides a training ground for promotion to other management positions
(Cooper et al., 1996). However, using the internal audit department as a potential pool
of management talent endangers the objectivity of internal auditors (Koonce, 2013;
Rose et al., 2013).
2.3.5.4. The Relationship between Internal Auditor and the Audit Committee
The Cadbury Report 1992 and the Smith Report 2003 emphasise the audit
committee as an important aspect of corporate governance. Moreover, both Reports
provide guidance on roles and responsibilities of the audit committees. It is suggested
that the audit committee’s members comprise at least three non-executive directors
within public companies. Furthermore, the Reports state that the audit committee is
expected to ensure that the company apply the systems of financial reporting and
internal control as well as maintain a suitable relationship with the company’s auditors.
Since the audit committee and the internal auditing are cornerstones of good
corporate governance, it is important to have an effective working relationship between
them. “By strengthening internal audit’s relationship with the board, internal audit will
be able to provide stronger assurance to the board…” (Chambers and Odar, 2015, p.44).
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In this case, the audit committee should monitor and review the works of internal
auditors. Referring to the Financial Reporting Council (FRC)’s Guidance on Audit
Committee (2008), the following factors should be reviewed by the audit committee:
• ensure that internal auditor has direct access to the board chairman and to the
audit committee and is accountable to the audit committee;
• review and assess the annual internal audit work plan;
• receive a report on the results of the internal auditors’ work on a periodic basis;
• review and monitor management’s responsiveness to the internal auditor's
findings and recommendations;
• meet with the head of internal audit at least once a year without the presence of
management; and
• monitor and assess the role and effectiveness of the internal audit function in
the overall context of the company’s risk management system
(p.11).
Similarly, the audit committee can increase the quality of internal audit functions
by opening lines of communication and holding an independent forum to discuss
sensitive issues, specifically matters affecting management raised by internal auditors
(Braiotta, 2004; Goodwin and Yeo, 2001). The audit committee can also provide
internal auditors with regular and confidential access to the committee (BRC, 1999). On
the other hand, the internal auditors can assist the audit committee in undertaking
oversight on reporting and risk management control (Bishop et al., 2000), and to
overcome the problem of information asymmetry since the audit committee has no
direct access to the same level of information as management (Bishop et al., 2000;
Raghunandan et al., 1998, 2001).
A number of scholars concluded that sound corporate governance required a good
relationship between the audit committee and internal auditors (Bishop et al., 2000;
Scarbrough et al., 1998). Arena and Azzone (2009) found that periodic meetings
between the chief audit executive and audit committee, and also the level of monitoring
and reviewing the internal audit works by the audit committee were significantly
correlated with the effectiveness of internal auditing. In contrast, Nagy and Cenker
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(2002) discovered cases where even though the chairman of the audit committee and the
internal audit director had a strong communication channel, none of the directors
assisted the audit committee to do financial reporting oversight. George (2005)
highlights cases of public sector organisations in the US that have no audit committee
with the result of a number of failures in the public sector and shortcomings of
government audits. George then calls on urges to the US Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to introduce audit committees in public sector organisations as a means to
achieve effective financial oversight. In addition, Al-Twaijry et al. (2002) revealed that
audit committees in the corporate sector in Saudi Arabia faced problems, such as
unqualified members, lack of independence, and poor relationships with internal
auditors.
2.3.5.5. The Relationship between Internal Auditor and the External Auditor
Internal auditing can contribute added value to an organisation by aiding good
cooperation with external auditors who perform an independent auditing. Both external
and internal auditors have to ensure the effectiveness of internal control systems and
have to examine the financial reporting process (Wagonner and Ricketts, 1989).
Wagonner and Ricketts (1989) further describe that the effective internal controls lessen
the risk of producing unreliable financial statements. Since internal auditors examine the
entire control systems as well as the financial reporting functions on an in-depth and
continuous basis (Edge and Farley, 1991), they have better understanding of the systems
(Braiotta and Marsh, 1992).
Some studies have found benefits are obtained from the cooperation between
internal and the external auditors, such as reducing the external audit fees (Messier and
Schneider, 1988; Wagonner and Ricketts, 1989; Wallace, 1984), and improving the
efficiency and effectiveness of the audit process (Gaston, 2000; Sawyer et al., 2003).
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Lowering the external audit fees could be achieved by number of mechanisms. For
example, the external auditor can use internal audit’s reports in evaluating the adequacy
and effectiveness of control systems which are directly related to the production of
financial statements (Munro and Stewart, 2008; Wagonner and Ricketts, 1989). Also,
the internal auditors may provide assistance, such as organisational support, reviewing,
testing, as well as preparation and drafting of footnotes to the financial statements to
external auditors (Wallace, 1984). Similarly, Messier and Schneider (1988) suggested
that minimising external audit costs can be achieved through integrating external and
internal audit plans and providing internal audit assistance, audit rotation of major
locations, external auditor acceptance of internal audit work, and audit work
performance of internal auditors under external auditors’ supervision. However, if there
is a lack of co-ordination between the internal and external auditors, then efficiency will
be lost due to duplication (Sawyer et al., 2003), and there is the possibility of errors
occurring (Gaston, 2000).
Nonetheless, cooperation between the internal and external auditors can be
realised if the internal auditors meet certain criteria set by the AICPA. AICPA issued
the Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 9 as a guideline for external auditors to
consider the competence, objectivity and work of the internal auditors before deciding
whether to rely on it or not (Messier and Schneider, 1988). Nevertheless, a number of
studies found that the external auditors use different factors as consideration of whether
to rely on internal auditors’ work, such as a high level of competence and work
performance (Margheim, 1986), the internal auditors’ involvement in consultancy
activities regarding the financial reporting system, relationship with the audit committee,
as well as the risk and control environment (Munro and Stewart, 2008).
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2.3.5.6. Quality Assurance Review
A quality assurance activity is crucial as it ensures high-quality internal audit
function work (DeSimone and Abdolmohammadi, 2016; Lin et al., 2011). The
Standards No 1300 require the chief audit executive to carry out a quality assurance
programme which covers all aspects of internal audit activity (IIA, 2013). This
programme includes both internal and external assessments (IIA, 2013). Chambers and
Odar (2015) describe best practice for conducting internal assessment to the internal
audit as follow:
a large internal audit function should have a dedicated, independent unit to
undertake internal quality assessment reviews of the internal audit function, or at
least these reviews should be undertaken by internal auditors who had no part in
the audit engagements being reviewed” (p.48).
In terms of the external assessment, it is recommended it is performed at least
once every five years by a qualified and independent reviewer (IIA, 2013). This
programme aims to maintain the quality of the internal audit practice (Huston and
Warrick, 1993). Therefore, lack of practice of external review may imperil continuing
development of the profession or in other words, “the external review is a professional
imperative“ (Huston and Warrick, 1993, p. 559).
A survey of Fortune 1000 companies in 1986 showed that there were a number of
benefits of conducting the external review, listed below (Huston and Warrick, 1993, p.
555):
• ... provide assurances to senior management and the audit committee that the
department is in compliance with the Standards, targeted problems and
presented sound recommendations, and provided an independent, objective
review of the department.
• ... provide internal auditors with an opportunity to exchange ideas with others
outside of the organisation, help management in allocating resources to the
internal audit function, and help to evaluate the performance of the director of
internal audit.
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However, in a number of cases, internal audit departments did not perform the
external review program as recommended by the IIA since the criteria of the review was
not mandatory (Huston and Warrick, 1993). In these cases, they replaced the external
review with carrying out the supervision or internal review processes (Huston and
Warrick, 1993).
This section describes the concept of internal auditing, the functions of internal
auditing and also the important nature of internal auditing. The nature of internal
auditing comprises independence, proficiency, the scope of work, performance of audit
work and managing of the internal audit department. The nature is derived from the IIA
as international profession organisation of internal auditor and supported by the
literature. This section provided a conceptual basis of internal auditing with a few
examples of empirical research; the practice of internal audit is presented in the next
section.
2.4.

The Practice of Internal Auditing
As presented in the previous section, the practice of internal audit function may be

influenced by the environment where it operates. Since conditions in every country are
different and government regulations and the implementation of the Standards of
Internal Auditing may differ, the practice of internal auditing worldwide could be
diverse. There are two kinds of studies focused on the practice of internal auditing. First,
there are studies that examined the environment and its influence on the internal audit
practice without using any particular theory as a framework. Second, there are studies
that use institutional theory to investigate the environment and its effect on the practice
of internal auditing.
Many studies focus on the effect of the environment on the internal audit practice
without using theory as a research framework. These studies were conducted in
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different countries, such as in the US, Europe, Malaysia, China, and India. In the US,
Thurston (1950) found that the formation of the Institute of Internal Auditors in 1940
resulted in the establishment of internal audit departments by fifty per cent of
manufacturing companies in the study. Similarly, Wallace and Kreutzfeldt (1991)
discovered that the recommendations issued by the Report of the National Commission
on Fraudulent Financial Reporting and the Treadway Commission’s report on
maintenance of an effective internal audit function had an impact on the formation of
internal audit departments in a substantial number of companies. However, Burnaby et
al. (1994) found practices of internal auditing in many countries varied since there were
different legal and economic environments in each country. They further explained that
internal auditing is strongly supported by government regulations in US, Canada, Israel,
and India, but not in Australia, or Japan. In terms of the implementation of the
Standards of Internal Auditing issued by the IIA, they found that 82% of the internal
audit departments followed the IIA Standards, while 16% of them did not. In addition,
they found that IIA chapters contribute to development of internal auditing in
companies in some countries, such as France, and New Zealand.
The IIA (1991) conducted a study on the practice of internal auditing in several
countries: Spain, China, India and Malaysia. In Spain, the IIA (1991) found a lack of
institutional regulatory or legal background. However, Spain’s Institute of Internal
Auditors had gradually influenced the business life of the country. This is indicated by
the presence of internal audit departments in almost all important organisations.
Furthermore, the internal audit has expanded its functions beyond the instrument of
control and fraud prevention, and is considered more as a management function in the
company (IIA, 1991). Nonetheless, IIA (1991) also revealed that in Spain there was lack
of awareness of the internal auditing function in general, and auditors were also lacking
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in professionalism. Nor was there a reliable indicator of the competence of internal
auditors, such as professional certification. Also, the failure to communicate the modern
concept of the internal audit function within organisations had an impact on the internal
audit image, and resulted in a communication gap between management and audit
departments (IIA, 1991; Vanasco et al., 1995).
In China, internal auditing obtained strong support from the government
regulations. China’s Regulation No 5 states that “the audit bureau can establish internal
audit departments or can assign auditors to perform internal audit functions in
governmental audits or enterprises” (Vanasco, et al., 1995, p. 35). This legislation
influenced the establishment of internal audit in China. The regulation defined the scope
of internal audit activities, which encompassed auditing of financial income and
expense, economic effect and economic responsibility (IIA, 1991). Similarly, India has
a strong legislative environment. The Indian Companies Act of 1956, amended in 1976,
required independent auditors to provide an opinion on the adequacy and efficiency of
internal audits in all medium and large companies (IIA, 1991). This legislation
prompted the growth of the internal audit function. The requirement of an effective
internal auditing was applied to all public and private companies (IIA, 1991, Vanasco et
al., 1995). However, since the 1950s, internal auditing was mainly found in financial
institutions. In these institutions, the internal auditors reported directly to top
management and the audit committee (IIA, 1991; Vanasco, et al., 1995). Similarly, IIAIndia played a role in the business environment by processing corporate membership for
large corporations in government and private sectors and holding seminars and
workshops for the banking and insurance sectors (IIA, 1991; Vanasco, et al., 1995).
However, envy on the part of the Institute of Chartered Accountants concerning the
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growth of IIA-India had a negative effect on the numbers of professionals who wished
to have a CIA certificate (IIA, 1991; Vanasco, et al., 1995).
In contrast, although there was no legal support for internal auditing in Malaysia;
the IIA-Malaysia was established in 1977. But despite this, the internal auditing has not
been fully accepted as a profession. This has impacted on many problems facing the
internal auditing profession. Internal auditing was perceived as a checking function
rather than a management control, resulting in a presumption that internal auditing was
a complementary function of financial and accounting activities (IIA, 1991; Vanasco, et
al., 1995). Moreover, the internal auditing was lacking management support, a fact
indicated by the resource constraints of internal auditing (IIA, 1991; Vanasco, et al.,
1995). This was reflected in the small size of internal audit departments compared to
their activities in most institutions. Also, there was no management policy on the
internal auditing causing the internal auditors were lack of authority and direction.
These conditions meant the activities of internal audits were largely ineffective. In terms
of competence, internal auditors were mainly accountants who had accounting as their
educational background. They were also lacking in education and training provided by
their organisations and in career opportunities. In Malaysia most of the internal auditors
are not members of the IIA Malaysia. Nonetheless, organisations such as banks and
other financial institutions with strong internal audits, also have an audit committee.
A number of studies on internal auditing have been conducted in Europe. Paape et
al. (2003) found that corporate governance regulations had no significant impact on the
practice of internal auditing, demonstrated by the fact that not all public companies
possessed an internal audit department. Also, not all Chief Audit Executives (CAE)
were aware of corporate governance regulations. In addition, some CAE believed that
they were not required to comply with the Standards of Internal Audit issued by IIA, a
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belief which may effect the quality of internal audit activities provided by the internal
auditor. However, in terms of scope of internal audit activity, the units have been
followed the Standards. This was demonstrated by the assurance services, such as
operational audit, information technology audit, financial audit and also consulting
services provided by the audit units. Burnaby et al. (2009) discovered that the presence
of European Corporate Governance Codes had an effect on the establishment of internal
audit unit only in financial companies, because it was voluntary for non-financial
companies. In contrast, the Netherlands has no regulations on internal auditing, but
many large Dutch multinationals have large audit units. The scope of internal auditing
expanded from financial and compliance audits to audits of operational, Electronic Data
Processing (EDP), working conditions, and quality. The scope of audit activity also
covered a review of internal controls focused on financial audits (Vanasco, et al., 1995).
Roth (2002) found that SOX 2002 created significant impacts on the internal audit
practice. First, SOX 2002 changed the emphasis of internal auditing services from
detection to prevention. Second, the mindset of internal auditors changed from
confrontational to partnering with management. Third, the internal audit approach
switched from a control- to a risk-based approach. Fourth, the services of internal audits
became centred on consulting activities. Fifth, there was an understanding of the
important function of internal audits and organisational goals.
Allegrini et al. (2006) conducted a study in France and found that French law and
SOX (2002) affected the internal audit activities by concentrating more on reviewing
the internal control of financial reporting systems and undertaking compliance audits.
The auditors also carried out consulting activities by providing recommendations on
specific projects or working teams. Also, the auditors used risk-based audits as a new
approach. In Italy, Allegrini and Bandettini (2006) found that the definition of internal
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auditing issued by the IIA and the Italian Law on the internal control system had an
impact on the activities of internal audit functions. This is demonstrated by the fact that
internal auditors provide more time on consulting activities, particularly in relation to
corporate governance and risk management.
Vanasco et al., (1995) and Vinten (1991) found that regulations in the UK and the
US created divergence in the practice of internal auditing in American and English
corporations. The differences emerged since UK had the internal control guidance
issued by the Cadbury Committee Working Group on Internal Control in 1994 which
was not supported by the legal environment, while the US has had a strong legal
environment for internal control since the US has FCPA issued in 1977 (Vanasco, et al.,
1995; Vinten, 1991). However, this study did not provide a detailed explanation on this
divergence matter.
Goodwin-Stewart et al. (2006) conducted a study in Australia in 2000 and
discovered that lack of a legal requirement to have an internal audit function for public
companies resulted in majority of public companies in Australia having no internal
audit unit. In addition, the public companies that have established an internal audit unit
have only one or two internal audit staff. Likewise, Carey et al., (2000) also discovered
that the Australia Stock Exchange (ASX) does not mandate to all public companies to
have an internal audit function so that in general, there is an absence of internal audit
functions within companies.
Hass et al. (2006) highlight that SOX (2002) legislation created a number of
negative impacts on the practice of internal auditing in the US. First, many internal
audit units used too many resources to perform compliance audits to SOX (2002) and
less for operational audits and consulting activities (PwC, 2005). Second, an emphasis
on assurance services could result internal auditors being seen negatively as ‘a police’
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(Gray, 2004) which may decrease the effectiveness of the internal audit function in its
assurance and consulting activities (Hass et al., 2006). Third, the internal auditors need
to work closely with management and external auditors as a consequence of regulatory
requirements which could damage the independence and objectivity of the internal
auditors (Krell, 2005).
In addition, Nagy and Cenker (2002) found that the IIA as a professional
organisation of internal auditors failed to influence the practice of internal audit in the
US. This is indicated by the belief of directors of internal audit that the IIA only
responsibility was to provide the audit guidance and it was up to top management to
determine the tasks of the internal auditor. This belief resulted in the absence of changes
in the internal audit function in most companies.
Cooper and Craig (1983) found that in Australia the internal auditor had no
professional body and no generally accepted professional qualification. This condition
created an expectation gap between the internal auditor and the CEO. The activities of
internal audits focused on financial audits while the CEO expected the internal auditor
to perform beyond it. Cooper et al. (1996) found that in the late 1990s, in China,
regulation and culture impacted on internal audit activities. Internal auditing in China
was an agent of the state and all of the activities of internal audit were supervised by the
Audit Administration of the Peoples Republic of China (AAPRC). Under the Law of
China, the activities of internal audit institutions covered auditing of financial revenues
and expenditures, economic contracts, construction projects, internal control, economic
responsibility, maintenance of assets, economic laws and regulations, and operational
budgets. The business culture in China is that trust must be set up before conducting
business by the exchange of gifts and favours (Hwang and Staley, 2005) - a practice
which may impair the independence and objectivity of the internal auditor.
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Ernst and Young (2005) found that the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX)
principles of corporate governance had an impact on the internal auditing practice in
public companies in Australia and New Zealand. In this case, the internal audit function
concentrated on testing of internal control, and provided assurance on risk management.
Burnaby et al., (2009) found a different level of implementation of the Internal Auditing
Standards between US and a number of European countries, such as Belgium, Italy, the
Netherlands, the UK and Ireland. This occurred since the management and the board
believed that compliance with the Standards was not adding value, it was too timeconsuming, and there were no adequate internal auditors (Burnaby et al., 2009). As a
result, there were significant levels of variation between countries in terms of
educational degrees and professional certification of the internal auditors.
Burnaby et al. (1994) found that the Standards issued by the IIA created an effect
on the internal audit functions, which mostly focused on a review of financial and
operating information. Less than half of respondents audited the construction projects,
corporate ethics, manufacturing and production control, marketing, quality control,
research and development, and transfer pricing. In terms of audit reporting, the
respondents mostly reported to the CEO. However, only a quarter of respondents
reported to the audit committee and half of respondents met with the board once a year.
28% of the participants had meetings with audit committee four times a year. Thus,
Burnaby et al. (1994) inferred that only 82% of internal auditors complied with Internal
Auditing Standards.
The studies above indicate that the presence of legislation and Standards create
diverse impacts on internal audit practices in a number of countries. However, the
studies did not address details on how or why the response of internal auditors towards
the legislation or the Standards could shape the practice of internal auditing. Therefore,
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the extent of the effect of legislation and Standards on the internal audit practice is not
clear. Meanwhile, there are few studies that use the institutional theory to investigate the
influence of the institutional environment on the practice of internal audit. According to
the theory, the institution’s environment consists of three kinds of pressures; coercive
(government regulation), normative (the professional bodies) and mimetic (business
uncertainty).
Al-Twaijry et al. (2003) by using the institutional theory found that there was no
legislative support to internal auditing in Saudi Arabia which then resulted in the
closure of the IIA chapter of Saudi Arabia. In addition, the IIA failed to influence the
practice of internal audit which was demonstrated by the fact that internal audit units
were not established in the majority of the companies. Other companies that had
internal audit units had not fully implemented the Standards. The study of Al-Twaijry et
al. (2003) examines the internal audit practice by comparing the recommendations of
the Standards of Internal Auditing and responses of the internal audit units. In this case,
they use a survey and interview the directors of internal audit units.
Similarly, Arena et al. (2006) and Arena and Azzone (2007) found that there was
no specific Italian regulations on the practice of internal auditing. However, there was
Italian legislation on the internal control system which had an impact on the
establishment of internal audit unit and the practice of internal auditing in Italy. Arena
et al. (2006) and Arena and Azzone (2007) also compared the requirements from the
institutions' environment and the internal auditors’ responses in practice by interviewing
the directors of internal audit units. The study of Arena et al. (2006) and Arena and
Azzone (2007) confirmed the relevance of institutional pressures on the internal audit
practice.
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Mihret et al. (2012) discovered there was government support for internal auditing
in Ethiopia by providing regulations and supporting the establishment of the IIAEthiopia Institute. Mihret et al. (2012) explored the practice of internal audits in the
public sector and private companies by investigating the pressures from the institutional
environment (coercive, normative and mimetic) and the responses of the internal
auditors. By undertaking interviews with the directors of internal audit units, they
discovered the pressures that influenced the practice of internal auditing in Ethiopia.
Elbardan et al. (2015, 2016) used institutional theory to investigating internal
audit function adaptation to the new Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems
implementation in the corporate governance’s institutional pressures context. Elbardan
et al. (2015, 2016) found that the internal audit function is changed in a number of
aspects, such as auditing tasks, time and effort needed to carry out audit activities,
structure of the internal audit function, internal auditors’ skills, tools, relationship with
information technology (IT) department, size of the internal audit function, budget for
the internal audit function and relation with external auditor.
The studies above investigate the influence of institutional pressures on the
practice of internal auditing. These studies involved directors of internal audit units as
participants who described the responses of internal audit units toward the pressures. In
this case, the studies only focused on upper management level and ignored the activities
and experiences of the middle and bottom levels of internal auditors which may create
an incomplete picture of the internal audit practice in the companies. Another gap in the
literature is that in none of these studies examined the responses of the internal audit
unit toward the institutional pressures by confirming the practice to Internal Audit
Charter. As the internal audit charter is a legal basis for internal auditors in conducting
their duties (Adam, 1994; Burnaby, 1994; Courtemanche, 1986, and Hughes, 2004);
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therefore, it is important to investigate the responses of the internal audit unit toward the
pressures on internal audit charter as well as examine the implementation of the charter
in practice as suggested by Fogarty (1996). Therefore, this study will fill the gap in
literature by investigating the adoption of pressures in the internal audit charter, and the
implementation of the charter in practice. In addition, in order to obtain a complete
picture of the internal audit practice, the study will involve all level of internal auditors
in the internal audit unit.
As presented in the previous section internal auditing is socially constructed, and
has a similar basic tenet with institutional theory, therefore this study will use
institutional theory as the research framework. The institutional theory is presented in
the following section.
2.5.

Theoretical framework

2.5.1. Justification for Using Institutional Theory
Institutional theories of organisations offer a rich, complex view of organisations
(Zucker, 1987) and can be used to study the practice of internal audit functions. The
practice is a part of organisational phenomena which could be explained by new
institutional theory. This is indicated by prior studies which suggest that new
institutional theory is appropriate for explaining the practice of internal audit functions,
both in developing countries (Al-Twaijry et al., 2003; Mihret et al., 2010; Mihret, 2012)
and developed countries (Arena et al., 2006; Arena and Azzone, 2007). In a similar vein
some authors (Ball, 1989; Flint, 1988) have mentioned that internal audit functions are
socially constructed and this is consistent with the new institutional theory that holds a
view that institutional environment is socially constructed. Therefore, it could be said
that new institutional theory is an appropriate theory to be used by this study.
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2.5.2. Institutional Theory
Institutional theory illustrates and defines the existence and power which underpin
rules, beliefs, values and norms; and those are derived from external interactions. It also
assists to provide further explanation of how culture, politics and social forces
surrounding entities affect organisational structures and behaviour (Fogarty, 1996). It is
also claimed that normative pressures derive from external sources and sometimes arise
from within an organisation itself, in turn influencing an organisation’s structure
(Zucker, 1987). In other words, “how much organi[s]ational structure is shaped by the
social environment” (Carruthers, 1995, p. 315). These views perceive a formal
organisational structure as “reflections of rationalized institutional rules” (Meyer and
Rowan, 1977, p.340) or “shared knowledge of belief systems” (Scott, 1995, p.13).
According to Meyer and Rowan (1977, p. 342) formal structure of an organisation is
a blueprint for activities which includes, first of all, the table of organi[s]ation: a
listing of offices, departments, positions, and program[me]s. These elements are
linked by explicit goals and policies that make up a rational theory of how, and to
what end, activities are to be fitted together.
In addition, Meyer (1978 cited in Fogarty, 1996, p. 249) provides the scope of
structure which embraces “the entire social configuration of an activity’s domain and is
therefore heavily cognitive in nature”. According to Fogarty (1996, p. 249), structure
contains “the dynamic elements of consent, trust, and the language through which
descriptive accounts are given”.
It is important to understand two principles of institutional theory. Firstly, the
basic belief of the theory is that the institutional environment is socially constructed and
affects individual behaviour. Conversely, individual behaviour and action in turn affect
the environment. In other words, it is humans who create an institutional environment
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Secondly, organisation from
the perceptive of institutional theory is viewed as an open system, which means that
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organisational structures and activities are shaped by both the external environment and
actors within an organisation (Scott, 1987). Therefore, as Scott (1998) further states the
ability to adapt to environmental changes is pivotal to enable organisations to survive.
Maclagan (1998, p.145) proposes that:
…to
survive
in
the
progressively
more
‘turbulent’
social
environment…organisations would need to adopt and act according to the values
that would align them with the expectations of society.
In addition Scott (1998, p.21) argues:
every organisation exists in a specific, technological, cultural and social
environment to which it must adapt. No organisation is self-sufficient: all depend
for survival on types of relations they establish with larger systems of which they
are part.
The principles above suggest that organisations need to pay attention to the
institutional environment and act in accordance with socially shared beliefs, values and
norms. Meyer and Rowan (1977) claim that institutional commands, such as rules and
procedures, are commonly incorporated to sustain appearances, since they enable
conferring of legitimacy upon the organisation, rather than generating efficient
organisational decisions or better outcomes. Accordingly, Scott and Meyer (1983, p.149)
believe that organisational contexts are the central view of the institutional theory which
are “characterized by the elaboration of rules and requirements to which individual
organisations must conform if they are to receive support and legitimacy...”. In addition,
Oliver (1997, p.700) suggests that:
the basic premise of institutional theory, then, is that firms’ tendencies toward
conformity with predominant norms, traditions and social influences in their
internal and external environments lead to homogeneity among firms in their
structures and activities, and that successful firms are those that gain support and
legitimacy by conformity to social pressures.
We can identify these rules, norms, traditions and requirements as institutions.
Institutions within an organisational context are viewed as “cognitive, normative, and
regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social
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behaviour” (Scott, 1995, p.33). Thus, it is necessary that organisations possess the
adaptive ability to institutional pressures so as to avoid external claims of irrationality
and negligent behaviour. In addition, the aim of organisational compliance to pressures
is to obtain legitimacy and enhance resources for their life prospects. Carruthers (1995,
p.317) claimed that:
being technically efficient is not the only path to organisational survival.
Achieving legitimacy in the eyes of the world, state, powerful professions, or
society at large, is another effective survival strategy.
In conclusion, the institutional theory acts as a theoretical lens to understand the
dynamics of organisational characteristics.
2.5.3. Institutional Theory and Internal Auditing
A number of organisational studies indicated that the institutional theory is useful
for understanding behaviours in organisations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; DiMaggio
and Powell, 1991a; Meyer and Rowans, 1977; Meyer and Scott, 1983; Zucker, 1988).
These studies were mostly conducted in public and not-for-profit organisations, such as
municipal governments, public agencies, schools and hospitals (Mezias, 1990).
The phenomenon of internal auditing has attracted the interest of a few scholars
who have studied it using institutional theory. For example, the studies on the design of
the internal audit department and the effectiveness of internal audit (Al-Twaijry et al.,
2003; Arena et al., 2006; Arena and Azzone, 2007; Mihret, 2012). However, research
on the practice of internal audit in the highly regulated environment of a public SOE in
Indonesia is difficult to find.
Internal audit functions are parts of institutional phenomena which are socially
constructed by individuals from within and outside organisations. Thus, the institutional
theory is relevant to understanding the dynamic of the practice of internal audit
functions. Such constructs indicate diverse aspects of behaviour and institutional
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environments which affect the practice of internal audit functions. Flint (1988, p.1)
contends that:
audit is a social phenomenon. It has no purpose or value except in its practical
usefulness. It is wholly utilitarian. The function has evolved in response to a
perceived need of individuals or groups in society who seek information or
reassurance about the conduct or performance of others in which they have an
acknowledged or legitimate interest.
Moreover, Ball (1989) in Seal (1993, p.27) stated that:
accounting and auditing are institutional phenomena. So it is reasonable to
assume that they derive many of their properties from the nature of firms as
economic institutions. Progress in understanding accounting and auditing, at all
levels of abstraction from board conception of their economic function through
to understanding of the reasons for specific accounting and auditing techniques,
seems likely to require a theory of the firm that views institutional phenomena as
its domain…(quoted by Seal 1993, p.27).
These arguments indicate that internal audit functions should be understood
within a framework of institutional theory since it is an institutional practice. According
to Schotter (1981), a social institution is regularity in social behaviour which is
approved by all of society’s members, determines behaviour in specific recurrent
situations, and is either self-regulated or regulated by external authorities.
Scapen (1994) argues that organisations could get support from the community
and finally gain legitimacy if their existence is based on expectations, norms and beliefs
which are judged by society’s members. Further, organisations’ legitimacy can be
obtained when organisations’ activities are in tune with norms, rules, and values of their
respective institutional environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan,
1977; Mizruchi and Fein, 1999; Scott, 1995). In this case, an SOE in Indonesia attempts
to legitimate its activities through the existence of an internal audit unit and its functions.
The existence can also play a role as a symbol of an organisation’s commitment,
particularly by top management, to external values, such as stakeholders’ expectation
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regarding the effectiveness of a company’s controls as a means to obtain the goals of
organisation (Adam, 1994).
The arguments above indicate that understanding the organisational contexts
within which internal audit functions are operated will lead to a more fruitful study.
This can be gained by understanding the interactions of players in an organisation and
developing or taking norms, rules, and beliefs to shape the organisation. As mentioned
by Neu (1992, p.234):
[a] social construction perspective provides us with a better understanding of the
factors mediating a manager’s choices. This approach recognizes that individual
institutional and societal relations influence, constrain and even define one’s
choices, both at point in time and over time. Furthermore, a social construction
perspective suggests that some practices are not consciously chosen, rather they
are so highly institutionalized that they are taken for granted.
2.5.4. The Origin of Institutional Theory
Institutional theory has its roots in studies of economics, politics and sociology
(Scott 1995). The Old Institutional Economics (OIE) emerged as a dissatisfaction
response to existing economic theory focusing on a rational economic actor. Veblen
introduced OIE through his works in 1889, 1909, and 1919 (quoted by Burns 2000).
Gouldner (1954), Parsons (1956), and Selznick (1957) work on the institutional theory,
particularly in a sociological context. Old institutional theory describes phenomena in a
procedural context and clarifies why and how something has taken place in
organisations over time (Burns, 2000). As a result, involving power and politics in
describing the occurrence of a process is an essential part of old institutional theory.
Institutional theorists claim that society’s members identify organisations through
norms and values shared by organisations. In respect to the old institutional theory,
Selznick (1957) explains that social norms and values are integrated by organisations
into their systems in order to demonstrate their sense of symbolic meanings and to
propose an alternative existence in a society despite technical and economic reasons.
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The adoption of social norms and values into organisational systems are means for
organisations to sustain their behaviour; and this adoption process is called
institutionalisation. Selznick (1957, p.16) explains this process as follows:
It (institutionalism) is something that happens to an organisation over time,
reflecting the organisation’s own distinctive history, the people who have been in
it, the group it embodies and the vested interest they have created and the way it
has adapted to its environment.
Within the old institutional theory, the dynamics of organisational factors, such as
specialisation and technical design, determines the institutionalisation of beliefs, values
and norms (Selznick, 1957). The phenomena of ineffective and obsolete behaviour and
actions which is continuously used by certain organisations could be described as the
institutionalisation process (Pfeffer, 1981). The institutionalisation of norms and values
in organisations occurs when the members of an organisation can be motivated and
driven by their leaders to follow the leaders’ behaviours. Thus, the leader is “an agent of
institutionalisation” (Selznick, 1957, p. 27). The leaders are responsible to ensure that
the organisational beliefs, norms, and values are in harmony with social beliefs, values
and norms. The institutionalisation of norms and values constitutes the behaviour
guidance for the organisational members (Simon, 1957). As a result, the
institutionalised rules and procedures of the organisation are reflected in the individual
actions and behaviour.
To conclude, the old institutional theory relates to understanding socially accepted
values, how the adaptation process occurs in organisations, in terms of the changing of
an organisation’s culture and structure to conform to social values, and how the values
turn into weak and deinstitutionalized (Selznick, 1996). Even though the old
institutional theory sees the aspect of external effects, the focus of discussion is centred
on the institutionalisation of normative controls such as types of beliefs, norms, and
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values (Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1997; Mizruchi, 1999; Scott and Christensen, 1995;
Selznick, 1957).
2.5.5. New Institutional Theory
New institutional theory was initiated by Meyer and Rowan (1977), and Zucker
(1977) during the mid-1970s. Then, DiMaggio and Powell (1983), and Meyer and Scott
(1983) developed and elaborated it further.
A foundation belief of the new institutional theory is that the characteristics of the
environment in which the organisation operates determine the structure and behaviour
of the organisation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Scott, 1983). The
organisational practices are influenced by the institutional environment, such as social,
political and economic, and also internal institutions including the objectives, structure
and culture of the organisation. Obtaining support and legitimacy from the institutional
environment are the aims of organisation in adapting with the environment (DiMaggio
and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Scott, 1983; Zucker, 1977). Accordingly, organisations
are pressured to change their routines by external factors, such as the given sociocultural norms, relationships among organisations and political pressures by
government and other authoritative bodies (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Dacin, 1997;
Scott and Christensen, 1995). This condition indicates that “organi[s]ations are
embedded in larger systems of relations” which called the “societal sector” (Scott and
Meyer, 1991, p. 120). This relates to the group of organisations that provide similar
products, services or functions, as well as its major owners, customers, suppliers,
competitors, and regulators (Scott and Meyer, 1991).
The system of relations is organised at a broad level, and organisations are related
in non-local and vertical hierarchies (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). As a result, the
features and structures of organisation are significantly shaped by how the societal
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sector is structured. This happens particularly when organisations are controlled by the
structure of decision making, technical or institutional processes, the nature of internlevel controls and the numbers of levels to which organisations have developed (Scott
and Meyer, 1991).
The new institutional theory claims that organisations are designed to be obedient
to procedures and practices, which are perceived as socially accepted rationalisations, in
terms of how to structure the organisation operations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).
Therefore, the concept of rationality develops and changes (Fogarty, 1996). New
institutional theory deems that organisations adopt rational rules and routines to ensure
that actions of organisations are legitimate not only for reasons of efficiency (Meyer and
Rowan, 1977; Meyer and Scott, 1983; Oliver, 1997). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978)
believe this adoption is to sustain the trust of external stakeholders in the organisations’
operations.
In similar vein, Scott (1998) argues that organisations will ensure that the external
constituents are able to see the institutionalised rules and routines. For instance,
establishing the internal audit department in a company to gain legitimacy and sustain
its image in shareholders’ eyes (Adams, 1994). Another example is that the professional
certifications gained by the internal auditors legitimate their functions’ performance
(Al-Twaijry, 2003). Rationally, in harmony with a social expectation is a means to
improve a company’s ability in obtaining continuing resources, lessening the likelihood
that its behaviours are doubted and increasing survival prospects (Albernathy and Chua,
1996; Covaleski et al., 1996; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977;
Scott, 1987; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983).
The arguments above indicate that macro aspects are the focus of new institutional
theory, particularly the understanding of external pressures to change. The environment
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creates “organisations in their own image” (Carruthers 1995, p.315). In addition,
rationalised rules are reflected in the formal organisational structures, which function as
myths and give legitimacy as well as stability to resources of an organisation (Meyer
and Rowan, 1977). It is the isomorphism that has an impact on the structure, not the
technical criteria. The isomorphism process “is a cultural and political one that concerns
legitimacy and power much more than efficiency alone” (Carruthers, 1995, p.315).
Meyer and Rowan (1977) contend that the tendency of organisations to become
isomorphic with their environment is because of reasons associated with two essential
beliefs of new institutional theory. Firstly, organisations are open systems, in which a
number of exchanges and technical interdependencies are the efforts to create harmony
with their environments. DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 73) clarified as follows:
…each of the institutional isomorphic processes can be expected to proceed in
the absence of evidence that it increases internal organi[s]ational efficiency. To
the extent that organi[s]ational effectiveness is enhanced. The reason is often that
organi[s]ations are rewarded for their similarity to other organi[s]ations in their
fields. This similarity can make it easier for organi[s]ations to transact with other
organi[s]ations, to attract career-minded staff, to be acknowledged as legitimate
and reputable, and to fit into administrative categories that define eligibility for
public and private grants and contracts. None of this, however, ensures that
conformist organi[s]ations do what they do more efficiently than do their more
deviant peers.
Secondly, the institutional environment is socially constructed, and this is
reflected in organisational structures. This means that organisations are considered as
institutions in themselves and products of their institutional environments.
Institutionalised rules which function as rational and objective prescriptions of myths
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977) are taken in by organisations to adapt to their environment.
Meyer and Rowan (1977) further explain that to the degree that rules are believed to be
appropriate, sufficient and reasonable, organisations ought to integrate them to maintain
legitimacy by protecting themselves from having their behaviour doubted, and also
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increasing the commitment of internal participants and external constituents to the
organisation’s operations.
According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), there are two types of isomorphism;
competitive and institutional (coercive, mimetic and normative). The competitive
isomorphism refers to competition among organisations in an organisational field for
resources and customers while the institutional isomorphism refers to the quest for
political power and legitimacy. The neo-institutional theory suggests that the pressures
from players in the institutional environment lead to isomorphism. Organisations in
stronger institutional environments such as state-owned enterprises are subject to
greater pressures while organisations such as those in manufacturing operate in
environments where their resources depend mainly on the market’s evaluation of their
products and services and as a result the pressures from the institutional environment
are weaker. Organisational structure of SOEs arises from the institutional constraints
imposed by the state and the professions and the efforts to achieve rationality with
uncertainty and constraint lead to homogeneity of structure (institutional isomorphism).
Unlike the competitive isomorphism, institutional isomorphism assumes that
organisations seek legitimacy by conforming to a socially constructed environment.
Since, this study is undertaken on a state-owned enterprise where the political power
and legitimacy are robust, this study focuses on institutional isomorphism consisting
coercive, mimetic and normative pressures. The institutional isomorphism types will be
presented in the following sections.
2.5.6. Legitimacy as an Essential Concept
A number of scholars (Clegg, 2010; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; DiMaggio
and Powell, 1983; Fogarty, 1996; Meyer and Rowan, 1977) agree that legitimacy is an
essential concept in the new institutional theory. Organisations tend to achieve a
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legitimation from external institutions in which they depend upon, rather than improve
an organisational effectiveness to attain their objectives (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).
Adopting the prevailing institutions may give legitimacy to organisations, and increase
their own survival (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) by gaining social approval and resources
(Oliver, 1991).
Scott (1995, p.45) remark that “legitimacy is not a commodity to be possessed or
exchanged but a condition reflecting cultural alignment, normative support, or
consonance with relevant rules or laws”. Despite the value of Meyer and Rowan’s work
(1977) that contributed to the new institutional theory development, it had no clear
definition of legitimacy. Thornton and Ocasio (2008, p.100) indicate that “parts of
organi[s]ations had to be loosely coupled from their technical core” as part of the notion
of legitimacy. The practice of loose coupling occurs when organisations adjust
themselves to the expectations of the external environment, and so legitimacy is
acquired. Suchman (1995, p.574) defines legitimacy in a more holistic way: “legitimacy
is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable,
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs
and definitions”. Suchman’s definition (1995) contains two prominent attributes: the
formal structures of organisations should conform to prevailing values and beliefs; and
legitimacy is a socially constructed reality, a view shared by Deephouse and Suchman
(2008). This means that the actors create the desired reality by performing collective
actions (Scott, 1987; Selznick, 1949, 1996). In this case, the actors direct the activities
and programmes of organisations in a way that fulfils social expectations (Fogarty,
1992). Galaskiewicz (1985) and Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggested that charity
programmes are examples of organisational programmes which are aimed to increase
the organisational legitimacy to the public.
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2.5.7. The Mechanism of Institutionalisation
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identified an institutionalisation mechanism that
creates the homogeneity of companies which is called institutionalised isomorphism.
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) explained further that institutional behaviours are shaped
by three kinds of forces. Firstly, pressure to comply with regulations and rules published
by an individual or organisations, which is namely coercive isomorphism. Secondly, the
uncertainty pressure creates a need for self-adjustment to the objectives by imitating
procedures which are used by other organisations, and recognised as mimetic
isomorphism. Thirdly, pressure to self-adjust to the regulations and norms were issued
by professional bodies, namely normative isomorphism. These mechanisms are three
institutional pillars as a means to respond to environmental pressures, which then shape
the organisational behaviour (Scott, 1995). Scott (1995, p.33) remarks that:
[i]nstitutions consist of cognitive, normative and regulative structures and
activities that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour. Institutions are
transported by various carries – cultures, structures, and routines – and they
operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction.
The role of isomorphism in institutional theory is presented in the following
sections.
2.5.7.1. Coercive Isomorphism
Coercive isomorphism occurs when organisations strongly depend for resources
and support on the other organisations or parties, which then respond to pressures by
performing organisational changes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Power is the key
point of coercion (Scott, 1995). Therefore, the more powerful organisations impose a
pressure to change on the dependent organisation when an organisation operates in a
wider network (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983).
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) divided the pressures into two kinds: formal and
informal pressures. Formal pressures may come from legal and standards, such as law,
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the government regulations and standard operating procedures and legitimated rules and
structures. Informal pressures are derived from outside organisations upon which the
institution relies on administratively and culturally expected in the society. In addition,
Scott (1991) suggested two categories of pressures: pressure by means of coercive
power and authority. Alterations forced by authority take place more rapidly and with
less resistance than those enforced by coercive power. Structural changes, which are
driven by authority, could generate higher levels of compliance and stability since these
changes are less superficial than change by coercive force (Scott, 1991).
An illustration of a coercive mechanism is a public organisation which
experiences a pressure to obey other institutions when survival of one department
strongly relies on resources and support from other government departments (DiMaggio
and Powell, 1983; Mayer and Rowan, 1977). In terms of the practice of internal audit
functions, an example of coercive isomorphism is the requirement of all public SOEs to
establish an internal audit department and set the Internal Audit Charter as required by
the Capital Market Regulatory Body and Financial Institution (Bapepam-LK), which
later changed into Indonesia Financial Services Authority (OJK), as an authoritative
body, when the public SOEs enter the capital market. This indicates that the internal
auditing within the SOEs is a subject to or at least shaped by regulations set by other
organisations.
In the context of internal audit functions, Al-Twaijry et al. (2003) conducted a
study that used new institutional theory to investigate the development of internal audit
department in Saudi Arabia. The study found that the new institutional theory provided
an explanation of why some companies did not have internal audit department.
Moreover, the study indicated that the companies needed coercive pressure to enforce
the establishment of internal audit department.
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Arena and Azzone (2007) applied new institutional theory to understand the
adoption and characteristics of internal audit functions in Italian companies. The results
of the study revealed that coercive pressure affected companies’ support for the internal
audit function. This coercive pressure consists of the regulations that apply to certain
types of industries, such as financial companies and listed companies.
Arena et al. (2006) used the new institutional theory to investigate the influence of
the relevance of institutional pressures in the development of internal audit department
in Italy. The findings of the study indicated that regulations shaped the development of
internal audit functions, and its effect was stronger when regulations imposed sanctions.
2.5.7.2. Mimetic Isomorphism
Mimetic isomorphism occurs when organisations face a high level of uncertainty
and search for a good model by following the actions of successful organisations
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In this case, the imitation processes are triggered by the
uncertainty condition which deals with organisational technologies, goals and
environmental expectations. Therefore, the organisational fashions tend to spread
through mimetic isomorphism (Carruthers, 1995). The tendency to mimic operational
models of successful companies and willingness to receive techniques of fashionable
business could protect the organisations from the uncertainty (Abrahamson, 1996;
Granlund and Lukka, 1998). The organisations select the other successful or legitimate
organisations as their benchmark in order to reduce the uncertainty or to sustain the
survival (Baldridge, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). In
addition, a company will count on professional specialists, who will influence the
corporate strategies, to deal with environmental uncertainties (Thomas, 1989).
As discussed in the prior section, the study of Arena et al. (2006) on Italian
companies found that companies seek to model themselves on the practices of similar
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organisations which they perceive to be more legitimate or successful. Moreover, the
study of Arena and Azzone (2007) as discussed earlier, found that mimetic force in
Italian companies was explained by company size. Size is a significant driver of firms’
choices regarding both the adoption of internal audit department and its structural
characteristics.
2.5.7.3. Normative Isomorphism
Normative isomorphism is based on a premise that organisational change is
achieved through the process of professionalism. This process occurs through two
mechanisms: firstly, formal education and research-based products from authoritative
experts, and secondly, professional networks that share science and technology
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In 1991, DiMaggio and Powell claimed that the
normative pressures could be transferred through education, professional standards, and
inter-organisational networks.
The process of normative isomorphism can be seen in the practice of internal
audit functions through recruiting the internal auditors who have knowledge and
experience in internal auditing as the basic foundation for conducting their duties.
Moreover, the internal auditors are facilitated to maintain their professional competence
by being provided with continuous professional education and training as well as
joining professional networks of internal auditors.
In the context of audit competencies, at the earlier stage the competencies of
internal auditor are obtained from the university level, and are then enhanced by gaining
a Certified Internal Auditor and other professional qualifications. This creates the
potential to increase the number of internal audit staff and the Institute of Internal
Auditor (IIA) organisations in that region and enhance the momentum for the diffusion
of internal audit functions to similar establishments. The increasing internal auditor
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competency within companies will enhance the conformity with IIA Standards (AlTwaijry et al., 2003). This condition will drive the occurrence of isomorphism and the
internal audit functions will be established in line with the objectives of the internal
audit profession. This demonstrates that the internal auditors’ competencies and
knowledge and also how others can similarly benefit (Abbott, 1988). Thus, the status
and prominence of the internal audit department will motivate other organisations to
adopt International Standards for Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (ISPPIA).
Therefore, the IIA would be able to accelerate the process of institutionalisation through
the dispersal of internal audit department in all sectors of the economy (Al-Twaijry et
al., 2003; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).
The study of Al-Twaijry et al. (2003) found that the establishment of IIA local
affiliates in Saudi Arabia was one of the most significant pressures for the establishment
of internal audit departments in the country. Arena and Azzone (2007) discovered in
their study that normative isomorphism is a key aspect in shaping the characteristics of
internal audit departments. Professional bodies have important roles for enhancing the
quality of internal auditors. Also, Arena et al. (2006) uncovered that professional bodies
(for example the IIA) and consultants influenced the development of internal audit
departments in Italian organisations.
2.5.8. The Concept of Decoupling
Organisations are driven to incorporate the prevailing rationalised concepts of
organisational work and institutionalised norms, beliefs and practices prevalent in the
society in which they operate (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Organisations who operate
within their cultural context will obtain more legitimacy (Carruthers, 1995), since they
are ‘seen’ to be able to meet the social expectations (Fogarty, 1992) by ceremonially
adopting institutionalised policies, programmes, techniques, products and services
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which function as powerful myths (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). According to Fogarty
(1996, p. 249):
Organi[s]ations must signal, through their program[me]s and priorities, that they
are doing all that can be done, and that this is being done in the ways that society
has reason to believe will work. This implies that control and coordination
necessary to achieve goals are not purely technical, but instead reflect the
internalisation of shared typifications.
The institutionalised programmes are applied to create the good image in order to
impress the society. For example, the society is offered donations, loans and investment
programmes by the organisations with the legitimacy in return (Meyer and Rowan,
1977).
Nonetheless, organisations may demonstrate to the external environment that they
are operating in keeping with what is expected by the external environment when, in
fact, this is not the case (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). The adoption resulted in decoupling
or loose coupling experience of organisations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Orton and
Wick, 1990); a deviation between what given the formal organisational structure, they
should do and actual organisational practice (Fogarty, 1992). This means that the
organisations tend to do a loose resemblance to their official roles. Consequently, they
fail to give attention to efficiency and effectiveness principles (Meyer and Rowan, 1977;
Mouritsen, 1994; Zucker, 1987). Meyer and Rowan (1977, p. 357) explained the
process of decoupling as follows:
[a]ctivities are performed beyond the purview of managers. In particular,
organi[s]ations actively encourage professionalism, and activities are delegated to
professionals. Goals are made ambiguous or vacuous, and categorical ends are
substituted for technical ends. Hospitals treat, not cure, patients. Schools produce
students, not learning. In fact, data on technical performance are eliminated or
rendered invisible. Hospitals try to ignore information on cure rates, public
services avoid data about effectiveness, and schools deemphasize measures of
achievement. Integration is avoided, program[me] implementation is neglected,
and inspection and evaluation are ceremonialized.
Decoupling or loose coupling occurs since the formal organisational structures
function only as symbols (Scott, 1987). This means that “formal structure has much
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more to do with the presentation of organisational-self than with how things actually
transpire within the organisation” (Carruthers, 1995, p. 315).
In terms of internal auditing, Al-Twaijry et al. (2003) contends that organisations
are sometimes involved in decoupling, that is, actual organisational practice may be
different from what the external appearance of an organisation suggests. Furthermore, in
the context of one internal audit department, Al-Twaijry et al. (2003) found that genuine
operations of internal audit departments in Saudi Arabian companies were decoupled
from the expectations of how they operate and prescribed International Standards for
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (ISPPIA). Moreover, they concluded that
ISPPIA is not affected by departments, and equally, internal audit department have only
a limited influence on work performed by ISPPIA. In addition, they believe that the
tasks completed by internal audit departments occur without examination by outside
agencies, which allows the internal audit department to function according to their own
business process. Hence, organisations may have an internal audit department, but it
may not necessarily function in line with ISPPIA guidelines. Thus, decoupling may take
place when organisations demonstrate to the business world that they are operating in a
perceived way internally, when from the point of view of the external environment more
generally that they are in fact falling short of those expectations (Meyer and Rowan,
1977).
2.5.9. Organisational Responses to Institutional Pressures
Organisations are not automatically forced to obey institutional pressures. In
terms of facing the pressures, the powers and interests within the organisation determine
the responses of the actors which could differ from those suggested by the studies of
new institutionalism. The responses are conducted in order to gain legitimacy, and they
comprise four strategies as suggested by Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) and Lindblom
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(1994). Firstly, organisations change their behaviour to conform to the prevailing
definitions of legitimacy and inform the changes to the relevant public. Secondly,
organisations could use their sound performance to influence external expectations.
Thirdly, the organisations can associate themselves to a strong legitimacy base of
symbols, values or institutions to manipulate social perception. Fourthly, the
organisation changes the existing social legitimacy to fit with the organisational practice.
According to Oliver (1991, p.151), the organisational responses to institutional
pressures:
…will vary from conforming to resistant, from passive to active, from
preconscious to controlling, from impotent to influential, and from habitual to
opportunistic, depending on the institutional pressure toward conformity that are
exerted on organisations.
In other words, the existing institutions will limit an organisation’s capability to
make a change (Pfeffer, 1981).
Further, Oliver (1991) suggests acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance,
and manipulation as five strategic responses to institutional pressures. Acquiescence
means compliance to the institutional pressures which consist of three kinds of tactics:
comply, imitation and habit. Comply tactics means obeying regulations and rules
consciously, whilst Imitation means copying successful institutional models, and Habit
means unconsciously following invisible, taken-for-granted norms.
The second response, Compromise is a strategic response which is undertaken
when there is a conflict between internal and external institutional pressures in relation
to efficiency. The Compromise strategy may be performed in three different ways:
balance, pacify and bargain. The Balance tactic is used to balance the expectation of
multiple constituents. The Pacify tactic is used to please and accommodate a variety of
institutional elements. The Bargain tactic is used to negotiate with the institutional
stakeholders (Oliver, 1991).
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The third response is Avoidance strategy which is related to “…the
organi[s]ational attempt to preclude the necessity of conformity” (Oliver, 1991, p.154).
This strategy consists of three means: conceal, buffer and escape tactic. The Conceal
tactic is associated with the response to disguise the fact that it does not intend to
implement the requirement using rational plan (Oliver, 1991). The Buffering tactic
refers to an “…attempt to reduce the extent to which it is externally inspected,
scrutinized, or evaluated by partially detaching or decoupling its technical activities
from external contacts” (Oliver, 1991, p.155). According to Oliver (1991, p. 155) the
Escape tactic means “…an organi[s]ation may exit the domain within which pressure is
exerted…or significantly alter its own goals, activities, or domain to avoid its necessity
of conformity altogether.”
The fourth response is Defiance strategy which is related to “…a more reactive
resistance to institutional processes” (Oliver, 1991, p.156). This strategy comprises
three forms of tactics: dismiss, challenge and attack. The Dismiss tactic is characterised
by “ignoring institutional rules and values” (Oliver, 1991, p.156). The Challenge is
described as “…offensive in defiance of these pressures and may indeed make a virtue
of their insurrection” (Oliver, 1991, p. 156). The Attack is indicated by “…the intensity
and aggressiveness of the organi[s]ation’s active departure from institutional pressures
and expectations” (Oliver, 1991, p.156).
The fifth response is Manipulation strategy which refers to the way organisations
redefine the organisational reality perceived by others. Oliver (1991, p. 157) contends
that manipulation is used to “actively change or exert power over the content of the
expectations themselves or the sources that seek to express or enforce them.”
Manipulation strategy covers three tactics: co-opt, influence, and control (Oliver, 1991).
Co-opt tactics could be conducted by someone who decides to “…persuade an
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institutional constituent to join the organi[s]ation or its board of directors” (Oliver, 1991,
p.157) to neutralise institutional opposition and enhance legitimacy. Influence tactics is
“…more generally directed toward institutionalized values and beliefs or definitions and
criteria of acceptable practices or performance…” (Oliver, 1991, p. 158). Controlling
tactics refers to “…specific efforts to establish power and dominance over the external
constituents that are applying pressure on the organi[s]ation” (Oliver, 1991, p. 158).
In terms of the organisations’ responses, Scapen (1994) suggested that the
implementation of a certain response is restricted by the existing institutions.
Organisations want to be seen as competent and acceptable, which are the key reasons
for them to adapt to the environment. Therefore, organisations are likely to adopt
similar practices and structures to conform to socially accepted beliefs (Covaleski et al.,
1993; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).
2.5.10. Institutional Theory: A Critique
Briefly, the institutional theory comprises two different theories: old institutional
theory and new institutional theory. The focus of view of these theories is different:
micro level of an organisation is the focus of the old institutional theory, whilst the
macro level is the emphasis of the new institutional theory. As a result, a number of
scholars (Christensen, et al. 1997; Kraatz and Zajac, 1996; Selznick, 1996) have
criticised the theory, particularly the new institutional theory as an oversimplified view
of organisation.
The new institutional theory is also criticised as it concerns the roles of actor,
power, and interest (Boons and Strannegard, 2000; Carruthers, 1995; Perro, 1985; Scott,
1995). In this case, the scholars argue that the theory ignores the actors and their
capabilities to influence and shape organisations, which means the theory disregards the
power and politics in the institutionalisation process.
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However, it can be argued that the role of power in the process of
institutionalisation is considered by the institutional theory. Bourdieu (1990) claims that
the practice of behaviour in the immediate environment of individuals affects them.
Accordingly, there exists a formal structure and practice of actors’ influence on
individuals’ behaviour as well as organisational realities. Similarly, Shepsle (1989)
contends a sufficient number of individuals could disrupt institutions and resulted in the
institutional change. The process of an institutional change can be dominated by the
powerful individuals who are not satisfied with the present situation. The main
determinant of change is the power position of individuals, not the number of
individuals.
On the other hand, institutions also shape power and preferences of actors (Hall,
1986; Levi, 1990). The theory that institutions contain and create power (Levi, 1990).
Hall (1986, p. 19) postulates that:
The organi[s]ation of policy-making affects the degree of power that any one set
of actors has over policy outcomes...Organi[s]ational position also influences an
actor’s definition of their own interests, by establishing institutional
responsibilities and relationships to other actors.
The power of organisational actors’ translations and use of social expectation is
reflected through the institutionalisation of organisational rules and routines (Clegg,
1979). This argument means that the power and conflicts of interest within an
organisation motivate the response of powerful actors to external pressures. The
pressures will be interpreted by powerful actors or leaders, and then used as power
sources to decide their organisational responses (Finstad, 1998; Jeppersen 1991).
Therefore, the statement that institutional theory overlooks power issues cannot be
accepted.
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Nonetheless, the main deficiency of institutional theory is that the theory does not
acknowledge a specific concept of power in the institutionalisation process discussion,
and not on ignores the power.
2.5.11. Research Framework
Internal audit functions are the kind of actions or activities that are socially
constructed by individuals, both within and outside organisations as an institutional
practice (Flint, 1988). In order to understand the practice of internal audit functions this
study uses the new institutional theory as a lens to investigate the practice. New
institutional theory has a basic tenet that structures and behaviours of an organisation
are affected by the features of its environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).
According to Schotter (1981), social institutions exhibit regularity in social
behaviour which is approved by all of society’s members, determine behaviour in
specific recurrent situations, and are either self-regulated or regulated by external
authorities. The social construction feature of internal audit activities can be seen from
its functions which have evolved over time. It started as a part of the accounting
department, acting as independent appraisers of accounting, had operational
independence, and lastly evolved into providing added value to an organisation. This
scope of work developed as a response to the demands of society which can be traced to
the developing of internal audit standards.
As socially constructed activities, organisational actors can construct the practice
of internal audit functions so as to achieve legitimacy and show that the internal audit
unit operates in line with socially acceptable beliefs, values, rules and norms. The
issuing of the Internal Audit Charter is a signal from the director of an internal audit
unit to stakeholders that the internal auditors will behave responsibly and in a manner
consistent with the charter. The existence of the charter is important as it is a legal basis
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for internal auditors in conducting their duties (Adam, 1994; Burnaby, 1994;
Courtemanche, 1986, and Hughes, 2004). The acquired legitimacy is essential for a
company since it needs to demonstrate social worthiness to mobilise resources (Oliver,
1991).
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) stated that pressure to obey other institutions occurs
when the survival of one department strongly relies on resources and support from other
government departments. Government mandates, state-sponsored legitimacy and more
subtle and less explicit political mechanisms, could be deemed to be indicative of
coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In the case of Indonesia
particularly for SOEs, the existence of coercive isomorphism may be indicated by the
pressure to comply with government laws and regulations in order to obtain legitimacy
since the SOEs are financed by the Indonesian government. In terms of the practice of
internal audit functions, SOEs are required by a number of regulations, such as the
Decree of Ministry of SOE to have an internal audit department to perform internal
audit activities, for public SOEs these activities also are regulated by the Capital Market
Regulations. These regulations provide a detailed prescription for performing the
functions of internal audits which cover auditing, and consulting functions, as well as
essential features of the functions. Thus, these regulations may give signals to the
existence of coercive isomorphism on the practice of internal audit functions by SOEs.
Normative isomorphism is based on a premise that organisational change is
achieved through the process of professionalism. This process occurs through formal
education and research-based products from authoritative experts, professional networks
that share science and technology (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), as well as professional
standards (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Abbott (1988) states that the internal audit
professional body, the IIA, would be expected to legitimise internal audit functions by
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demonstrating both the IIA’s competence standards and the expertise of the internal
auditor, and how this expertise can be used to the benefit of others.
In Indonesia, university students that major in accountancy must complete various
accounting subjects including auditing as one of the core subjects. The auditing subject
will give basic knowledge to become either internal or external auditor. At the early
stage the competencies of internal auditors are obtained from the university, and then
enhanced by becoming a Certified Internal Auditor (CIA) through the examination held
by professional organisation. The test is provided through two organisations: IIAIndonesia affiliated to IIA-international and the Internal Auditor Association. There is a
belief in society that internal auditors have to possess appropriate knowledge of the
profession gained from university and/or from professional organisations. This belief
may create pressure on the way an SOE recruits its internal auditors. This practice may
be seen as the signal of the existence of normative isomorphism.
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) contend that mimetic isomorphism is a process of
change started internally by the organisation. Mimetic isomorphism occurs when
organisations perceive that internal audit functions impact on improvement in
organisational control and operational performance which is important to it being
adopted. In Indonesia, particularly for SOEs, the mimetic could occur when internal
auditors within an unsuccessful SOE may duplicate the practice of internal audit
functions of a successful SOE. Another possibility is that internal auditors in an SOE
may mimic the practice of internal audits of a leading company in the same industry.
This might happen since there is no reliable regulation from the Ministry of SOE that
regulates a complete internal audit practice for SOEs. The uncertainty condition in
terms of the best practice of internal audits will generate mimetic isomorphism.
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Based on the discussion of the relevant theory of this research, Figure 1 shows the
research framework of this study.
Figure 1
Research Framework of the Study
Coercive Pressure:
• Reg. of Min. of SOE No: PER01/MBU/2011
• Cap. Market No: KEP496/BL/2008
• Relevant regulations

Normative Pressure:
• Education Background
• Certificate of Internal Auditor
• Professional network (IIA, FKSPI)

The Practice of Internal
Audit Functions within
a public SOE

Mimetic Pressure:
• No Regulation from Ministry of
SOE which regulate the practice
of internal audit entirely
• Information technology issues

2.6.

Summary:
This chapter presents two main sections, the literature review and the research

framework. The literature review comprises three main ideas which encompass the
evolution of the functions of internal audit, the concept of internal auditing and its
fundamental qualities, and also the practice of internal auditing. The empirical studies
show that the regulations and the Standards of Internal Auditing had an impact on the
internal audit practice. Moreover, the literature and empirical research findings prove
that the practice of internal auditing is socially constructed by the institutional
environments, such as government regulation, professional bodies and an uncertain
business condition. Therefore, studies of internal auditing should be framed by an
appropriate theory, namely the institutional theory. The basic tenet of institutional
theory is that an organisation’s actions are socially constructed by the institutional
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environment surrounding them. Yet, only a few empirical studies use the institutional
theory as a theoretical framework to understand internal auditing. Also, the studies have
not yet addressed to what extent the internal audit unit bows to institutional pressures in
the internal audit charter and the implementation of the charter in practice. Therefore,
this study attempts to contribute to the internal auditing literature by filling this gap.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
3.1. Introduction
This chapter describes the research methodology used to investigate the practice
of internal audit functions in an Indonesian public State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) from
the perspectives of Institutional Theory. Initially, the epistemological stance of
employing interpretive study is discussed. It is followed by the justification of
employing a qualitative methodology and a single case study. The techniques of data
collection and analysis are described in connection with the broad nature of this study.
Finally issues around trustworthiness and ethical considerations are addressed.
3.2. Research Paradigms
This section discusses the ontological and epistemological approaches and how
they affect the research methodology of this study. Having an understanding about the
basis of philosophical concepts is vital in order to conduct solid research in that these
concepts allow the researcher to understand the nature of how knowledge can be
acquired. Henn et al. (2006) suggest two critical aspects of research: what can be
considered as knowledge? And, how can that knowledge can be acquired? This implies
that how a researcher views reality in order to gain valid and reliable knowledge from it
is determined by the research paradigm used by the researcher. Bryman (1988) and
Myers (2009) stress the importance of following a research paradigm as a guide. A
research paradigm is a world view that covers a number of perspectives: ontological,
epistemological and a methodological perspective (Guba and Lincoln, 1998). Ontology
is the theory of the nature of reality, while epistemology is a theory of gaining
knowledge about reality (Myers, 2009). Research methodologies are strategies of

inquiry that provide specific direction for procedures in a research design (Creswell,
2009).
Ontology deals with the nature of reality (Collis & Hussey, 2003; Creswell, 1998;
Denzin & Lincoln, 1998). It deals with two questions: whether reality is socially
constructed that is, a product of people’s consciousness and should be treated
subjectively, or whether reality is independent and thus should be treated objectively
(Cresswell, 1998; Eriksson and Kovalianen, 2008). Ontologically, this study assumes
that the internal audit functions is socially constructed by the actors since such practice
is perceived as a reality or social product that results from human interaction, creativity,
and symbolic interaction created by actors (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Burrell and
Morgan, 1979; Flint, 1988; Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Morgan, 1980).
Epistemology is concerned with the process of how knowledge is derived
(Bisman, 2010; Collis and Hussey, 2003; Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). Since a social
constructionist approach is an ontological assumption used in this study, then qualitative
research is an appropriate epistemological method. According to Guba and Lincoln
(1988 in Creswell, 1998), in order to capture a clearer picture, qualitative research
demands researchers lessen their distance from the object being studied. Based on the
ontological and epistemological standpoint mentioned above, this study adopted an
interpretive paradigm when interpreting phenomena. Using such a paradigm allows the
researcher to draw deeper insights from the studied issue and provide reasons for the
observed phenomena.
Moreover, the knowledge gained enables the researcher to increase understanding
about a phenomenon within a particular situation, without letting the researcher’s
preconceptions influence the outcomes (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991). Orlikowski and
Baroudi (1991) explained further that the phenomenon is directly studied in its natural
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context from the perspective of participants. Similarly, Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008)
claim that from an epistemological standpoint of interpretivism, knowledge is available
through social actors. In this case, this study obtained an understanding of the practice
of internal audit functions within the institutional environment in an Indonesian public
SOE context from the perspective of the internal auditors as the actors of such practice.
Methodology plays a vital role in linking theory and method, since it reflects
specific views of ontological and epistemological theory and assists the researcher to
choose an appropriate research method (Bryman, 1988). The study adopts an empirical
approach focusing on human interpretations (particularly the internal auditors) of
institutional pressures which comprise government regulations, professional bodies, and
the uncertain business environment. According to Elbardan et al. (2016); Walsham
(1995a); and Yin (2009), an in-depth case study is often used for such interpretative
investigation.
3.3. The Choice of Interpretive Paradigm
This section discusses the rationale of choosing the interpretive paradigm as the
philosophical foundation of this study. Collis and Hussey (2009) suggest that there are
two major factors influencing an adoption of a research paradigm: firstly, the dominant
paradigm in the research domain and secondly, the nature of the research problem. The
research aims to investigate the practice of internal audit functions in an Indonesian
public SOE from the perspective of institutional theory. In order to achieve this aim, the
research investigates the responses of the internal audit unit toward the institutional
pressures which led the practice of internal audit.
This study adopts an interpretative paradigm as it allows the researcher to draw
knowledge from analysing the issue and making conclusions from its real context, based
on the subjective and shared meaning from the research participants. Further,
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interpretative study is concerned with how individuals in a social group view social
events and settings. Interpretive study aims to explore and explain the interrelation and
interdependence of various factors in a particular social setting, it does not seek to prove
a hypothesis (Oates, 2006). Therefore, the nature of interpretative study enables the
researcher to understand the practice of internal audit functions from the participants’
perspective in the context of an Indonesian public State-Owned Enterprise (SOE). This
indicates that the participants’ personal views are elicited to build insights about the
practice of internal audit function. Erikson and Kovalainen (2008) stress that the way to
access changing and individual constructed reality can only be obtained from social
construction, for instance language. Ultimately, the researcher can understand the
complexity of human sense making from different individuals, and then construct
insights about the social context of the practice of internal audit functions in an
Indonesian SOE context.
Likewise, Erikson and Kovalainen (2008) suggest the way to gain knowledge is
from social actors’ points of view or from individuals taking part in a particular social
setting. This view is associated with the epistemological view that the external world
cannot be accessed by relying only on our own interpretation of a social issue.
The existing literature on the practice of internal auditing shows that a positivist
paradigm has been applied to carry out investigations. One of the pitfalls of this
paradigm is that it simplifies the world or phenomenon and places it within the “box” of
cause-effect relationships.
According to Flint (1988), and Humphrey and Moizer (1990), internal auditing is
socially constructed; therefore, people involved in it are social actors. By employing an
interpretative approach researcher can investigate in depth what the responses of social
actors to the institutional pressures in an Indonesian public SOE context, which lead to
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the practice of internal audit. An interpretive paradigm also enables the researcher to
examine the interaction between the practice of internal audit functions and its
institutional environment, consisting of government regulations, professional bodies and
an uncertain business environment. Further, the nature of this study is to understand the
interaction between actors’ practices and their environment. As such, employing the
interpretative stance is seen relevant for this purpose. As noted previously, this study
does not seek to prove a hypothesis or to make quantifications or to identify
significance or causality. Rather, this study aims to capture and explain the
interrelationship and interdependence between actors and action. Pettigrew et al. (2001,
p.699) suggest that “change explanations are no longer pared down to the relationships
between independent and dependent variables but instead are viewed as an interaction
between context and action”.
3.4. Qualitative Research Methodology
Collis and Hussey (2009) define methodology as the overall approach of the
research design that indicates clearly the selected paradigm underpinning the
assumptions. The research design used in this study is qualitative investigation.
The major reason for choosing the qualitative research methodology is due to the
limitations of quantitative methodology. Taylor and Bogdan (1988) argue that
quantitative methodology cannot provide in-depth information about the research
context and the subjective meaning of actors’ actions. Another criticism is that it only
provides snapshots of a problem and ignores the issues or variables which are not
included in the research design (Avital, 2000). Despite its strength in presenting the
correlation among variables, quantitative methodology does not give many insights
about why actions happen in certain ways or causal relationships. For these reasons, the
use of a qualitative design is expected to fill these gaps.
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Qualitative methodology is perceived to have abilities to help a researcher to gain
a deep understanding from a social context in order to draw insights about the studied
phenomenon (Silverman, 2010). When little information is known about an issue, this
methodology is appropriate. The nature of such methodology allows the researcher to
explore all related aspects of a studied issue and to examine their relationships. It
attempts to provide explanations from multiple points of view in order to develop a
holistic understanding about a studied phenomenon (Creswell, 2009). This methodology
has also gained recognition among many researchers (Berg, 2009; Patton, 2002) and has
been used to investigate uncovered meanings indicated by social actors. To do this, the
qualitative researchers frequently talk to the participants directly face to face and
observe their behaviours within the social context (Creswell, 2009). However,
qualitative researchers are often less rigorous and provide less opportunity to generalise
their research findings (Yin, 2009). Despite such drawbacks, qualitative methodology
can be used to explore a social phenomenon which is not aimed to build a general law.
3.4.1

Justifications for using Qualitative Research
The main reason for adoption of qualitative research is the need to obtain an

understanding about the practice of internal audit in an Indonesian public SOE context.
This is important in order to maximise the ability to understand the diverse perspectives
from members of such a dynamic and complex social phenomenon and to obtain rich
data. The following paragraphs discuss the theoretical and philosophical considerations
of adopting qualitative research.
To start with, qualitative research methodology allows the researcher to
consistently align theoretical and philosophical perspectives. Further, qualitative
research is considered an appropriate methodology to investigate research problems that
are context driven, interpretive in nature and aim to understand how things work. Klein
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and Myers (1999) suggest that the philosophical background to conduct this type of
interpretive study is intended to gain insights on social reality. Accordingly, the choice
of qualitative research methodology is consistent with the nature of the current study,
namely the interpretation the social phenomenon under investigation. In addition,
employing this empirical study, the researcher considers that social interaction leads to
the occurrence of social features and reality (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). This is
certainly the case in the adaptation of internal audit functions which have developed
through the interaction between individuals and the institutional environment of
Indonesian public SOEs.
Second, this study investigates the complexity and process in a less studied
phenomenon in order to understand the dynamics of process of how institutional
environment shapes the internal audit functions. For this reason, a qualitative research
approach was chosen. Ball (1989) in Seal (1993) argues that the practice of internal
audit functions is inseparable from the institutional context within which it is embedded.
As explained in chapter 2, empirical qualitative research on internal auditing has
been rarely conducted, and studies concerning the practice of internal audit functions
within the institutional environment of Indonesian SOE context were hard to find.
Therefore conducting a study by employing a qualitative inquiry is considered the most
appropriate option to gain understanding in order to fill the gap in internal auditing
research. Further, the flexibility of this approach will allow the researcher to understand
the nature of the dynamics of the phenomena under investigation, which cannot be
achieved through a quantitative approach.
Third, the use of a qualitative approach enables the researchers to gain contextual
data (Bryman, 1988). With this methodology, the researchers are able to conduct a
study in a natural setting in order to understand the phenomena (Silverman, 2010). As
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this study is also confidential and subjective, the researchers need rich contextual data in
order to be able to create a meaningful understanding of the issues investigated. Denzin
and Lincoln (1998), and Miles and Huberman (1994) highlight that collection of
qualitative data in natural settings should consider the effects and richness of the
environment, which consists of social and cultural contexts. These contexts within
which the participants work and interact can only be understood by employing a
qualitative approach. Accordingly, the use of a qualitative study to achieve the aim of
this study is suggested.
3.5. Case Study Research Strategy
This study employs qualitative approach in which interpretivism is used as the
epistemological stance. This section focuses on the selection of a research strategy.
Strategy is different from tactics (Remeniy et al., 2002). The adoption of an overall
approach is called strategy, while the specific details of data collection and analysis are
regarded as tactics. Henn et al. (2006) describe research strategy as how to study a given
issue, whilst the available technique variation that can be employed to collect and
analyse data is called research methods (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008).
There are a number of qualitative research strategies that can be employed to
investigate the practice of internal audit functions. However, Creswell (2009) argues
that the strategy choice is greatly dependent on the research aims and objectives. Hence,
the researcher considers the case study as the most appropriate strategy for investigating
the issue of this study in depth. Yin (2009, p. 18) defines case study as “an empirical
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context,
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly
evident”. Myers (2009) maintains that in–depth case studies are the most appropriate
research strategy for conducting empirical research when following the interpretive
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paradigm. The case study is also claimed as a research strategy of an encompassing
method which involves the logic of design, data collection techniques, and specific
approaches to data analysis (Yin, 2003). In other words, the case study is a
comprehensive research strategy, not merely a data collection tactic or a design feature
alone (Stoecker, 1991 cited in Yin 2003).
A number of scholars (Benbasat et al., 1987; Cavaye, 1996) have identified the
main characteristics of a case study method which include that: there is no variables
control; it studies a phenomenon in its natural context; the site at which the
phenomenon studied can be one or a few; it uses multiple means to collect data; it
employs qualitative techniques to collect and analyse data; and it focuses on
contemporary events. Yin (2003, p. 21) also proposes five components involved in the
research design of a case study, which consist of:
(a) a study’s questions,
(b) its propositions, if any,
(c) its unit(s) of analysis,
(d) the logic linking the data to the propositions, and
(e) the criteria for interpreting the findings
3.5.1. Justification of the Case Study Use
There are a number of considerations for choosing a case study as the research
design in order to understand the nature of the research setting along with its contextual
features. First, the research strategy should be based on the nature of the research
problems and objectives. Hessler (1992) believes that research problems and objectives
have become the fundamental basis of choosing an appropriate research strategy. This
implies that the selected strategy should enable the researcher to answer the research
questions of their study (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008). It also means that the chosen
strategy should allow the attainment of the research objectives. Based on the objectives
of this study, that is to find how the institutional pressures shapes the practice of internal
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audit functions in an Indonesian public SOE, a case study is found to be the most
relevant research strategy. Yin (2003) claims that ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are the most
appropriate types of questions in case study research, and a prerequisite to adopting a
case study as the research strategy. With this particular strategy, the researcher can
investigate the given issue in an appropriate manner which in turn can lead the
researcher to achieve the research objectives.
Second, a case study provides a range of benefits for the researcher. For instance,
a case study provides the opportunity for the researcher to gain diversity, complexity
and to avoid simplistic research designs (Erikson and Kovalainen, 2008). The case
study also focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single settings
(Eisenhardt, 1989). This enables the researcher to gain a comprehensive meaningful
picture of phenomena found in real-life events, for instance organisational and
managerial processes, daily-life activities, and a community social system (Yin, 2003).
Moreover, Yin (2003) states that the case study method is best used when researchers
want to cover contextual conditions as they believe these conditions might be highly
pertinent to their phenomenon of study. Further, Erikson and Kovalainen (2008) suggest
that a case study is methodologically associated with an interpretive approach. The
interpretive paradigm supports a less structured case study and emphasises the
explanations of case study participants (Doolin, 1996).
Third, the status of the research and the theory about the research problems
determine the use of a particular research strategy. As indicated in the literature review,
the study of internal auditing practice is still limited particularly with respect to
institutional theories. Hessler (1992) suggests that if the research problem is in its
infancy then the case study strategy is relevant. In other words, case studies are
appropriate when fewer studies on one particular issue have been conducted. Yin (2009)
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also claims the main criteria to determine whether the case study is the proper strategy
is by considering the type of research questions. He further argues that if the research
questions are about 'how' or 'why', then it is preferable to use a case study.
Neuman (2006, p.58) argues that the case study does not search for the
relationship between two or more concepts as the feature of qualitative research relies
on interpretive or critical social science. In line with this view, this study does not seek
to examine hypotheses, rather it is directed to understanding the practice of internal
audit as applied by an Indonesian SOE. Hence, a case study is found to be the most
appropriate research strategy. Furthermore, the selection of the case study strategy as
the research design is based on the following considerations.
Fourth, Collis and Hussey (2009) claim that a case study is appropriate when
research is conducted in the workplace and the researcher does not attempt to control
any aspects of the phenomena. This study does not aim apply a treatment to the research
variables, but aims to gain understanding of how the institutional environment shapes
the practice of internal audit functions in a particular context, in an Indonesian SOE.
With the insight gained from the study, the researcher can construct concepts
concerning the investigated issue. Similarly, Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) maintain
that case studies will enable the researcher to obtain rich qualitative data offering more
insights of complex social process that cannot be revealed by easily with quantitative
data. Stake (1995) also claims that case studies are appropriate to investigate complex
issues and to elicit intensive data within the research context. Further, the aim of
analysis in this study is to understand how and why internal auditors in an Indonesian
SOE respond to their context of government regulations, professional bodies and the
uncertain business environment.
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Fifth, it is appropriate to use case studies when there are limited insights about the
issue being investigated. Some scholars (Benbasat et al., 1987; Yin, 2009) claim that the
case study is the most recommended way of capturing the critical experiences of actors
in a social context when there are unclear boundaries between the phenomenon under
investigation and context. Similarly, Cavaye (1996) suggests that a case study strategy
seeks in-depth understanding of the phenomenon's context, investigates a predefined
phenomenon and contributes to knowledge by relating findings to generalisable theory.
Case studies also focus on investigating contextual factors and characteristics (Yin,
2009). This makes it an appropriate method to gain insights from practitioners in the
internal audit field. In other words, a case study makes it possible to dig deep and gain
understanding about one or a few issues of internal audit practice relating to the
institutional environment when there is limited knowledge available due to less research
in the area.
Further, some scholars also have recommended the use of case studies to
investigate the practice of internal audit functions. For instance Al-Twaijry et al., (2003),
Arena and Azzone (2009), and Humphrey and Moizer (1990) highlight the need to
conduct more case studies in auditing. This is indicated by the lack of published
scientific reading regarding such practice. In addition, where the institutional
environment is one of the influencing factors, most of the available written work on the
area is published by practitioners, not researchers. To put it simply, case study is wellsuited to obtain insights from practitioners and apply theory, in this research the
institutional theory, to understand the contextual phenomena.
This study takes the form of interpretive case study research as it promises a rich
description of contexts. In this case, understanding the responses of internal audit unit is
a contemporary phenomenon should be studied within its real-life context, the
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institutional environment in Indonesian public SOE context that shapes current internal
audit practice. For this purpose, this study adopts descriptive case study research based
on the aim of study.
Benbasat et al., (1987) propose a number of questions to justify the use of case
study in investigating a phenomenon. First, can the phenomenon of interest be studied
outside its natural setting? The previous discussion indicates that the practice of internal
audit functions within the institutional environment in an Indonesian SOE cannot be
investigated from outside the context, so the researcher has study within it. Second,
must the study focus on contemporary events? As explained above this study focuses on
the current responses of the internal audit functions to institutional pressures in an
Indonesian SOE context. Is control or manipulation of subjects or events necessary?
Controlling and applying treatment to the research variables is not necessary, as case
study does not seek to investigate the impact of a treatment. Rather, this study seeks to
obtain a holistic picture of knowledge concerning the practitioners’ experience and their
natural responses to how external factors affect the practice of internal audit functions,
that is, government regulations, professional organisations and the uncertain business
environment. Does the phenomenon of interest benefit from an established theoretical
base? The literature suggests that there is a few studies on this issue so it is necessary to
do a more in-depth study in order to build a comprehensive theoretical base. For these
reasons, the researcher considers that a case study is appropriate as the research strategy
for this study.
3.5.2. Overcoming Case Study Limitation
Despite its benefits, case study has received a number of criticisms. Cook and
Campbell (1979) indicate that there have been a number of poor case studies, leaving
them open to criticism, especially from the quantitative field of research. For instance,
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case study has an issue with internal validity since there is no control to the research
variables. However, the internal validity focuses only on explaining the causal
relationship for explanatory case studies which is inapplicable to descriptive or
exploratory case studies as these types of study are not concerned with making causal
claims (Yin, 2003). Other criticism relates to the findings, firstly that they require
interpretation, which may be subjective, and secondly that case study findings may not
be generalised. In addition, Humphrey (2001, p. 97) asserts that “there is no such thing
as a truly ‘correct’ and ‘balanced’ case study - that two researchers are likely to produce
two different case studies from visits to the same organisation”.
Yin (2009) identifies that the risk of bias in case study has been a common
criticism. In this sense the risk of bias refers to the biased views that can affect the
direction of the findings and conclusions. To avoid potential bias researchers can
employ triangulation (multiple sources of evidences), which is a common feature of
case studies. Neale et al. (2006) also suggest another limitation of case study: that is that
it can be lengthy. It is lengthy because it contains detailed information in narrative form
which might reduce readers’ interest. Therefore, it is important to provide rich
information in a digestible manner when writing a case study report. Another major
restriction of case study is that the data collected are only related to the case being
investigated. Although there are possibilities to set up relationships among the variables,
they cannot show direction of causality (Cavaye, 1996). In addition, despite having
limitations in terms of external validity, Yin (2014) claims that case study results can be
generalised for theory but not for the population.
Yin (2003) states that the goal of reliability is to reduce errors and bias in a study.
Reliable study allows the next researcher who employs the same procedures to arrive at
the same finding and conclusions. These procedures are documented in a research
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protocol which can be used as specific tactics to overcome reliability issues in case
study. As Yin (2003) points out the protocol is the key to increasing the reliability of
case study research and is used to guide investigators in collecting data from a singlecase study.
3.5.3. Single-Case Study Design
Case study is a flexible research strategy which is able to investigate single or
multiple cases, depending on the principal philosophical assumptions of the researcher
(Myers and Avison, 2002). However, Perry (1998) argues that there is no proper rule to
determine the total number of cases to be conducted. Similarly, Patton (1990) argues
that there are no rules for deciding sample size in qualitative research. Nevertheless,
Irani et al. (1999) assert that determining the number of cases requires the researcher’s
discretion and also considerations both of the research aim and questions. Likewise,
Eisenhardt (1991) claims that research questions and data to be gathered are the factors
in determining the appropriate number of cases.
Yin (2009) claims that a single case study is used when the case has unique
circumstances and is also the first examination of the phenomenon. Furthermore, a
single case can be utilised to test or confirm a theory if it meets the condition required
by the theory. This allows single case findings to contribute significantly to theory
extension or development and to direct the focus of future study (Yin, 2003). This study
focuses on the practice of internal audit functions within the institutional environment in
an Indonesian public SOE, which is a unique context as it is different with other
institutional environments in other developing and developed countries. The unique
context of Indonesia may be contributed from the colonial period in Indonesia that
created massive regulations on the internal auditing. Moreover, there is no research
concerning such practice in Indonesian SOEs. Furthermore, this study used institutional
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theory that holds the view that the institutional environment is socially constructed, as
are also the internal audit functions. Therefore, based on these research characteristics, a
single case study is appropriate.
The level at which research is carried out and which objects are researched is
called the unit of analysis (Blumberg et al., 2011). The unit of analysis should be
associated with “the major entity that you are analysing in your study” (Trochim, 2006).
It could be an individual, a group of individuals (such as a family or professional
association), a social category (for example a social class or gender) or an organisation
or individuals within an organisation (Neuman, 2006; Yin, 2003). The unit of analysis
in this study is an internal audit unit to understand how the institutional pressures shape
the practice of internal audit. In terms of analysis purpose, the study investigates the
response of the internal audit unit toward the institutional pressures. The response is
demonstrated in the internal audit charter and implementation of the charter in practice.
Afterwards, the case study findings will be further examined using the institutional
theory framework, particularly using the strategic responses to institutional process
developed by Oliver (1991). The findings also will be examined using method
suggested by Fogarty (1996) by comparing the charter and its implementation.
Benbasat et al. (1987) suggest that industry, geographic coverage and specific
technologies are the organisations’ characteristics which could be used for site selection
basis when investigating an organisation-level phenomenon. The case under study is
conducted in a public SOE in Indonesia since the Supreme Financial Audit of
Indonesian Government (BPK), and the Financial and Development Supervisory
Agency (BPKP), a government internal audit department, each reported over 6000 and
700 suspected corruption cases respectively during the years 2001 – 2004 in
government institutions, including SOEs (Oxford, 2004). In addition, several CEOs of
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the SOEs were convicted on corruption scandals by the Corruption Eradication
Commission (KPK) (Umar, 2011). Another reason is that the SOE has a crucial role in
the national economy, as an income source for the government, and SOEs’ poor
financial performance resulted in the government having financial difficulty. Moreover,
there is no study on the practice of internal audit functions within an institutional theory
framework in the Indonesian SOE context. In addition, the internal audit functions are
always a subject of government regulations, and subject to the demands of local and
international professional bodies. Thus, all these reasons contributed to choosing SOEs
for a case study.
However, the participation of public SOE in this study is on voluntary basis. In
this case, the researcher used personal contacts to gain the access to the SOE as well as
encourage their cooperation by sending invitation letters through e-mail to the CEOs of
the several SOEs. These letters explained the research objectives, the importance of the
research, and then requested participation. The invitation letter is written in Indonesian
language by the researcher, which then checked by one of supervisor who has
Indonesian background. The invitation letter then was translated back to English by a
certified translator then was also checked by the supervisor who has Indonesian
background. Having a single point of contact of the senior officer within selected
organisations

gave

benefits

to

the

researcher

which

included

access

and

recommendation of the best interviewees to provide the required data (Voss et al., 2002)
as well as avoiding duplications of communication (Lewis, 2003).
Most of SOEs refused to participate in this study since the research’s topic is
related with internal audit units, a confidential field for them. Also they were not
confident since they thought that the company's internal audit units and financial
performance were not good quality.
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3.6. Data Collection
This sub section discusses the process of how the data is collected. Yin (2009)
points out that empirical research design is a cohesive and logical process comprising of
a number of stages. The first stage is the formulation of ideas and developing the “what”
question about the research. The second stage is data collection or “how” the study
should be carried out. The third stage is the analysis of the collected data and
interpreting “why” questions concerning the research case.
Neale et al. (2006) identify a number of potential sources of information of case
study which include project documents (e.g. meeting minutes), project reports,
including quarterly reports, midterm reviews, monitoring visits, mystery client reports,
facility assessment reports, interviews, questionnaire/survey results, evaluation reports,
and

observation. In collecting data, there are some overriding principles that

researchers have to consider. These include a) using multiple sources of evidence, b)
creating a case study data base, c) maintaining the linkage between questions, evidence
and conclusions. Incorporating these principles will enable the researchers to increase
the case study quality (Yin, 2003). Therefore, it is important that researchers follow
these principles when collecting evidence from all the sources above. Similarly, the use
of multiple sources for collecting data has been highly recommended by a number of
researchers in order to increase both reliability and validity of qualitative research
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). Therefore, to maintain data validity, this study used
triangulation for data collection using interviews, documentation and direct observation.
The use of multiple sources also aims to triangulate the evidence acquired.
Triangulation is very important in conducting a case study, as Yin (2009, p.199)
suggests that “any case study finding or conclusion is likely to be more convincing and
accurate if it is based on several different sources of information”. This has strengthened
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case study as a research strategy. Yin further (2003) argues that the use of multiple
sources of evidence in case studies enables the researcher to gain a wider perspective of
historical, attitudinal, and behavioural issues. This has made case study findings and
conclusions much more convincing and accurate (Yin, 2003).
Yin (2009) identifies a number of triangulation methods and one of them is
employing multiple data collection techniques within a study to check the derived data
validity; which makes data triangulation possible (Eisenhardt, 1989). Data triangulation
is another type of triangulation which is useful to verify facts through multiple data
sources (Flick, 2008). It also enriches the quality of data and finding robustness (Myers,
2009), as well as increases the reliability and validity of qualitative research (Miles and
Huberman, 1994). Further, it enables data cross-validation gained from varied sources.
In other words, data triangulation allows the researcher to address the potential problem
of construct validity since multiple source of evidence enables the multiple
measurement of the same context. This has made case study highly rated in terms of its
overall quality compared to relying on single source of evidence.
Table 3.1. Six Sources of Evidence: Strengths and Weaknesses
Sources of Evidence
Documentation*

•
•
•
•

Strengths
Stable – can be reviewed
repeatedly
Unobtrusive – not created as a
result of the case study
Exact – contains exact names,
references, and details of an event
Broad coverage – long span of
time, many events, and many
settings

•
•
•
•

Weaknesses
Retrievability – can be low
Biased
selectivity,
if
collection is incomplete
Reporting bias – reflects
(unknown) bias of author
Access – may be deliberately
blocked

The actions taken at the site:
Collecting internal data from the company website, such as annual
reports of the company; gathering company information from external
sources, such as online newspapers; and compiling a list of relevant
law, government regulations and regulations from online sources, such
as regulations issued by the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprise.
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Archival Records *

• (Same
as
above
documentation)
• Precise and quantitative

for • (Same
as
above
for
documentation)
• Accessibility due to privacy
reasons

The actions taken at the site:
Collecting internal data from a company’s archives, such as
organisational structure of the company, the company’s policy,
procedures of internal auditing, a number of evaluation reports on the
company, book of the Internal Auditing Standards issued by the IIA as
well as Consortium of Internal Auditors of Indonesia.
Interviews*

Direct Observations*

• Targeted – focuses directly on • Bias due to poorly constructed
case study topic
questions
• Insightful – provides perceived • Response bias
causal inferences
• Inaccuracies due to poor recall
• Reflexivity – interviewee
gives what interviewer wants
to hear
The actions taken at the site:
Performing interviews with all levels of internal auditors in the internal
audit department. The interviewees consist of 18 auditors from various
positions; one manager-level auditor, five senior-level auditors, 11
middle-level auditors and one junior-level auditor. The total numbers of
participants were 18 out of 22 auditors in the internal audit unit being
investigated. Four auditors refused to be participated in this study.
• Reality – covers events in real • Time-consuming
time
• Selectivity – unless broad
• Contextual – covers context of
coverage
event
• Reflexivity – event may
proceed differently because it
is being observed
• Cost – hours needed by human
observers
The actions taken at the site:
Observing the office condition in the internal audit department, the
meetings held among the internal auditors in small group for each
bureau of internal audit, the meeting between the head of internal audit
department and bureaus of internal audit, the knowledge sharing
meeting.

ParticipantObservation

• (Same as above for direct • (Same as above for direct
observations)
observations)
• Insightful
into
interpersonal • Bias due to investigator’s
behaviour and motives
manipulation of events

Physical Artifacts

• Insightful into cultural features
• Selectivity
• Insightful
into
technical • Availability
operations

Source: Yin (2003, p.86)
*Sources of evidence adopted in this study
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The section below outlines the use of the multiple data collection method to
collect empirical evidence.
3.6.1. Semi-Structured Interviews
Concerning interpretive case study, interviews are considered the most important
source of information (Walsham, 1995a; Yin, 2003). In interpretive study, less
structured interviews are recommended as they encourage the participants to express
their opinion freely without being restricted by the researchers’ preconceptions (Doolin,
1996). It is consistent with ontological stance of this research since such interviews
explored the experience, understanding and interpretations of the participants as the
component of social reality. Moreover, interview is also in harmony with the research’s
epistemology since it is an interactive approach which allows the flow of participant
interpretations.
Hermanowicz (2002) suggests that the most fundamental type of interviews is the
semi-structured interview as it enables the researchers to gain a closer understanding of
people and their social world. In semi-structured interviews it is also appropriate to use
the common open-ended question in interviews such as what and how (Eriksson and
Kovalainen, 2008). Further, case study interviews are open-ended in nature since the
researcher can ask respondents about facts and their opinion of certain matters or events
(Yin, 2003). During the interview, the researcher records the participants’ responses and
transcribes them afterwards (Hermanowicz, 2002), and can complement this with notetaking if necessary (Walsham, 1995a).
Johnson and Christenson (2004, p.178) define interview as a data-collection
method in which an interviewer (a researcher or someone working for the researcher)
ask questions of the research participants. The interviewer asks questions related to the
issue being investigated, while the interviewees provide answers based on their personal
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knowledge or experiences. Interviews can be carried out in a number of ways: face to
face or in-person interviews and telephone interviews. For this study, the researcher
conducted face to face interviews which lasted roughly an hour and half for each
participant. However, the telephone interviews were employed to ask for additional
information. Johnson and Christenson (2004) emphasises the strength of using
interviews in collecting data, is that it allows the researcher to use probes or prompts to
obtain response clarity or additional information. In addition, biased views can be
reduced by interviewing many different highly knowledge respondents who have the
critical ability to show their views from different perspectives (Eisenhardt and Graebner,
2007).
Yin (2003) suggested using open-ended interviews during field research since it
encourages research respondents to discuss issues and share their viewpoints. This study
gathered the interviewees’ interpretations concerning changes in the practice of internal
audit functions in relation to government regulations, professional bodies and the
uncertain business environment as the institutional pressures on a public SOE.
Therefore, the interviewees were chosen to include 18 internal auditors from various
positions; one manager-level auditor, five senior-level auditors, 11 middle-level auditors
and one junior-level auditor. The total numbers of participants were 18 out of 22
auditors in the internal audit department under study. 4 auditors refused to participate in
this study. Using multiple informants allows the viewing research points from more
than one perspective and also verifies the credibility of data. Interviewing different
people within an organisation aims to triangulate subjects (Myers and Newman, 2007)
and reduce the bias of interviewing only prominent individuals (Miles and Huberman,
1994). The information from the semi-structured interview comprises the functions of
internal audit, how these functions operate, how human resources is managed, how the
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internal auditors tackle their challenges while performing their duties, as well as the
reasons for their actions. In addition, when a researcher finds that more information is
needed, he / she can ask for permission to call back in order to clarify some information
or to gain feedback (Myers and Newman, 2007).
An interview protocol of this study was guidance for the interviews, and was
developed prior to the field study, including being reviewed and checked by three
supervisors have expertise in internal auditing and institutional theory. The protocol
draft was given to three supervisors who have expertise in internal auditing and
institutional theory for comments. Johnson and Christenson (2004, p.180) defines an
interview protocol as an instrument to collect data in an interview which includes the
items, the response categories, the instructions and so forth. However, there will be no
response categories in this interview as it is a qualitative interview with a list of openended questions to obtain qualitative data (Johnson and Christenson, 20004, p.183). The
protocol provides a description of procedures for the interview purposes. The protocol
contains the purpose of the research, data collection methods, data analysis, the unit of
analysis of the study, questions on the general information of the organisation, questions
regarding personal information of the participants and questions that relevant to the
research topic. The three supervisors were asked to review whether the protocol was in
line with the objectives of the study and provide required information for the
participants to provide the required information for the researcher. The supervisors also
provided advice on the ways to conduct the interview with the research participants.
Such protocol allows other researchers to trace the data collection path used (Irani et al.,
1999), replicate the study and obtain similar results (Yin, 2009).
The interview session is initiated by providing a participant information sheet
(PIS) and a consent letter to each of participant. The PIS and consent letter are written
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in English. However, with the advice of the supervisors, the researcher explained the
content of these to the participants in Indonesian language. In addition, the internal audit
manager who is fluent in English provided explanation about the content of the PIS and
consent forms in Indonesian language to his subordinates who participated in the study.
In this interview session, the researcher informed the participant in Indonesian language
about the aim and general objectives of the study, the purpose of the interviews, and
how the information gathered in the interviews are presented in the thesis. At this point,
the participants were assured the confidently of their identities in all the research
documents.
During the interview process, the researcher avoided over-directing the
interviewee and allowed the interviewees to express their views freely. All interviews
were conducted in the interviewee’s office within the department of internal audit, and
this facilitated access to relevant documents to support their views. The initial English
interview questions and their Indonesian translations were checked by one of the
supervisor who is a native Indonesian fluent in Indonesian and English languages. All
interviewees answered the interview questions in a mixture of Indonesian and Javanese
(local) languages. The researcher recorded interviews using an audio tape recorder and
then converted the recordings into transcriptions in Indonesian language by listening to
the recordings repeatedly. The transcriptions were then checked by the researcher
listening to the recordings again. In order to increasing the credibility of the interview
data, these transcriptions were sent to the participants for final confirmation as Bryman
and Bell (2007) suggest that members’ validation is essential to confirm the collected
data. These transcriptions were then translated into English language by a certified
translator. The English transcriptions were then checked by the supervisor who is fluent
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in English and Indonesian languages by comparing them with the transcriptions in
Indonesian.
3.6.1.1. Purposive Sampling for Participants
Many researchers highly recommend the use of purposive sampling techniques in
qualitative research (Neuman, 2003), to identify the key participants. In such a sampling
technique, it is the researcher’s self-interest which develops or specifies the criteria for
the research participants (Johnson and Christensen, 2004, p. 215), and the main criterion
is having a detailed understanding of the phenomenon under study. For instance, in this
study, the participants’ profession as internal auditors in a public SOE is mainly used to
determine the criterion of being participants in the research. This criterion is set up
because the unit of analysis was the internal audit unit which covers individual internal
auditors, who are in a position to respond to institutional pressures in undertaking
internal audit activities. The internal auditors enabled the researcher to explain the
research phenomena. Further, Yin (2003) suggests careful selection of participants as
they play a vital part in interview, and they should be integrated in the case study
protocol.
3.6.2. Direct Observations
Along with interviews, data was collected through the observation of a number of
internal auditors in their departments, to observe the interaction between internal
auditors as well as between the auditors and the auditee. Observation comprises of
activities like listening, looking, and everyday face-to-face interactions which greatly
depend on both verbal and visual behaviours (Punch, 1999). In some cases, internal
auditors, can demonstrate practically how they, for example, undertake the internal audit
plan activity, and sharing knowledge for training purpose. All these actions will be
observed as they add to data richness and as Yin (2003) highlights, a researcher can
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observe relevant behaviour or available environmental conditions. In qualitative
research, observation is unstructured as recommended by Bryman and Bell (2007).
As noted previously, triangulation involves multiple used of data collecting
methods, and observation is employed in order to optimise the triangulation to obtain
data enrichment as well as increase research validity and reliability. Observations in this
study can involve observations of meetings between the internal auditor team, and
between the internal audit staff and both the audit committee and top management.
Moreover, researcher will observe the condition of workspaces as they indicate an
organisation's working climate. In addition, while carrying out observation, some efforts
to converse informally with the internal audit staff were conducted for additional
information.
Observation was found to be a useful method of collecting data, instigated by the
need to investigate the working environment, the communication between partners, and
the means of interaction. A number of relevant behaviours or environmental conditions
will be available for observation within the phenomena under study (Yin, 2003). Such
observations provide an added source of evidence in a case study. Ultimately, the
technique of observation was employed to obtain maximum benefit from triangulation
in this study, which resulted in enriching the gathered data and increasing the research
reliability and validity.
Moreover, informal conversations among the internal auditors offer opportunities
to gain additional information about the area being studied. Similarly, the meetings
between the internal auditor team and the audit committee represent other information
sources that can be obtained through observations.
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3.6.3. Documentation and Archival Records
For case studies, documents are important to corroborate and augment evidence
from other sources (Yin, 2003: p. 87). Yin (2003) further explains that documents can
be used to make inferences, and be used as clues worthy of further investigation. The
overall value of documents indicates its explicit role in any data collection for case
studies. Therefore, systematic searches for relevant documents are an essential aspect of
the data collection plan (Yin, 2003).
In qualitative studies, collecting documents is deemed a crucial means of data
collection. Documentation and archival records strengthen research and provide
information that may not be available from other sources (McDonald, 2010; Yin, 2003).
Documentation includes “administrative documents, formal studies or evaluation and
newspaper clippings” (Yin 2003, p.86). The documentation in this study will cover:
• All government regulations relating to the internal audit, for example: BapepamLK/OJK regulation for listed companies, the Decree of Ministry of SOE on corporate
governance for all SOEs, the Law of SOE and other relevant government regulations
for SOE.
• The internal audit charter, the independent audit reports generated by the BPKP and
the consultant firms, the annual report of SOE.
• The company policy, the organisational structure, all Standard Operating Procedures
(SOP) documents of internal auditing, Internal Audit Plan, knowledge sharing
materials from internal audit training sessions, and other relevant documents, such as
the book of International Professional Practices Framework (IPPF) issued by the
Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the Professional Standards of Internal Auditing
published by the Consortium of Professional Organisation of Internal Audit in
Indonesia.
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• In order to corroborate the evidence from other sources, this study also provides data
from the organisation’s website and other public sources of information, such mass
media.
These data assist to develop rich knowledge concerning the phenomenon being
investigated.
3.7. Data Analysis
Data analysis methods are often not well formulated is one of weaknesses of using
qualitative data (Miles and Huberman, 1994) and most methods require skills of the
researcher to observe themes within data (Oates, 2006). Some researchers have
suggested that qualitative content analysis can be used to analyse the significant amount
of qualitative data (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin 2009; Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009).
Qualitative analysis consists of “three concurrent flows of activity: data reduction, data
display, and conclusion drawing / verification” (Miles and Huberman, 1994: p.10). This
study applied the ideas of Miles and Huberman’s (1994) as a general strategy and a
qualitative content analysis suggested by Zhang and Wildemuth (2009).
3.7.1. Qualitative Content Analysis
This study employed a qualitative content analysis technique in order to
understand the nature of the investigated phenomena and to interpret the themes of the
research participants. This technique preserves the deep meaning of the qualitative data,
and provides a holistic view of the phenomena through the interpretation of all
transcribed interviews, documents and observation.
Content analysis usually refers to a systematic and replicable technique for
compressing words of text into fewer content categories stemming from clear rules of
coding (Krippendorff, 2004; Weber, 1990). Content analysis interprets the meaning
from the content of text data. Patton (2002, p.453) defines qualitative content analysis
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as “any qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort that takes a volume of
qualitative material and attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings”. Content
analysis enables researchers to understand social reality in a subjective but scientific
manner (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009).
Qualitative content analysis typically uses an inductive approach, in which themes
and categories are obtained from the data (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009). However, the
deductive approach is not excluded from qualitative content analysis (Patton, 2002).
Using inductive reasoning, there are three approaches to qualitative content analysis
(Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). This study follows the approach of qualitative content
analysis, whereby a theory and relevant research findings are used as the basis for initial
coding. Then, during data analysis, a number of new codes may arise from the data.
This method is employed since it validates a conceptual framework (Hsieh and Shannon,
2005). This approach directs the analysis and interpretation with particular expectations,
while empirical data may reveal some new aspects which differ from facets within the
conceptual framework.
3.7.1.1. Prepare the Data
In the analysis process, data collected from multiple sources were handled
concurrently rather than separately. Every data source has an important role in
providing a greater understanding of the entire phenomenon and in reinforcing the
research results. The process of data analysis began with data being converted into
written text. Recordings of interviews using audio tapes were transcribed.
Comprehensive transcripts contain all the answers to the interview questions which
were transcribed literally in as spoken. The transcribing process includes the translation
process from Indonesian to English. A copy of all raw data was created. The first step of
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analysis was reading all the data to identify its key themes. At first, three themes were
employed (Oates, 2006):
a) Themes have no relation to the aims of the research so are not required.
b) Themes furnish general information which is needed for explaining the research
context. For instance: the organisation history, and the number of employees.
c) Themes were pertinent to the research questions. These themes are coded and
categorised.
3.7.1.2. Define the Coding Unit
In the qualitative content analysis, defining the coding unit is one of the most
fundamental and essential decisions (Weber, 1990). Zhang and Wildemuth (2009)
maintained that the coding unit of analysis means that the basic unit of text has to be
classified. To do qualitative content analysis, individual themes are used as the coding
unit of analysis instead of words, sentences or paragraphs. A theme can be represented
by a single word, a phrase, a sentence, a paragraph or the whole document. In other
words, a text chunk of any size can express a code as long as the chunk represents single
theme of an issue relevant to the issue being investigated.
3.7.1.3. Developing Categories and a Coding Scheme
In the Miles and Hubermen Framework (1994), data reduction occurs continually
throughout the analytical process (Punch, 1999). Miles and Huberman, (1994, p.10)
define data reduction as “the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting,
and transforming the data that appear in written-up field notes or transcriptions”. The
objective of data reduction is to “reduce the data without significant loss of information”
(Punch, 1999). Further, Punch (1999) classifies the form of data reduction activities in
three stages: early, middle and final. In the beginning stage, data reduction happens
through editing, segmenting, and summarising data. In the middle stage, it happens
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through “coding and memoing and associated activities like finding themes, clusters and
patterns”(p.203). Johnson and Christenson (2004) define memoing as writing memos or
recording reflective notes about what the researcher is learning from the data. At this
stage, the researcher tries to develop the categories and a coding scheme. A category is
defined as “a group of words with similar meaning or connotation” (Weber, 1990, p37).
In the final stage, data reduction occurs by conceptualizing and explaining as
developing an abstract concept is also a way of data reduction (Punch, 1999, p. 203).
Hsieh and Shannon (2005) point out that analysis starts with developing initial codes
based on the conceptual framework. The coding scheme and categories are developed
into themes and sub-themes.
Rowley (2002) points out the importance of developing a framework to be used as
an analytic strategy for organising a case study. The framework development should
reflect the themes and the collected evidence within each theme is analysed and
compared in these categories. Rowley further suggests that the purpose of doing this is
to get a description that can be corroborated from multiple sources of evidence. The
coding scheme and categories were based initially on the conceptual framework themes
and sub-themes. This approach was indeed helpful for the data reduction stage. This
process is also directed towards the research questions and objectives. Moreover, Miles
and Hubermen (1994) suggest that coding should be based on the conceptual framework
and research questions since they are the best defence against overload. Miles and
Hubermen (1994) also indicate that a list of coding categories should be generated from
the framework and modified during the analysis as new categories emerge inductively.
Assigning a unit of text to more than one category simultaneously is applicable in
qualitative content analysis (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009). The definition of coding
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scheme categories is directed to be as internally homogeneous as possible and as
externally heterogeneous as possible (Lincoln and Guba, 1994).
3.7.1.4. Test the Coding Scheme on a Sample
At early stage of the analysis process, the researcher developed and validated the
coding scheme in order to use a standardised process of analysis. Afterwards, coding
consistency was checked through an inter-coder agreement assessment. A sample data
was coded to test the clarity and consistency of category definitions (Zhang and
Wildemuth, 2009). Weber (1990) mentions that the process of coding sample text,
checking coding consistency and revising coding rules is iterative, which continues until
the achievement of sufficient coding consistency.
3.7.1.5. Code all the data
The coding rules were applied after sufficient consistency has been achieved. Also,
there were repeated checks during the coding process. When new themes and concepts
were revealed, they were added to the coding scheme.
3.7.1.6. Assess Coding Consistency
Having coded the entire data and rechecked the coding consistency, the researcher
carried out a further check.
3.7.1.7. Draw Conclusions from the Coded Data
This step comprises the process of making sense of the themes or categories
identified and their properties. The data are used to derive meanings which are then
inferred and reconstructed. Exploration of properties and dimensions of all categories is
done to identify relationships between categories. Perry (1998) stressed that the key to
rigorous analysis of case study data was theoretical replication. One of the strategies to
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analyse case studies, as recommended by Yin (2009) is to analyse the evidence based on
the development of a case description technique.
3.7.2. Within-Case Analysis
Some scholars (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2009) suggest that within-case
analysis is the analysis of each individual case by comparing it with the research’s
frame of reference. For each case it is necessary to collate participants’ individual
responses to each question to facilitate comparative analysis, and to make a case
summary, which is a single document created for each case and used to facilitate the
production of case reports. Ultimately, within-case analyses, transcripts and response
summaries are useful data.
3.7.3. The Role of Theory
In interpretive case study, theory is used in the early steps to formulate an initial
conceptual framework. Walsham (1995a) mentioned that the framework considers the
previous insights and forms a rational theoretical basis to inform the empirical work.
The study used institutional theory to investigate the practice of internal audit functions
as responses to government regulations, professional bodies and an uncertain business
environment as the institutional pressures. The study investigated how the changes in
the internal audit functions give it acceptance and legitimacy as a profession. Ball (1989)
pointed out that institutional theory is relevant to understanding the effects of an
institutional environment to internal auditing. The theory has been used to study internal
auditing with a focus on the design of internal audit departments as well as the
effectiveness of internal auditing (Al-Twaijry et al., 2003, Arena et al., 2006, Arena and
Azzone, 2007, Mihret, 2012). However, there is no research on the practice of internal
audit functions focusing on comprehensive practice of internal auditing. The theory also
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offers a good conceptual basis for studying the practice of change shaped by
institutional environments.
This study uses institutional theory as its base in interpreting the research findings.
Perry (1998) highlights the essential role of theory in case study design and data
analysis. Creswell (2009) also places case study in the middle of the continuum on how
theory is used in qualitative research approach. Further, this study uses a single-case
study to investigate the practice of internal audit using the institutional theory as a
research framework.
3.7.4. Criteria for Finding Trustworthiness
Despite the existence of criteria for finding trustworthiness in quantitative
research like objectivity, reliability, internal validity and external validity, these criteria,
are not applicable to interpretive research (Díaz Andrade, 2009; Lincoln and Guba,
1986). Therefore, for interpretive case study, different criteria have been set (Morse et
al., 2002) although there is no agreed set of criteria. The criteria for interpretative study
as postulated by Guba and Lincoln (1994) include: trustworthiness (validity),
confirmability (objectivity), dependability (reliability), credibility (internal validity) and
transferability (external validity).
3.7.4.1. Credibility
Guba and Lincoln (1994) define credibility as the extent of results’ accuracy,
matching reality and measuring it correctly. It parallels validity in quantitative research.
Credibility is ensured by adopting a number of techniques. It is vital to ensure that the
research is well designed so that it can examine the right things and collect the right data
from the right source. In order to collect the right data for the study’s purposes, the
researcher asked three supervisors who are experts in internal auditing and institutional
theory to check and review the interview questions. Offering an explanation on what
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happens concerning the relationship and the reasons underlying them is also an essential
aspect of research validity (Eisenhardt, 1989). Further, the researcher prolonged her stay
in the SOE in order to observe the participants’ behaviour. This is important to become
familiar with their routines and any unusual events. This extended engagement enabled
the researcher to gain an in-depth and comprehensive understanding (Morse et al., 2002)
of the internal audit functions practice.
Credibility can be increased by presenting some verbatim quotation as expressed
by the participants. Lee and Lings (2008, p.237) indicate that presenting raw data
collected from the fieldwork “allows the reader to get a better picture of the respondents’
own concepts and categories, without relying solely on the interpretation of the
researcher”. This research also takes into account the participants’ comments as a way
of increasing credibility as Bryman and Bell (2007) suggest that members’ validation is
essential to confirm the collected data. Not only does it allow the expansion of
understanding, this technique allows the refinement and clarification of the
understanding of the collection the data. This technique is applied after each interview
by summarising the main points expressed by the participants for final confirmation.
There are other techniques that can be used to increase the research credibility.
These include the use of triangulation and relying on information from multiple
respondents for semi-structured interviews. These techniques enable the researcher to
see a particular aspect of research from more than one point of view (Morse et al., 2002).
This study used triangulation on data collection methods; interview, documentation and
observation, which resulted in triangulation on data evidences. In term of interview, the
researcher involved various positions of internal auditors in the internal audit
department. One technique to increase research credibility is undertaking peer
debriefing process (Lincoln and Guba, 1986). This process involves colleagues acting as
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external reviewers to share data collected in order to obtain different perspectives about
the data. This also allows the researcher to broaden her / his interpretation of the data
and to avoid biased explanations by asking a qualified peer to challenge the primary
assumptions the researcher has made.
3.7.4.2. Generalisability
Collis and Hussey (2009, p. 59) argue that generalisation is “concerned with the
application of research results to cases or situations beyond those examined in the
study”. This definition has frequently led to the criticism of case study as case study
results cannot be statistically generalised (Yin, 2009). However, the generalisation of
the results is dependent on analytical generalisation (Yin, 2009). Researchers such as
Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) clearly indicate that interpretive research aims to gain a
deep understanding of the phenomenon which can be used to inform other contexts of
study. It does not aim to reach statistical generalisation. From an interpretive position,
the validity relies on the plausibility of the logical reasoning used in describing the
findings and in drawing conclusions from them (Walsham 1993). Therefore, the
generalisation in this study is not statistical but analytical whereby the empirical
findings of the case study will be compared with the established theory, which is
institutional theory. Furthermore, Walsham (1995a) indicates four other types of
generalisation of interpretive case studies: the development of concepts, the generation
of theory, the drawing of specific implications and the contribution of rich insight.
3.7.4.3. Confirmability
Confirmability is a concept viewed differently by positivist and interpretive
approaches. In the positivist paradigm, it concerns the state of the researcher being free
from bias (Lincoln and Guba, 1994). However, as there are interactions between
researchers and the participants, there might be influences which cause bias in
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interpretive research. In other words, there is the potential of researcher subjectivity
which may cause biased explanations. Therefore, Rowley (2002) stresses that it is vital
to link data collection questions to research questions in order to reduce subjectivity.
Yin (2009) also postulated three solutions to deal with subjectivity which comprise the
use various sources of data, establishing a string of evidence and having key
interviewees review a draft of the case study report. Confirmability can also be achieved
by using multiple-data sources, methods and informants to verify the description as well
as interpretations that have been used (Doolin, 1996; Lincoln and Guba, 1994). It is also
suggested that the researcher provides sufficient explanation to judge whether the
results do flow from the data in the setting (Lincoln and Guba, 1994). Doing this
contributes to the trustworthiness of the analysis as Yin (2009) points out that auditors
and any external inspection are able to track the development of ideas through
trustworthiness procedures.
3.7.4.4. Dependability
Dependability refers to the accuracy and reliability of the research instruments
(Oates, 2006), and can be achieved through documentation of procedures (Rowley,
2002). In other words, both the research process and data need to be well recorded or
documented. Yin (2009) advises that developing a case study protocol and database are
one way to record or document the research process.
To enhance the dependability of this study, all the research processes follow the
standard process which is clearly guided by a case study protocol. For instance, the
recorded data from the interview data is fully transcribed so that accurate interpretation
can be ensured as much as possible. Also, the empirical data, collected from all the
interviews and other documents, is stored in a systematically and logically ordered
manner which is called a structured case study database. Furthermore, to make sure all
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the processes of data collection and analysis are accessible for review, a digital format
of data is provided.
3.8. Ethical Considerations
It is suggested that ethical issues is critical particularly in social research (Tilley
and Woodthorpe, 2011; Myers, 2009). In this study, there is an imbalance of power
between the researcher and the participant (Bell and Bryman, 2007) whereby the
researcher has a weaker bargaining position. The power to define to what extent access
and setting can be accessed by the researcher is defined by the senior participants, in
particular the senior manager. The researcher has to gain consent from the participant to
conduct the research. Securing research consent is by convincing the participants that
they would benefit from taking part and by ensuring them that confidential information
is protected. Further, both the researcher and the companies made an agreement
concerning information restriction that clearly specifies what can be disclosed for the
research purpose. The researcher also faces pressure to protect participants as well as
the companies’ confidentiality and anonymity to avoid harmful effects (Bell and
Bryman, 2007; Tilley and Woodthorpe, 2011). Confidentiality is related to protection of
the given information while anonymity concerns the concealing of the names and any
identifying information of the participants involved. Therefore, the participants’
identities were protected by using pseudonyms and removing identifiable information
concerning individuals and the company in this study. Furthermore, any input and
feedback provided by them were used for research purposes and kept in high
confidentiality. Overall, this process allows participants to be open and frank in sharing
their personal beliefs and experiences.
The researcher also provided a participant information sheet (PIS) explaining
participants’ rights, contributions, benefits and risks of the study. They were also asked
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to sign the consent form, which stating their participation was on a voluntarily basis.
The PIS and consent form also stated that they had the right to take part or to refuse to
participate in the study without having to experience any harm in the future. They could
also withdraw participation at any stage of the research along with any information they
had supplied. Such a condition is in alliance with suggestions by Krathwohl (1997,
p.212) concerning the code of ethics in the conduct of research with human participants
stating that “informing participants about the nature of the study, and respecting their
freedom to decline to participate in or withdraw from the research in any time”. In the
same tone, Payne and Payne (2004, p. 68) also argue that participants should “be
enabled freely to give their informed consent to participate, and advised that they can
terminate their involvement for any reason, at any time”.
Furthermore, the researcher has to ensure the privacy and confidentiality of the
information provided, and informed participants that tape-recordings would be stored
securely in such a way that only the researcher could gain access to the data. Moreover,
during the analysis of data, the researcher was aware of ethical considerations and made
obvious efforts to maintain the objectivity of the research.
Ultimately, it is critical to address ethical considerations of doing the interviews.
Myers and Newman (2007) identify some ways to do this which involve such things as:
gaining approval from the research ethic committee and consent from the participants;
treating the participants in such a way as to respect their knowledge, expertise, position,
and time provision; maintaining the confidentiality and anonymity of the collected data
and the informants' identities; and providing feedback to the participating organisation.
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Chapter 4
A Historical Account of the Legislation
Related to the State-Owned Enterprises in Indonesia

4.1. Introduction
The institutional theory supports the idea that the evolution of internal auditing is
shaped by the changes in government legislation. In Indonesia, the government
legislation may affect the development of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and the
practice of internal auditing in SOEs. In addition, the establishment of SOEs in
Indonesia is related to the independence of Indonesia after the era of colonialism.
Therefore, it is important to understand the evolution of internal auditing specifically as
implemented by SOEs in Indonesia.
The discussion on the development of SOEs is spread into three periods starting
from the early years after independence which is called ‘the Old Order (Orde Lama)’
and was led by Soekarno. The second period is the period after the old era which is
called as ‘New Order (Orde Baru)’ led by Soeharto. The third period discussed in this
chapter is the Post-New Order era which is a transition era within a situation of political
instability after Soeharto stepped down.
Many developments in the practice of internal auditing in SOEs are discussed in
this chapter. The issuance of government regulations that affect the operation of SOEs
and hence the practice of internal auditing by SOEs is also covered in this chapter.
Finally, the chapter will be closed with a summary.

4.2. The Development of State-Owned Enterprises (1945 – 2015)
Indonesia was colonialised for many years by Portugal, Britain, the Netherlands
and Japan (Baker 1991; Fettling, 2014; Frederick, 2012; Hendriks, 2012). Such a long
sombre colonial period has been an influence on past and also current Indonesian
economics, because when those invaders entered Indonesia, they brought along their
own control over Indonesian economics with a wide range of distinct regulations, some
of which have remained until now (Baker, 1991; Hendriks, 2012; Lindblad, 2003). To
illustrate, throughout 350 years of the colonial era, the Dutch built their business around
Indonesia (Baker, 1991; Hendriks, 2012; Lindblad, 2003). The Dutch government
established a large number of banks and business entities, which operated under Dutch
policies (Baker, 1991; Hendriks, 2012; Lindblad, 2003). This policy meant the
Indonesian government had difficulty taking control of businesses during the early
period of independence. The situation was also affected by the nature of a country,
being an archipelago as well as having a huge population that contains distinct multicomplexes of ethnic groups, cultures and religions.
The process of how the Indonesian government took over SOEs from the Dutch
government and how the SOEs were developed will be discussed in three periods. The
first period, in the Old Order was considered the initial period of the formation of
companies owned by government in Indonesia. This era was under an economic
framework created by President Soekarno. The second period was the era of President
Soeharto who developed the companies owned by government into three legal forms,
namely Perum, Perjan, and Persero. The third period was the era after President
Soeharto in which the government started to focus on improving the condition of the
SOEs. The detailed development of the SOEs will be presented in three subsections
below.
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4.2.1. The Old Order Era (1945 – 1966)
The Republic of Indonesia proclaimed its independence on 17th August 1945 with
Soekarno as the first president (Baker, 1991; Fettling, 2013; Fettling 2014; Lindblad,
2008). The independence proclamation was a huge opportunity taken as soon as the
Indonesian government recognised the power vacuum that arose when the Japanese
army had completely withdrawn from Indonesia due to its surrender to the Allied forces
after Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombing events. At the same time the Netherlands,
one of the main allied forces, was still on the long trip to return to Indonesia with the
purpose of re-colonisation (Baker, 1991; Fettling, 2013; Frakking, 2012; Hendriks,
2012). As a result, the independence declaration was from the Indonesia government
itself without any recognition by the Dutch government. This condition triggered battles
across the entire territory of Indonesia (Baker, 1991; Fettling, 2013; Frederick, 2012);
however, these wars were never successful in obtaining acknowledgement from the
Dutch government. On the other hand, although the Dutch used violence to try and
quash Indonesia’s independence, the fact this is not only failed but also generated
international criticism ended up forcing the Dutch and the Indonesian governments to
hold a meeting to settle the problem peacefully (Baker, 1991). Therefore, in order that
Indonesia’s independence from the Dutch be acknowledged, the Indonesian government
attempted to conduct many negotiations with the Dutch through a wide range of
meetings, for example the Linggar Jati meeting in 1946 (Frakking, 2012), the Renville
conference in 1948 (Fettling, 2014; Fettling, 2013), the Roem-Royen convention in
1949 and a Round Table conference in the same year (Lindblad, 2008; Wie, 2003).
However, these meetings were not totally successful because the Dutch government
affirmed political independence for Indonesia but not economic freedom (Lindblad,
2008). The Dutch government put pressure on the Indonesian government to sign the
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Financial Economic Agreement in the Round Table conference that had both
governments and the United Nations Commission in attendance (Wie, 2003). According
to this Agreement, the Dutch wanted the Indonesian government to satisfy three key
requirements (Wie, 2003). Firstly, the Indonesian government had to ensure the
sustainability of the Dutch business’s activities in Indonesia. Secondly, any Dutch
companies could be nationalised only if such companies agreed and were considered to
be in Indonesia’s national interests. Thirdly, the Indonesian government had to commit
to consultation with the Netherlands on any financial and economic policies that might
affect the Dutch’s economic benefits in Indonesia.
Undoubtedly, such requirements were extremely disadvantageous for Indonesia
but the Indonesian government had no choice but to agree to let the Dutch take
considerable control over Indonesian economics until the early 1950s (Higgins, 1990;
Linblad, 2008). Nevertheless, the Indonesian government really understood that they
could not have actual independence without having control of the economics of the
country. Hence, the government planned to nationalise all foreign-owned companies
that played vital roles in Indonesian economics by gradually purchasing them from the
Dutch (Baker, 1991). For example, in 1947, a major oil refinery company and a
strategic cement factory started to be managed and operated by Indonesian government
(Lindblad, 2008; Zed et al., 2001). In 1950, the Dutch airline company was purchased
by the Indonesian government and became the very first airline company of the country
and was named Garuda Indonesian Airways (Linblad, 2008; Wie, 2003). In 1954, the
Indonesian government took over all four electricity firms across Indonesia (Lindblad,
2008). These companies had similar conditions and still hired foreign experts as
employees for organisational management and operational purposes since Indonesia
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lacked competent people. As a result, the entities operated under a Dutch management
style as well as Dutch regulation.
Moreover, keeping in mind the aspiration of gaining control of all economic
aspects for Indonesia, a variety of new state-owned enterprises were built up by the
Indonesian government. For instance in 1946, two state-owned enterprises were created
to manage the agricultural estates, called Badan Penjelenggaraan Peroesahaan Goela
Negara (Body for Management of State Sugar Companies) and Poesat Perkeboenan
Negara (Centre for State Estates) (Lindblad, 2008). In 1950, the government continued
to establish the largest industrial project, namely the Gresik Cement Factory (Wie,
2003). In 1952, the government of Indonesia also established PELNI Company for
inter-island shipping (Linblad, 2008). Interestingly, since the financial condition of the
Indonesian government was not always good on the road to gaining economic freedom
from the Dutch as it was purchasing and creating new enterprises, it came up with the
solution of establishing joint ventures. By way of illustration, in 1952, the largest sack
factory of Indonesia was a joint venture between the State Industry Bank (Bank Industri
Negara), Dutch and two domestic plantations was established (Linblad, 2008).
Implementing the nationalisation plan resulted in considerable foreign debt for the
Indonesian government. Since the government had a serious financial shortage, the
nationalisation plan was temporarily stopped between 1956 and 1957.
In order to legally support the continuous nationalisation plan as well as stateowned enterprises that had recently been taken-over or built, the Indonesian government
started to issue a variety of laws throughout the three-year period from 1958 to 1960. In
1958, the Law No. 86 of 1958, the Indonesian government emphasised that they would
take over any Dutch companies if necessary even without the agreement of those
companies. Moreover, a nationalisation plan in terms of economics was carried out by
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considering the Indonesian government as a sovereign government, so that it could give
maximum benefit to the people of Indonesia, strengthen the country’s security and
protect the national unity.
In 1959 to 1960, President Soekarno imposed a politic system of guided
democracy and guided economic to reduce the involvement of western capitalists and to
build more of a relationship with Chinese socialists instead. In 1960, the Government
Regulation No. 19 of 1960 was issued, which was associated with the essential need for
establishing State Companies (Perusahaan Negara) in order to manage and implement
all-important governmental economic projects. Under the Economic Guidance principle
of President Soekarno, all State Companies had experienced similar management and
control as well as shared the same legal form. Additionally, this law mentioned that the
establishment of state enterprises aimed to build a better national economy.
It is necessary to notice that from 1960, it was Indonesian laws that were applied
to the companies of State, rather than the law set up by the Dutch - “Indonesiche
Bedrijvenwet Staatsblad 1927 No. 419”. Importantly, regarding the control over of
SOEs, the Regulation no. 19 of 1960 did not touched on any aspect associated with
internal evaluation of a company’s operation, which should have been performed by
responsible internal auditors. Instead, audit activities of any company were performed
by external parties who were members of the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) and the
Bureau of State Accountant.
In brief, the key motivation of the Indonesian government to establish the SOEs
was to push rapid economic growth in order to increase the employment rate and to
reduce poverty. Also, at the beginning of the independence period, building the
necessary infrastructure was a priority because of its primary role in any country’s
development. In detail, there were two approaches used by the Indonesian government
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to possess SOEs, one was by establishing new SOEs and the other was by taking over
existing foreign companies through giving them appropriate financial compensation.
Both methods required a huge budget that resulted in a considerable foreign debt for
Indonesia. Another weakness of the Indonesian government at that time was the lack
qualified native experts who could contribute effectively and efficiently in the
enterprises already nationalised. Additionally, these SOEs were still affected by
mimetic pressure because they still operated under the Dutch management style, with
Dutch employees in various vital positions and they continued to be regulated by
colonial regulations such as the ICW (Indische Comptabiliteitswet) which regulated
managerial and financial accountability of the Republic of Indonesia and the IBW
(Indische Bedrijvenwet) which standardised the financial administration of state
enterprises (Burger 1975 cited in Wie 2003).
4.2.2. The New Order Era (1966-1998)
The history of Indonesia was divided into three main periods. The first, was called
the Old Order. That period covered from the early years of independence in 1945 until
1966. The second era was named the New Order, which ran from 1966 to 1990. This
period was indicated by a new political policy employed by the new government, and
was marked by a shift from a tendency to be socialist to liberalism. Thirdly, the PostNew Order Era encompasses from 1998 to date.
4.2.2.1. 1966 - 1970
In 1966, the executive power was handed over from Soekarno to Soeharto (Baker,
1991). Afterwards, Soeharto became the second president of the Republic of Indonesia.
In this era, Soeharto inherited a collapsed economy from the previous period (Baker,
1991; Panglaykim and Arndt, 1966). Serious corruption was present in every aspect of
the governmental control system across the entire economy (Panglaykim and Arndt,
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1966). In order to improve the national economy, the new President Soeharto drastically
changed many policies to facilitate the shifting of Indonesia's political direction towards
liberalism, rather than socialism (Baker, 1991). This meant that the government opened
the door more widely for foreign investments in Indonesia. In 1967 the government
obtained positive foreign aid, in terms of debt from the Inter-Governmental Group in
Indonesia (IGGI) with a condition that the government must commit to implementing a
liberal economy in Indonesia (Baker, 1991; Sadli, 1997). Taking this opportunity, in
1967, the government continued to attract foreign investors by issuing Law no 1 of 1967
on Foreign Capital Investment (Baker, 1991; Sadli, 1972). The presence of both foreign
loans and foreign corporations was intended to improve the slumped economy of
Indonesia by building infrastructure such as power plants, highways, ports, and
industrial areas (Gie, 2011). Not only that, in the next year - 1968, the Law no 6 of 1968
on Domestic Capital Investment was released to attract domestic investors (Baker,
1991). Fortunately, the success of stabilising the economy was obvious and evident
through the significant declining in the inflation rate (Baker, 1991).
Meanwhile, economic stability had been restored by implementing direct and
indirect investment by the government in 1969 (Baker, 1991). Direct government
investment was conducted in productive sectors of the economy, infrastructure and
general services; while the indirect government investment was undertaken through the
offer of subsidised credit by the state-owned banks as well as a great contribution from
oil sector exports (Baker, 1991). As a result, economic growth during the 1970s was
high.
The Indonesian government prioritised agriculture, food crops in particular, rather
than manufacturing (Sadli, 1997), because the agricultural sector had played a major
role in the Indonesian economy by contributing substantial national income, employing
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a large proportion of the labour force and supplying raw materials for the manufacturing
sector. For instance, plantations, which were wholly owned by the government, were
allocated to 28 estates companies. As a result, under many new policies created by the
government, Indonesia became the world’s largest rice importer in 1970 and
successfully transformed itself to be self-sufficient in rice production. Not only that, but
Indonesia also became the world’s major exporter of natural rubber, and palm oil (Baker,
1991). These achievements were mainly a result of the effective operation of 12
government-owned estates organisations that focused primarily on rubber products and
10 public plantation companies that produced palm oil.
Additionally, in 1967, the government evaluated the legal form of SOEs, which in
the Old Order they had to follow the provisions of Guided Economic system mentioned
above. The evaluation led to the conclusion that SOEs with different functions could not
use alike legal form because it was considered causing an inefficiency of those SOEs’
operation throughout the long period under the management of the first president.
Instead, SOEs should be differentiated based on their main functions. Therefore, the
President Soeharto decided to generate some stipulations in Presidential Instruction no
17 of 1967, which was also supported by the Government Regulation No.1 of 1969.
According to the regulations, SOEs were divided into three forms, according to their
different functions, namely Bureau Enterprise (Perdjan), Public Enterprise (Perum), and
Limited Liability Company (Persero). Firstly, Perdjan was wholly owned by the
government and constituted a part of Department/Local Government that focused on
public services, such as trains and public hospitals. These services have been charging
affordable prices thanks to government subsidisation. Secondly, Perum firms such as
the Electricity Company and Perum, Forestry, were also fully owned by the government.
However, in contrast to the first form, although the main function of Perum was also to
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serve public interest, it has been operated for profit to ensure the sufficiency of
governmental income. Similarly, Persero was profit orientated and operated to
contribute to the development of private sectors and small business units, which
Perdjan and Perum had not focus into those aspects yet. Interestingly, Persero included
companies that were either fully or partly owned by government.
In terms of Persero, Regulation no 12 of 1969 was issued as guidance to how all
Persero companies should be run. This regulation stated that Persero companies’
activities were under the control of the Ministry of Finance, since Persero was mainly
responsible for improving the government finances. To this end, President Soeharto also
issued the Presidential Instruction No 11 of 1973, only for Persero. To illustrate, the
Ministry of Finance represented the government as a shareholder in Persero, and had
the right to delegate the authority to the technical Ministry as the supervisor of SOEs.
The delegation was conducted in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of
SOE activities. Thus, the technical Ministry had to provide technical supervision by
giving operational direction and guidance to the board of directors, on matters such as
production quality, production cost, and human resources.
Generally, the period between 1966 and 1969, after Soeharto had been appointed
president of Indonesia, could be considered a positive period in Indonesian economics.
Thanks to a wide range of new policies designed to attract more foreign investors, the
high inflation rate was controlled and decreased effectively. Also, the agriculture
industry got the necessary support from the government to grow and transform
Indonesia from a rice importer to an exporter in only a decade. Importantly, SOEs
operated more efficiently after the functional division and many supporting regulations
were issued to re-define the administration and management style for each and every
new form of SOE.
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4.2.2.2. 1970-1979
This phase, after Independence Day, could be considered the golden period of the
Indonesian economy. The strong economic growth was primarily supported by high
revenues from the petroleum sector which benefited from the rising world petrol price
from 1973 and beyond. However, the government seemed to pay such high attention to
oil-related sectors that they were distracted from non-oil sectors. Possessing high
revenues from the oil sector meant that the government had the ability to perform
heavily direct and indirect investments (Baker, 1991). The increasing direct investments
were mostly in infrastructure, public services and strategic industries through the
establishment of a number of SOEs such as iron and steel (Krakatau Steel), aluminium
(Asahan) and the development of existing SOEs, such as fertiliser (Pupuk Sriwidjaja
Palembang), cement (Gresik) and oil refining (Pertamina) (Baker, 1991).
Besides, in 1976, the government, through the Ministry of Research and
Technology, set up a state-owned company, PT Nurtanio Aircraft Industry, which in
1985 was renamed Nusantara Aircraft Industry. All these SOEs have similar features:
they are capital-intensive and require long periods of time to provide benefits (Baker,
1991). There was also a great increase in indirect investment made by the government
through giving subsidised credit to certain sectors through state-owned banks.
In 1976 the government established the Board of Trustees of Capital Market
(Bapepam), which serves as a supervisor and manager of the stock exchange.
Reactivation of the capital market was strengthened by the Presidential Decree no 52
issued in 1976. However, the capital market did not develop as expected because the
stock market experienced a decline over a span of 10 years from 1977.
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4.2.2.3. 1980
Right after the golden period, the Indonesian economy faced a slump with many
difficulties. In 1980 the world economic deterioration resulted in a decrease in export
revenues and an increase in the foreign debt burden on the government. In 1982, world
oil prices fell, which caused negative effects on oil export earnings which were the main
source of the governmental budget. In such a bad situation, the government tried to shift
its effort and budget to other export industries, but the world market prices for those
industries’ products also decreased in the early 1980’s, which negatively influenced
foreign exchange earnings (Baker, 1991). Faced with this negative situation, the
Indonesian government realised that they could not rely only on the public sector, but
they should offer various advantages to the private sector to encourage them to
contribute to the growth of the national economy. Therefore, the government issued a
variety of policies associated with capital markets, the banking sector and the increasing
roles of private companies in Indonesian industries (Wie, 1992). These policies reduced
the roles of state-owned industries and increased the roles of private organisations in
terms of both local and foreign companies in a wide range of industries (Bapepam,
2015). Moreover, those financial difficulties forced the government to sell some sound
SOEs in order to get cash quickly (Bapepam, 2015). Although Gresik Cement Company
was considered to be the most profitable company, it was the very first SOE whose
shares were sold to the public.
Furthermore, in order to improve the performance of SOEs, in 1983, the
government issued Government Regulation no 3 of 1983 which regulated the guidance
and supervision of three legal forms of SOEs, namely Perdjan, Perum and Persero. The
guidance was carried out by specifying particular plans, implementation and evaluation
of SOEs’ duties and functions. The evaluation could be conducted by comparing the
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results from the implementation with specific targets set in the plan in terms of both
financial and operational aspects. It was this regulation that commenced the setting up
of the internal control unit which is now recognised as the internal audit unit.
In 1988, the Presidential Instruction No 5 of 1988 was issued to provide
guidelines on how to improve soundness and management, which were controlled by
the Finance Minister as the government treasure counsellor and also the shareholder of
SOEs. To follow up on the president instruction, then, in 1989, the Finance Minister
released

the

Finance

Ministry

Decree

No

740/KMK.00/1989

and

No

826/KMK.013/1992 on improving the efficiency and productivity of SOEs. The
regulation stipulated that the assessment of efficiency and productivity of the SOE
should be conducted in the form of a periodic performance evaluation based on the
management report and financial statement. The result of performance appraisals of
SOE allowed the determination of the soundness level of SOEs, such as very sound,
sound, less sound and unsound. The financial ratios, consisting of profitability, liquidity,
and solvency were used in the soundness appraisal of SOEs.
However, despite the government’s efforts to improve the performance of SOEs
by issuing several regulations on performance evaluation and financial soundness
standards, it did not achieve the expected results. Consequently, the SOEs could not
contribute much to the national income as many SOEs suffered financial losses. This
occurred because the management of SOEs was unprofessional, non-transparent and
also much corruption happened mainly in SOEs and in specific government departments,
such as the Taxation Office, Public Works and the Police Service (Brown, 2003).
In this case, the government assisted the unsound SOEs to recover by using
funding from the non-budgetary expenditure of government. However, a problem
emerged since such funding was also handed out to corporate crony businessmen to
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subsidise and protect their businesses, which increased the government spending
(Nasution, 1995). It was collusion between political power holders and their business
cronies, nepotism, and the corruption of public funds (Wie, 2001). The cronies included
Soeharto’s children and heads of conglomerates who owned and controlled numerous
companies, such as banking, real estate, manufacturing and export-import (Brown,
2003).
These management approaches created a situation of dependence of SOEs on the
government. It made them become burdens on government and meant they had
difficulty in achieving efficient operating patterns (Brown, 2003). Furthermore, the
approach resulted in the failure of SOEs to compete with private enterprises since they
offered products with high prices due to high cost of production.
4.2.2.4. 1990s
In 1991, the government undertook a privatisation programme by selling SOEs’
shares to the public to obtain quick income for the budget. During 1991-1999, President
Soeharto and President Habibie privatized 10 SOEs through the capital market and
invited investors who had potential as strategic partners (Aliya, 2015).
In 1997, Indonesia was hit by the Asian crisis which had an impact on Indonesian
currency which dropped from Rp2400 to Rp17500 per US dollar. It was believed that
the government had no capability to bring Indonesia out of the crisis (Brown, 2003). In
early 1998, the deteriorated economic crisis triggered increasing student demonstrations.
In the meantime, in March 1998, Soeharto was elected the President of Indonesia for a
seventh term and established the Ministry of SOE. Along with the establishment of the
Ministry of SOE, the position, duties and authority of the Finance Minister as
shareholders at the Persero was transferred to the Minister of SOE, except for some
SOEs which were set by the Presidential Decree. This transfer of responsibility was
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intended to improve the performance and efficiency of SOEs, as contained in the
Government Regulation No. 50 of 1998 as well as the Presidential Instruction No. 15 of
1998.
At the end of Soeharto’s era, the Asian crisis hit Indonesia and resulted in the
decline of Indonesian’s economy; an increase in the budget and spending of the
government, the burden of foreign debt maturities, the fragility of monetary economic
stability, and political instability (Wie, 2001). Wie (2001) further explained that the
various government policies which were intended to provide more protection to
conglomerates also increased the burden on the government. All these circumstances
forced President Soeharto to ask the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for help to
overcome the crisis. This action resulted in the involvement of IMF in determination
monetary and economic policy in Indonesia, including implementation trade
liberalisation and privatisation of SOEs (Nurfitriani, 2012; Wie 2011). Obviously, the
crisis meant the Indonesian economy depended on foreign aid as well as foreign capital.
On May 1998, Soeharto formally resigned as Indonesia’s President.
During the New Order era, the SOEs had been fully controlled by the Indonesian
government, operated by Indonesian employees and regulated by Indonesian law.
However, the SOEs still hired foreign consultants for certain positions in the
organisation due to there being no capable Indonesian employee for such positions.
Also, some SOEs had joint cooperation with foreign companies. Such conditions
indicate that management of SOEs was still influenced by mimetic pressure.
Additionally, since the SOEs were funded by the Indonesian government and controlled
by the Indonesian law this means the SOEs have to conform to Indonesian law. This
situation points to the fact that the SOEs were shaped by coercive pressure.

153

4.2.3. Post – New Order Era (1998-2015)
During 1998 to 2015, the Indonesian government was led by four presidents: BJ
Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). BJ
Habibie was elected to replace Soeharto as Indonesian president. He presided over the
government from 1998 to June 1999. He took over the president position when a serious
economic crisis was occurring - the Indonesian currency, the rupiah, slumped against
the US dollar, foreign debt increased, inflation was at a high rate, economic growth was
negative, 90 per cent of major companies in Indonesia were bankrupt, many banks were
closed and various constructions stopped (Brown, 2003). BJ Habibie carried out a
number of actions to overcome the crisis. First, in banking sector, in 1999, BJ Habibie
issued Regulation No. 17 as a basis to establish the National Bank Restructuring
Agency (BPPN). Second, he ratified the Law No. 5 of 1999 to prohibit monopolistic
practices and unfair competition and also introduced Act No. 8 of 1999 on consumer
protection.
In 1999, Abdurrahman Wahid was voted president and took the position between
1999 to 2001. In 2000, the president established a Ministry of State that was responsible
for capital investment and development of SOEs. With the establishment of this new
Ministry of State, the authority and duties of the Minister of Finance as a shareholder of
Persero was transferred to the new minister of state, except for banking, insurance,
other financial services and trains. The requirement of transfer was contained in
Regulation No. 98 of 1999 which then amended by Regulation No. 48 of 2000.
Abdurrahman Wahid was dismissed in 2001 as an Indonesian president by People’s
Consultative Assembly.
In 2001, Megawati was chosen as president of the Republic of Indonesia for the
years 2001 to 2004. She decided to separate the Ministry of State for SOEs from capital
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investment. This decision was followed by issuing the Regulation No. 64 of 2001. The
regulation required the authority and duties of the Minister of Finance in Persero,
Perum and Perjan to be transferred to the Minister of SOE. In 2002, the Ministry of
SOE released a regulation on the implementation of Good Corporate Governance (GCG)
in SOEs, which was contained in the Decree of Minister of SOE No KEP-117/MMBU/2002. The issuing of this regulation stemmed from two considerations. First,
undertaking GCG was important to create a sound management system for SOEs.
Second, the GCG was not fully implemented in SOEs. Additionally, this regulation also
presented the internal control system and the internal audit. However, the item of
internal audit was only briefly mentioned in the regulation. Moreover, in the same year,
the Ministry of SOE also issued KEP-100/MBU/2002 as a legal basis to monitor the
financial and non-financial performance of SOEs. The financial performance is
measured using financial ratios, while non-financial performance is assessed in terms of
efficiency and productivity. For this purpose, internal auditing may play an important
role in creating and maintaining the soundness of SOEs. In 2003, the Law of SOE No.
19 of 2003 on the management and operation of SOEs was published. This law paid
special attention to the establishment of an internal audit unit and to external auditing.
In this case, the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia (BPK) was authorised to
undertake audits of financial statements of SOEs. In terms of overcoming the crisis in
Indonesia, President Megawati privatised 12 SOEs to cover the budget deficit and pay
back most of the foreign debts. The privatisation policy was contained in the Decree of
People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) No VIII/MPR/2000 and MPR Decree No
XI/MPR/2000 as well as Law No 25 of 2000. Privatisation programme aimed to create
sound SOEs.
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In 2004, SBY proceeded to lead the Republic of Indonesia for two periods: 20042009 and 2009 - 2014. During this period, the Indonesian economy was able to
withstand the global crisis in 2008. In this situation, the government proposed the
privatisation of 44 SOEs for reasons of greater efficiency and profitability, but it was
rejected by many parties (Anonym, 2010). In 2005, Regulation No. 45 of 2005 was
issued as the technical instruction to implement Law No. 19 of 2003. The Regulation
No 45 of 2005 described the duties and authorities of management of SOEs. The
internal audit unit and its works were also contained in the regulation. In 2008, the
Capital Market Regulatory Body and Financial Institution (Bapepam-LK) published a
Regulation No KEP-496/BL/2008 as a guideline to prepare the Internal Audit Charter.
From 2009 to 2014, economic growth slowed down, influenced by the European debt
crisis and a global economic slowdown. In this situation, however, the government gave
subsidies rather than raise the fuel prices, which had an impact on increasing the deficit
of the trade balance (Wanandi, 2014). In 2012, the Decree No: SK-16/S.MBU/2012 was
issued by the Ministry of SOEs as a guide to assess and evaluate the implementation of
GCG in SOEs. The internal auditing was a part of GCG aspects that had to be assed and
evaluated.
During the New Order era, the SOEs were privatised by Indonesian government
through selling a percentage of SOEs’ shares to the public. This action resulted in SOEs
having to listen to business recommendations from the shareholder since they had rights
regarding the SOEs. In this situation, the SOEs were influenced by mimetic pressure.
Moreover, SOEs were affected by coercive pressure since they had to follow Indonesian
law. Additionally, the SOEs were shaped by normative pressure since some government
regulations, such as the corporate governance regulations published by the Ministry of
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SOE, required the SOE to follow the International Standard of Auditing issued by the
Institute of Internal Auditor (IIA) in terms of internal audits.
4.3. The Understanding of State-Owned Enterprise
The current definition of State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) is contained in Law No.
19 of 2003. SOE is defined as a business entity that is wholly- or majority-owned by
government. The law describes two legal forms of SOEs: a fully government-owned
enterprise (Perum) and partially government-owned enterprise (Persero). Furthermore,
there are two types of Persero: unlisted Persero and listed Persero. However, all types
of Persero must possess at least 51% of government shares and also be profit-oriented
enterprises. The difference is that the listed Persero can sell its shares to the public.
Therefore, the ownership of public SOEs consists of government and public investors as
shown in figure 4.1. below.
Schema 4.1. The ownership of a public SOE (listed SOE)
Ownership

Public
Investor

Government
Public SOE

As presented in Law No. 19 of 2003, there are four main roles of SOEs. First,
SOEs contribute to the economy of Indonesia by providing income to the government.
Second, the SOEs must meet public needs through producing high quality goods and
services. Third, the SOEs undertake business activities that cannot be implemented by
the private sector. Fourth, SOEs must assist small business and communities.
Furthermore, the Law No. 19 of 2003 regulates activities, management and
control of SOEs. In terms of internal auditing, this law provides very broad guidance for
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the internal audit unit. First, the SOE must have an internal audit unit. Second, the head
of the internal audit unit is responsible to the CEO. Third, the top management explains
the audit report to the board of directors. Fourth, the top management has to respond to
the internal audit report.
To implement the Law No. 19 of 2003, the government issued Regulation No. 45
of 2005 as a technical instruction. Therefore, this regulation provides a more detailed
requirement, including on the internal audit aspect. In this matter, the activities of the
internal auditor are described in detail. First, the auditors carry out operational and
financial audits. Second, the auditors must assess an internal control system. Third, the
auditors deliver audit reports to the CEO. Fourth, the auditors monitor the follow-up of
audit recommendations.
4.4. The Legal Institutions Context of Public SOEs in Indonesia
The legal environment in Indonesia can be traced to the Constitution of 1945 of
the Republic of Indonesia. The Constitution is used as a basis for governing an
administration system in Indonesia. The Constitution states that Indonesia is a
democratic country with sovereignty in the hands of the Indonesian people. In this
system of state, the Indonesian government is led by a president. The president has a
right to appoint and dismiss the ministers who will preside over government
departments.
The SOEs in Indonesia are under the responsibility of the minister. As presented
in the previous subsection on the development of SOEs, there were some changes in the
ministries who were responsible for the management of SOEs. The changes were
presented in regulations from 1960 to 2009. These ministries consisted of the technical
Ministry in 1960, the Ministry of Finance in 1969, the Ministry of Finance and the
technical Ministry in 1973, the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprise in 1998, the
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Ministry of State for Capital Investment and Development of SOE in 1999, the Ministry
of Finance in 2000, the State Ministry of State-Owned Enterprise in 2001, the Ministry
of State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) in 2009 to date (BUMN, 2015). The changes of the
ministries are illustrated in figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2. The Ministries who are responsible for SOEs
Technical
Ministry
(1960)

Ministry of Finance
and
Technical Ministry
(1973)

Ministry of Finance
Enterprise (SOE)
(1969)

Ministry of State
for Capital Investment
and Development of SOE
(1999)

Ministry of SOE
(1998)

State Ministry of SOE
(2001)

Ministry of Finance
(2000)

Ministry of State-Owned
(2009)

These changes aim to improve both financial and non-financial aspects of SOEs,
to enable SOE to increase their contribution to the national income. For this purpose,
the SOEs must comply with regulations issued by the Ministry of SOE.
In addition, the Constitution 1945 also states that the responsibility for financial
management of the government institutions and the SOEs will be audited by the
Supreme Financial Audit (BPK). The audit results will be reported to the House of
Representatives. The function of BPK in undertaking audit activities to the SOEs also is
supported by the Law No. 15 of 2006 and the Law No. 15 of 2004.
Besides BPK being an external auditor of the government, there is an institution
which acts as the internal auditor of the government. This institution is called the
Financial and Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP). The functions of BPKP are
contained in the Decree of President No. 192 of 2014. The establishment of BPKP aims
to assist the government in carrying out internal oversight towards financial
accountability in government institutions and the SOEs. In this case, the BPKP is the
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coordinator of all internal audits of government’s institutions as well as the SOEs. The
BPKP reports to the President.
Public SOEs who are listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) also have a
responsibility to the Capital Market Regulatory Body (Bapepam) and the IDX
institution. Bapepam serves to direct, control, and supervise the activities of the capital
market as regulated in Law No. 8 of 1995. The Bapepam and IDX institutions are
controlled by Ministry of Finance. In 2005, the Bapepam and the Directorate General of
Financial Institution (DJLK) merged to create a new institution namely the Capital
Market Supervisory Agency and Financial Institution (Bapepam-LK) as contained in
Decree of Minister of Finance No KMK606/KMK.01./2005 (BapepamLK, 2006). In
2011, the Bapepam-LK was replaced by a new independent institution called the
Financial Services Authority (OJK) as presented in Law No. 21 of 2011. The OJK
regulated and supervised all activities in the financial services sector, such as banking,
capital markets, insurance, pension funds, and financial institutions. The OJK is
responsible to the House of Representatives (DPR). These changes are illustrated in
figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3. The changes in the capital market regulatory body
Ministry of Finance
(Bapepam)
1952-2004

Ministry of Finance
(Bapepam-LK)
2005-2010

OJK
2011- to date

The regulations released by the Bapepam-LK are still being used to date.
Therefore, public SOEs must comply with all regulations published by the BapepamLK/OJK.
Additionally, the IDX is an institution that is responsible for executing trading of
securities in Indonesia. The IDX resulted from a merger of the former Jakarta Stock
160

Exchange and Surabaya Stock Exchange. As public SOEs are listed in IDX, these SOEs
have to follow requirements published by the IDX.
4.4.1. The Regulations on Internal Auditing Issued by the Legal Institutions
Context of Public SOEs in Indonesia
As previously described there are five legal institutions in the context of public
SOEs in Indonesia. They are Bapepam-LK/OJK, the Ministry of SOEs, BPK, BPKP,
and IDX. Each of these institutions has issued a number of regulations which have to be
observed by the SOEs.
4.4.1.1. The Regulation on Internal Auditing issued by the Capital Market
Regulatory Body and Financial Institution/ the Financial Services
Authority
The Capital Market Regulatory Body and Financial Institution/the Financial
Services Authority (Bapepam-LK/OJK) issued a Regulation No: KEP-496/BL/2008
related to internal auditing for all public companies in 2008. This regulation aims to
increase the effectiveness of risk management and corporate governance on public
companies. For this purpose, the regulation requires all public companies to establish an
internal audit unit and own an internal audit charter. The detailed requirements of this
regulation are presented in table 4.1.
Table 4.1. The Regulation of Bapepam-LK/OJK on the Internal Auditing
Regulation of Bapepam-LK/OJK No: KEP-496/BL/2008
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

The public company is required to have an internal audit unit.
The numbers of internal auditors should be appropriate to the size and complexity of company
The public company must own the Internal Audit Charter which is set by the top management and
approved by the board of directors.
The Charter has to set the definition of internal auditing and describe the functions of internal
audits, assurance providers and consulting functions.
Code of Ethics of internal audit refer to the national or international Code of Ethics of Internal
Audit
The structure and position of internal audit unit in public company:
a. The internal audit unit is led by the head of internal audit.
b. The head of internal audit is appointed and dismissed by the CEO and approved by the board
of directors.
c. The head of internal audit unit is responsible to the CEO.
The duties and responsibilities of internal audit unit:
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a.
b.

Set an annual internal audit plan.
Test and evaluate the implementation of internal control, and risk management in
accordance with the company’s policy.
c. Examine and asses the efficiency and effectiveness of financial, accounting, operational,
human resource, marketing, information technology and other activities.
d. Recommend improvement and objective information on the activities being audited to all
levels of management.
e. Compose the audit report and deliver it to the CEO and the board of directors.
f.
Monitor, analyse, and report the follow up audit recommendations.
g. Have cooperated with the audit committee.
h. Set the programme to evaluate the quality of internal audit activities.
i.
Perform the special audit if necessary.
8. The authorities of internal audit unit consist of:
a. Can access all relevant information of the company.
b. Communicate directly to the top management, the board of directors, the audit committee,
and their members.
c. Have regular and incidental meetings with them.
d. Coordinate its activity with the external auditor’s activity.
9. Qualification of internal auditor:
a. Has to have integrity, professional behaviour, independence, honesty, and be objective in
performing their duties.
b. Have knowledge and experiences of the audit technique and other relevant knowledge.
c. Understand the capital market regulations and other legislations.
d. To have communication skills.
e. Obey Professional Standards issued by the Internal Audit Association.
f.
To keep confidential information and company’s data related to the internal audit duties,
except as required by legislations or court.
g. Understanding the GCG principles, and risk management.
h. Willing to increase their professional knowledge, skill, and capabilities continuously.
10. It is forbidden for internal auditors to work as operational staff in holding and subsidiaries
companies.

4.4.1.2. The Regulation on Internal Auditing issued by the Ministry of SOE
The Ministry of SOEs issued a number of decrees. In 2002, the Decree of
Ministry of SOE No: Kep-117/M-MBU/2002 was issued. The Decree regulated the
implementation of GCG. There were some considerations on the issuing of this
regulation. First, the GCG execution is crucial to create a sound SOE management
system. Second, the GCG’s codes were not yet fully applied in SOEs. Third, an optimal
application of GCG’s norms could increase the performance of SOEs. However, the
regulation did not regulate the practice of internal auditing. Therefore, in 2011, the
Ministry of SOE released a new Decree of Ministry of SOE No: PER-01/MBU/2011 to
replace the previous decree on the operation of GCG, with a more complete requirement
by adding the internal auditing aspect. Since the implementation of GCG needs to be
evaluated and assessed, then, in 2012, the Decree of Ministry of SOE No SK162

16/S.MBU/2012 was published. This Decree provided a detail guideline to evaluate and
assess the application of GCG at SOEs, including internal auditing. The items of
internal auditing that are evaluated and assessed are presented in table 4.2.
Table 4.2. The Decree of Ministry of SOE on Internal Auditing
The Decree of Ministry of SOE No SK-16/S.MBU/2012
1. The SOE is required to have an internal audit unit.
2. The Charter is stipulated by the top management and approved by the board of directors.
3. The Internal Audit Charter has to contain:
a. Items in line with Bapepam-LK/OJK Regulation and Company Law.
b. Consideration of using the Professional Standards of Internal Audit issued by Indonesian
Consortium of Internal Auditor or the International Professional Practices Framework of the
IIA.
c. Explanation of the position of the internal audit unit in an organisation, authorities of internal
audit function which includes having access to all recordings, personals, and assets of company,
and also defining the scope of the internal audit function.
4. The Charter has to be reviewed and up-dated if necessary.
5. Position of the internal audit unit is directly under the CEO in the organisational structure. The
head of internal audit unit is appointed by the CEO and approved by the board of directors.
6. The head of internal audit has direct access to report to the audit committee.
7. The internal audit unit has to make a plan for the need of its auditor staffs. The numbers of internal
auditors are appropriate to conducting the internal audit activities.
8. The qualities of internal auditors are appropriate to undertake internal audit activities.
a. The head of internal audit must have capabilities that qualifies him as an internal auditor as
certified by the professional association (Certified Internal auditor/Qualified Internal Auditor).
b. The internal auditor staff possess knowledge, skills, and are also required to have appropriate
professional certificates.
c. There is a continual professional development programme for the internal auditor which aims
to maintain professional certification and provide education support.
d. Having proper quality of internal auditor professionalism
9. The internal audit unit must have audit guidelines, Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and a
supervisory role in the internal audit unit and assessment of quality assurance programme.
a. The head of the internal audit unit sets the policy and procedures as activity guidelines for the
internal auditor. Such policy and procedures should fit with the structure of the internal audit
unit, its size, and also the complexity of the business activities of the company.
b. The head of internal audit carries out a quality assurance programme which covers all aspects
of internal audit activities.
c. The internal audit unit must have a quality assurance programme which is assessed by an
independent assessor every five years, who aims to evaluate compliance over the Charter,
standards and code of ethics, efficiency and effectiveness of internal audit functions in fulfilling
the stakeholders’ needs.
10. The internal audit department sets annual internal audit plans and undertakes the audit activities as
planned.
a. The annual internal audit plan takes a risk-based approach.
b. The annual internal audit plan is communicated to the audit committee to obtain
recommendations.
c. The audit plan has to be approved by the CEO and communicated to the top management.
d. The accomplishment over the targets must be included in the annual audit plan.
10. The internal auditors report to the CEO and the audit committee.
a. The QAR’s report also has to be delivered to the audit committee.
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11. The internal audit functions contribute to the corporate governance process, risk management and
internal control improvement.
12. The internal auditors give recommendations on the business strategy of the company.
a. The internal auditors evaluate whether the goals of the programmes and its operational
activities are in accordance with the organisation’s goals.
13. The internal auditors monitor the follow up of internal and external audit recommendations.
a. The internal audit unit has guidelines for monitoring the follow up of the internal and external
audit recommendations.
b. The internal auditors record the results of monitoring activities.
c. The internal auditors report the monitoring results to the CEO and the audit committee.
14. The internal audit recommendations can be applied and improve the operational activity.

4.4.1.3. The Regulation on Internal Auditing issued by Supreme Financial Audit
of Indonesian Government
The Law No. 15 of 2006 gives authority for Supreme Financial Audit of
Indonesian Government (BPK) to audit SOEs. This law describes further that the scope
of audit activities covers financial audit, performance audit and specific audit. In
conducting the audit activities, the law gives authority to BPK to obtain any information,
data and documents as needed.
In a similar vein, the Law No. 15, 2004 grants authority to BPK to carry out
financial audits. In undertaking a financial audit, BPK will also assess the
implementation of the internal control system. In addition, verse 20 of the Law No. 15,
2004 regulates that the auditee (SOEs) must respond to the audit recommendation
issued by BPK. There are legal sanctions to the auditee who refuse to provide data
access as required by BPK or to follow up the audit recommendations.
4.4.1.4. The Regulation on Internal Auditing issued by Financial and Development
Supervisory Agency
The Decree of President No 192 of 2014 regulates the duties of the Financial and
Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP) in assisting the government to conduct
internal oversight for financial accountability in government institutions, including
SOEs. The Decree further states that the scope of audit activities comprises setting
national policies on financial accountability in all government institutions, undertaking
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an audit over the financial accountability, providing consulting services on the risk
management, internal control and good corporate governance. The Minister of SOEs
used an official letter, SE-14/MBU/2010, to instruct the boards of directors and the
CEOs of SOEs to assess GCG implementation every two years and this must be
conducted by BPKP as independent assessors.
4.4.1.5. The Regulation on Internal Auditing issued by IDX
The Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) issued a number of regulations. One of
these is the regulation No Kep-306/BEJ/07-2004 that sets the requirements for public
companies to provide audited annual reports and interim reports to the public. In this
respect, sanction will be given to companies who are late in providing this information.
4.4.2. The Legal Environment and Professional Bodies of Internal Audit
The Constitution 1945 gives a right to the Indonesian people to communicate and
obtain information to develop their personal and social life. The people also have a right
to deliver information through any means. In terms of internal auditing, this legal
environment supports the establishment of a number of professional bodies, such as the
Indonesian chapter of the IIA, the Communication Forum of SOE’s Internal Auditors
(FKSPI), the Foundation of Internal Audit Education (YPIA), the Certification Boards
of Qualified Internal Auditors (DSQIA) and the Association of Indonesian Internal
Auditors (PAII).
The Indonesian chapter of the IIA was established in 1989. The formation of IIA
Indonesia was aimed to advance the internal audit profession in Indonesia (iiaindonesia.org, 2016). FKSPI was founded in 1985. This organisation is specifically for
all internal auditors in SOEs. The FKSPI is the communication forum for the internal
auditors to share knowledge and experiences. The YPIA was built in 1995 and aims to
increase the competence of internal auditors through providing training in internal
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auditing. DSQIA is established in 2006. This organisation collaborates with YPIA in
terms of providing professional certification after completing training courses. These
five professional bodies of internal audit collaborated to produce the Indonesian Internal
Audit Standards. For this purpose, they refer to the internal audit standards issued by the
IIA.
4.5. Summary
Chapter 4 describes the development of SOEs and their legal environment context.
The history shows that unprofessional management of SOEs had an impact on their
performance. The poor performance of SOEs resulted in low financial contribution to
the government. To overcome this issue, the government published a number of
regulations which related to internal auditing. These regulations were released by five
government institutions; Bapepam/OJK, the Ministry of SOE, BPK, BPKP and IDX.
In addition, the legal aspect also supports the establishment of professional bodies
of internal auditing. This is indicated by the existence of five professional bodies: the
Indonesian chapter of the IIA, Communication Forum of SOE’s Internal Auditors
(FKSPI), the Foundation of Internal audit Education (YPIA), the Certification Boards of
Qualified Internal Auditors (DSQIA) and the Association of Indonesian Internal
Auditors (PAII).
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Chapter 5
The Case: The Practice of Internal Audit

5.1. Introduction
The previous chapter presented a historical account of the legislation related to
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in Indonesia. This chapter provides the findings from
the case study on the practice of internal audit at a public SOE, PT. Nusantara
Sukses

1

(NS). The findings from the case study are presented using the case

descriptions strategy suggested by Yin (2009).
As noted in chapter 3, this study used an interpretive worldview approach for the
research inquiry where the phenomenon under study has to be understood by gaining
the perspective of the participants, in terms of their experiences, understanding and
interpretations of the phenomenon and then analysed using the appropriate theory as a
guide. Therefore, the interview data and document analysis are the main sources of the
findings.
This chapter depicts functions of the internal audit and their essential
characteristics at PT. NS as the first multinational SOE in Indonesia. Briefly, there are
three main functions of the internal audit, namely audit, consulting and catalyst. The
functions have to be facilitated in order to provide professional services. The interview
data and the internal documents indicated that three key factors had impacts on the
professionalism of internal auditors: position, people and process. ‘Position’ describes
the internal audit position in the organisational structure; ‘people’ refers to the human
resources in the internal audit unit, whilst ‘process’ signifies the processes performed by
the internal auditor.

1

pseudonym

This chapter consists of six core sections which comprise the history of PT. NS,
the internal audit department history, the internal audit unit, the position, the people and
the process of internal audit, and also the summary.
5.2. The History of PT. Nusantara Sukses
The history of PT. NS can be traced back on the annual report of PT. NS. PT.
Nusantara Sukses (NS) is the largest cement producer in Indonesia and is recorded as
being the first multinational state enterprise in Indonesia with overseas subsidiaries.
Currently, PT. NS controls 40.9 percent of the domestic cement market share, and has
ten subsidiaries which engage in cement manufacturing, distribution and its utilisation.
PT. NS is a listed SOE. An intention to build this cement manufactory had existed
since the Dutch Era. In 1935, Ir. Van Es a Geologist Dutch national discovered huge
resources of limestone, used for making cement, in the Gresik area of East Java. He
recommended the Dutch government build a cement factory in Gresik. In 1943, the
Dutch government followed up his report by setting up a plan, however, the plan could
not be realised because of the occurrence of World War II.
After independence, the plan was furthered by the Indonesian government. The
vice president of Indonesia mandated to study in more detail the idea of establishing a
cement factory. This project aimed to obtain more accurate geological data by involving
two mining experts from Germany, Dr Laufer and Kraeff. In January 1951, they
reported that the deposit of limestone was sufficient for a cement factory with a
production capacity of 250,000 tons a year for 60 years. Afterwards, the Indonesian
government made preparations to start the factory. On March 25, 1953, a legal entity,
N.V. SG, was set up. In April 1955, the construction of the SG factory commenced. On
August 7, 1957, Soekarno as president of Republic of Indonesia announced that the SG
factory was operational and was designed to produce 250,000 tons of cement each year.
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SG was the first cement manufacturer in the island of Java had crucial roles in
supplying cement for construction. The establishment of SG was contained in the
Government Regulation No 132 of 1961.
In 1960, the government issued Regulation No. 19 of 1960 concerning the State
Company (Perusahaan Negara). Based on this regulation, the legal status of N.V. SG
was changed to a State Corporation (PN). In 1966, the Old Era of government ended
and the New Era of government began. The new regime of government published a new
Regulation No 1 of 1969 which had an impact on the alteration of the legal form of
SOEs. The SG as a SOE had to follow this regulation by officially transforming its legal
status to a limited company (Persero) in June 1969.
In the early period of 1990, the government set up a program of privatisation by
selling a maximum 30 percent of shares of SOEs to the public. This policy aimed to
increase income to the state budget. This policy was developed because the government
could no longer rely on the oil sector as a main revenue of the state. SG was the first
SOE to be considered worthy of being privatised by selling a portion of government
shares to the public. On July 8, 1991, SG was listed in the Jakarta and Surabaya Stock
Exchanges and 40 million shares were sold to the public. The shareholder composition
was 73% government, and 27% public. On September 1995, after the SG undertook a
limited public offering (Rights Issue I) the stockholder composition became 65%
government and 35% public. This action was performed because SG needed funding for
expansion. In order to maintain the composition of government shares, the government
then combined two other cement companies, namely SP and ST, into SG. On September
15, 1995, SG was consolidated with SP and ST and SG was the holding company, while
SP and ST became its subsidiaries. This new consolidation of three cement companies
was able to produce 8.5 million tons of cement every year. SP and ST are government169

owned cement companies which have strategic locations. SP is located in western
Indonesia, while ST is located in eastern Indonesia.
On September 17, 1998, the government offered 14% of its shares in the SG in an
open bidding which was won by Cemex SA de CV, a global cement company based in
Mexico. The composition of share ownership was then Indonesian Government 51%,
public 35%, and Cemex 14%. Later on September 30, 1999 the composition of
shareholding changed again so that the Indonesian Government 51.01%, public 23.46%
and Cemex 25.53%. On July 27, 2006, Cemex Asia Holdings Ltd. sold its shares to
Blue Valley Holdings PTE Ltd., so the composition of shareholders was Indonesian
government 51.01%, Blue Valley Holdings PTE Ltd. 24.90% and the public 24.09%. At
the end of March 2010, Blue Valley Holdings PTE Ltd. sold all of its shares through a
private placement, resulting in a shareholder composition of: government 51.01%,
public 48.99%. On December 18, 2012, SG took over 70% shares of Thang Long
Cement Joint Stock Company (TLCC) from Hanoi General Export-Import Joint Stock
Company (Geleximco) in Vietnam with a 2.3 million ton capacity. With this action SG
became the first multinational SOE in Indonesia. On December 20, 2012 the SOE grew
into a strategic holding company and changed its name from SG to NS. At the end of
2012, its capacity for cement production was 28.5 million tons a year which comprised
26.2 million tons in Indonesia and 2.3 million tons in Vietnam. Furthermore, on
December 24, 2013, NS established a new subsidiary, namely PT SG. In 2014, NS
started to build two cement factories in Padan and in Rembang and founded PT SISI as
a subsidiary in the information technology area.
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5.3. The History of the Internal Audit Department
From the end of the 60’s, NS owned an internal audit department called the
internal control unit. In this period, the function of the internal control unit was in
budget control through overseeing and evaluating the realisation of the budget. The unit
of internal control was located under the commercial department and was on an equal
level with other units under the department, namely marketing, procurement and
financial administration.
From the 1960s to the end of the 1970s, the position of the internal control unit
was firstly equivalent to the second echelon and then rose to the first echelon. In the
early 1980s, as the company developed the internal control unit then changed to an
internal supervisory unit (Satuan Pengawasan Internal / SPI). This unit was placed
under the top management. The unit has not yet been divided into bureaus, so all
auditors have the same level as staff. The recording system was adapted from the Anglo
Saxon Bookkeeping of Continental System to Accounting. Therefore, the company used
new accounting principles in addition to changing the system that it followed.
In 2003, the SPI was converted into the internal audit unit. This unit was placed
under the President Director of the company. The transformations of the unit of internal
audit were associated with changes in business processes of the company and external
influences, such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002. In 2009, the internal audit changed its
paradigm from watchdog to consultant and furnished the internal audit charter which
regulated the governance of internal audit. In 2012, the unit of internal audit established
three audit bureaus for task specialisation which consisted of audit bureaus of technique,
accounting and finance, and also commercial and management systems. The main
functions of the internal audit in the period up to now comprised auditing, consulting
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and catalyst functions. In February of 2014, a new audit bureau was established, namely
the ICT audit bureau.
5.4. The Internal Audit Unit
The practice of internal audit functions has changed since the new paradigm of
internal audit function was applied in 2009. It started as a simple function as budget
controller but now has three functions, namely assurance, consulting and catalyst. These
changes were triggered by external factors as mentioned by an interviewee as follows 2:
Changes in internal auditing paradigm are triggered by the development
of internal auditing standards as well as the development of internal audit
worldwide. And it seems that it is more appropriate for our circle to use
the new paradigm, where the auditor position itself as partner of the
auditee. It is better if we work as a partner, since partner could find
solutions for auditee’s problems.
In similar vein, another interviewee described the reason for adopting the new
paradigm as follows 3;
A transformation from watchdog to consultant and catalyst is a global
paradigm in the area of internal auditing which we adopted later. I do not
know the global reason of it. What I know, internal auditing face
difficulties in using the old paradigm. Basically we have a good motive to
help the enterprises to improve. But, when our role is watchdog we use a
rigid approach to auditee which resulted in no cooperation from the
auditees in terms of providing information to us. That is why we decided to
follow the new paradigm by changing our roles to consultants instead of
being watchdog.
The interview demonstrated that factors triggering changes in internal audit
functions encompass a new paradigm of internal audit initiated by the Institute of
Internal Auditor.
The old paradigm had a number of characteristics which cover perceiving the
internal audit as a watchdog, focusing on monitoring and looking for mistakes of the
auditee by using a policeman style approach. In this case, detecting problems is the
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main goal, whereby a number of audit findings are an indicator of success for the audit
activity rather than following up audit recommendations by the auditee. All these
features of the old paradigm created a negative attitude of the auditees toward the
internal auditor as the auditees feel their career is threatened by the presence of the
internal auditor. This condition resulted in auditees not accepting well the presence of
an auditor which may create difficulty for the auditor to obtain the necessary data as
well as delve into problems that have occurred in the unit of the auditee. This situation
was mentioned in an interview as follows 4;
When in auditing, we approach auditee as watchdog, we are considered
too focus seeking auditee’s flaws. This supposition creates a negative
impact, auditee tries hard to hide their problems, giving incomplete
information and there is no cooperation at all from auditee.
Other negative effect of the old paradigm implementation was stated by an
interviewee as follows 5:
When the internal auditor function is still as watchdog, there will be an
audit recommendation at the end of the audit process. But, it is ignored by
the auditee because auditee does not like the internal auditor’s attitude.
The participants also explained the solution for the condition described above as
follows 6:
Auditee hates internal auditing, though the company needs it. So, internal
audit must use a different approach, no longer approaching as watchdog
but as partner. What is a partner? We must assist auditee. If only auditing
without consultation and catalyst, then how can we help auditee. Become a
consultant as well as catalyst is the key to help auditee as early as possible,
because preventing problems is much better. Personally, I agree to this
principle. Actually, we adopt this idea of solution from the Institute of
Internal Auditors.
The adoption of new paradigm of internal auditing, initiated by the Institute of
Internal Auditor (IIA), brought new images to internal auditors and positive impacts to
auditee, as mentioned by the participant as follows 7:
4
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Using the new internal audit paradigm, change the auditee point of views
toward the internal auditor. Internal auditor is no longer considered as a
troublemaker who likes to find auditee’s flaws. If they have problem, they
now come first to the internal auditor to seek advice from the auditor. This
is different than the past condition where they rather choose to hide their
problems.
The interview also demonstrated the new role of internal auditor as a consultant
and partner for the auditee, as stated below 8;
There is a shift in the role from watchdog to partner. Now, the internal
auditor is not looking for any auditee’s fault, but internal auditors also
show the auditee that they have the chance to enhance and improve
performance. Internal auditors explain to the auditee the risks so that we
could prevent them making mistakes. Here, we play our role as partner.
The role of the head of internal audit unit is also important to the changes as
indicated by the following statement 9:
The application of the new internal audit paradigm started in 2009
initiated by the head of internal audit unit. By applying the new paradigm,
the head of internal audit unit tried to make a change in the internal audit
unit and in auditee too. From my personal point of view, the change is
seen started in 2011.
The idea of the new paradigm was not fully supported by the staff of internal audit
as indicated by the following comment 10:
In controlling and giving assurance, internal auditors should also play the
role of a watchdog. So, it is not possible if the internal auditor is not a
watchdog. Internal auditor remains being a watchdog, but using different
approach. For example, the internal auditor should also be a watchdog
when investigating a fraud. In this case, it is not possible to use the new
paradigm that is internal auditor is a partner. But, however, due to the
current low rate of fraud, then the function of a watchdog is no longer
dominant. So, the main function of internal auditor is currently a
consultant and agent of change.
However, the internal auditors who are recently recruited have a different opinion
of the new role. Typically, the new auditors are recruited from other units, and have
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experience being audited in the watchdog mode. They have traumatic feelings about the
internal auditor. They are pleased with the new paradigm, as mentioned below 11:
In the early stage of my moving here, I did not like internal auditing. My
dislike is caused by the general overview that internal auditor always seek
other’s flaws. But later, the chief of internal audit unit explained to us of
the long-term plan and the high hope on the implementation of the new
internal audit paradigm. Auditor in a company must cover three functions,
consultant, catalyst and audit itself. So it is not only a matter of auditing
but there are two additional functions. Besides, internal auditors also
change its point of view as watchdog to become a partner of the unit being
audited. This slowly changed me. Anyhow, the role of internal auditor was
not straightforwardly change all auditor’s point of view. There are still
senior internal auditors who still apply the old internal audit paradigm
until now. What makes me happy is that new internal auditors follow the
new paradigm.
Another participant described the internal audit functions under the new paradigm
in detail as follows 12:
Internal audit unit is one of the units that aims to assist management in
controlling the company's business operations from A to Z. Business
operation encompasses production, marketing, procurement, sales,
maintenance and company’s image. The internal audit function is
controlling, in particular helping to control the activities of management
in managing the company. This is the most important function. An
auditor’s function is how to be a good controls assessor, assurance
provider and also a consultant. To materialize such target, we made a
structure and decide who is the responsible person based on each
respective field. Further we made several actions, such as making audit
program and others to control transactions.
Similarly, the auditee behaviour has also changed once they were confident that
the internal audit purpose had changed. Now, participants say, auditees appreciate and
accept the internal auditor as indicated by their cooperation in providing data for
auditing. Also, the auditees are more active, and even come to see the internal auditor if
they have a problem and to discuss a solution.
However, there are differences between the functions of audit, consulting and
catalyst. For consulting and catalyst functions, the internal auditor may officially enter

11
12

Interview with N, a senior-level auditor, at 15 September 2014
Interview with E, a senior-level auditor, at 22 September 2014

175

the work place only if there is a request for assistance from the auditee. Thus, the
internal auditor will help an auditee based on an assignment letter. In contrast, the
internal auditor does not need a request from the auditee to conduct the audit function;
the internal auditor needs the assignment letter to perform the audit activities. Yet, these
three different functions of the internal audit may operate concurrently, as supported by
the comment from interviewee 13:
The functions of internal audit can be performed simultaneously. While an
internal auditor is auditing, he or she can also act as consultant by giving
audit recommendation.
Another participant explained that consulting activity also can be conducted
separately from an assurance work 14;
We have a routine agenda set out in the annual audit plan. The regular
agenda includes assurance and consulting. When we worked on this
assurance activity, usually there is only a small fraction consulting.
Therefore, assurance and consultation can be done at the same time; or
they could invite us in one meeting when they need inputs from an internal
auditor.
The audit, consulting and catalyst functions operate at different stages in a
business process cycle, which consists of planning, process and product (result). The
consulting function is performed in the beginning step of the business processes, when
the auditee has to formulate plans. The catalyst is carried out in the middle stage, when
the auditee conducts the working plan, while the audit function is conducted in the last
phase of the business process, after auditees have carried out their work plan and
delivered a result. Each of them will be discussed below.
The interviews indicated that the practice of internal audit started to follow the
global development of internal auditing from 2009. The application of multiple
functions of internal audit within this NS was very slow when you consider that the
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initiation of this idea was in 1999 by the IIA. However, the head of internal audit was
eager to adopt the IIA’s thought on the multiple functions of internal audit, which
created both positive and negative reactions from internal auditors and the auditee.
5.4.1. The Audit Function
The audit function remains a core function of the internal audit. One participant
defined the function under the new paradigm as follows 15;
Audit is to provide assurance to the management that the company's
business processes are carried out in accordance with the applicable rules.
Risks involved in every business process, such as procurement, marketing,
IT has also been mapped and its mitigation is also defined and required
controls have been designed appropriately.
During this time, this function has been changed primarily in four aspects: the
scope of activities is getting more comprehensive, the audit approach has shifted from
watchdog to consultant, the method of audit has changed to risk-based audit, and the
requirement of competence of the internal auditor has changed. According to the
interviewees, the scope of audit activities has altered and has become more complex 16:
Yes the function of audit has changed. Presently, audit has a broader
scope. This means that we could study the strategy, whether the design is
already right or not, so is with its policy. Before, internal audit only
compared the condition and criteria. Other than that, the old fashioned
style of internal auditor tends to blame the auditee. Now, we prefer to
work as a consultant. In that sense, how do we find solutions.
In conducting the audit function, internal auditors perform a number of audit
activities. In this matter, the internal auditors provide assurance after conducting the
evaluation about whether the process is correct or has errors. In carrying out such
assessments, the internal auditor compares the observation condition and the criteria.
The gap between the real situation and the criteria will become the audit findings, and
then the internal auditor has to find the cause of the problem and its effect. If the root of
15
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the problem cannot be found, then such trouble cannot be solved and the issue will
continue in the next period. This is called recurrent findings. Generally, there are two
reasons for the emergence of such findings. Firstly, when the auditee did not follow up
previous audit recommendations. Secondly, where the internal auditor cannot find the
core of the problems. This auditor felt uneasy about such a situation: 17:
Being an internal auditor I am puzzled. We are required to give the best.
At the end of our audit, we are asked to provide recommendations,
implications and total loss. But, that is just numbers. We cannot give a
reward or punishment to the auditee. Also, if there is fraud, we cannot do
anything. The findings of a fraud are not followed by any investigation
audit or anything else. Sometimes, I find something that can be prevented,
it should not happen but it continues to happen, especially when it comes
to the top management. It is also difficult.
The method in of performing audits has changed. Previously, the control-based
approach was seen as best practice for internal control and as the guideline or criteria in
the audit evaluation. The internal audit focuses on the function of the internal control.
Under the new paradigm, the audit method is risk based which brings a new standpoint
where the internal auditor concentrates on risks and controls management as well as
ensures that the existing controls have been operating effectively. This new audit
method brought consequences to the auditee, as mentioned by a participant below 18;
We have used the risk-based audit ever since four years ago. The
consequence is, auditee must be able to identify and be responsible to all
risks and controls the business processes in their working place.
Moreover, the new audit method became a challenge for the internal auditors, in
terms of their competence to understand business processes as a basis to provide
recommendations to the auditee.
The audit function under the new paradigm uses new approaches. First, the
auditors act as a consultant rather than as a watchdog in the audit process. Second, a
risk-based audit is the new audit method. Finally, internal auditors are recruited from
17
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other units to fulfil the competence requirement of understanding business operations.
These changes are in line with the Internal Auditing Standards issued by the IIA.
5.4.2. The Consulting Function
Being a consultant is a new function of the internal auditor which has been
brought about by the new paradigm as mentioned by an interviewee 19:
With internal audit unit, the application of the new internal audit
paradigm creates a change in the atmosphere, like the change in the
auditors attitude in facing the auditee. But at this time, auditee has not yet
feel these changes because we have not yet optimally performing the
functions of consultation and catalyst. Because there are still senior
auditors who still have the stand point of the old paradigm of internal
audit. They believe that if we frequently have communication with the
auditee, we will be no longer independent. They also believe that such
interaction makes us feel attached to the auditee and will create conflicts
of interest. This will create a sense of aversion to the auditee, but I do not
agree with that argument.
Actually, the consulting services have been provided by the internal auditor when
the auditor applied the old paradigm of internal audit. Nevertheless, there are
differences between consulting services in the old and new paradigms. In the old
paradigm, the consulting service is given after the audit activity is completed. Moreover,
consulting services concentrated on the suggestion to fix the error. In the new paradigm,
the consulting services are provided primarily at the beginning stages of the business
process when the auditee sets a working plan. Also, the auditee may have a consultation
any time they need. Thus, the consulting service is not restricted to the end of the audit
activity. Besides, the focus of consulting is the risks that may exist in the business
process and how to eliminate or minimise the risk.
As consultants, internal auditors do not provide any assurance. A number of
consulting activities provided by the auditor are contained in the Internal Audit Charter
of 2012. Firstly, preparing and carrying out the control self-assessment (CSA) in the
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main business processes. Secondly, giving suggestions and objective information
concerning the activities is examined at all management levels. Thirdly, internal
consultation services may be offered to management if necessary to discuss preparation
of a working plan, the company budget, risks and control identification or business
strategy. This situation is confirmed through the following comment found in an
interview 20:
Changes in government regulations in terms of mining, prices and
transportation associated with business enterprise processes, require
companies in particular the working units (auditee) to follow these
changes. Provide assistance to the auditee in terms of providing an
understanding on the changes in the regulation puts our role as a
consultant.
In performing the role of consultant, there are a number of approaches used by
internal auditors toward the auditee. One of participants mentioned it below 21:
Serves as a consultant, we usually are invited by the auditee in drafting the
procedure. In these conditions, we will inform the auditee that they need to
consider several aspects, such as the law and regulations and internal
control.
Other participant employed another style of approach as follow 22:
Almost every day or at least once in a week I sit and talk with the IT Unit
employees. I ask them what are the problems that they have. Later, they
told me about their problems. I listen to their complains because their
information is an input for me. I make a note of it not as a findings but to
seek solution on their problems. We are really focus in finding solution for
their problems, this they know. Every day, if they find problem, we suggest
a solution to auditee. But, we do not give suggestion that is implemented
directly. On the other hand, we only provide them with a guideline to the
auditee, and the auditee should think about the implementation details.
From that comment, it could be said that the internal auditors are invited by a
department that wants to make a working plan. In that case an internal auditor’s
attendance at the event is as a consultant who then provides consulting services to the
staff of the department. In this case, the consulting services only provide advice to the
20
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auditee to consider the risks of business processes that are being planned, determine
controls that need to be applied in order to anticipate and mitigate risks. Internal
auditors ask the auditee to include all recommended components in their working plan.
In other words, as a consulting function, the internal auditor will merely explain the
criteria including factors that should be considered and performed. However, the auditee
is responsible for identifying risks and their controls and ranking the risks by number.
In addition, internal auditors may give opinions on whether or not the internal
control is appropriate based on two main points. Firstly, the internal control should be
good enough to cover an activity. Secondly, it should not lead to the bureaucratic
procedures taking longer. However, internal auditors are not involved in designing the
internal control.
Not only the auditees take benefit from the consulting function of internal audit,
but also management, as mentioned by a participant below 23:
One of the reasons why this internal audit unit is formed is to help the top
management making strategic decisions. Such as, the decision of the top
management to build a new factory based only on the feasibility study
report which has been assessed by the internal auditor. The Internal
auditor's opinion will influence the decision of top management.
The consulting function under the new paradigm of internal audit is performed
along with the stages of business process. The alteration is in conformity with the
Internal Auditing Standards of the IIA.
5.4.3. The Catalyst Function
The other new internal audit function is as a catalyst. The internal auditor
performs the catalyst function if requested by the auditee. In this case, the auditee
carries out the activities of the working plan which is the second stage of business
activity. In this stage, the auditee has defined the risk, has implemented the internal
23
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controls and set the risks’ mitigation. As a catalyst function, the internal auditor assists
the auditee to evaluate itself whether the risk has been well controlled by applying
internal control and risk mitigation. The way of an auditee assesses itself is called
Control Self-Assessment (CSA). The interviewee explained the aim of undertaking the
CSA by the auditee as follows 24:
Self-Assessment Control (CSA) is aimed to strengthen the internal control.
Auditee was forced to apply the CSA because each working unit is
expected to monitor the risks inherent in the business processes and
determine the proper internal controls. Therefore, overall internal control
will be better. We took this concept of risk management. In addition, we
use a CSA survey results as a basis to conduct a field audit.
Whilst the aim of the evaluation of CSA by auditors was described by participant
as follows 25:
We act as facilitator in Control Self-Assessment Theory. In the new
internal audit paradigm, a facilitator does not seek the auditee’s flaws. But
facilitator is more focus in looking for the working unit‘s shortcomings, so
that they are more open in telling their problems. Different than the
previous old paradigm internal audit, we come up with the attitude of
doing the audit; now by applying the new paradigm of internal audit, we
come to evaluate the character and thus be in the form of discussion.
The auditors assessed the CSA implementation by giving the questionnaires to
auditees. One participant clarified what the auditors did with the responses to the CSA’s
questionnaires as follows 26:
Assessment on the implementation of the CSA by the auditee covers
several aspects. First, the auditors evaluate the details of business
processes of the working units made by the auditee. Second, the auditors
examine the risks arising in the business processes that are identified by
the auditee. Auditors review the controls made by the auditee to minimise
risks. In internal audit, auditors remind the auditee by giving
recommendations to auditee if there are still unidentified risks and
controls are not done. Other than that we also deliver it to GRC unit.
The catalyst function under the new paradigm of internal audit is conducted by
influencing the auditee to make an alteration. An example of this function is when
24
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auditors assist the auditee in carrying out CSA. The implementation of the function is in
line with the risk management concept.
In order to perform professionally the three functions of internal audit, there needs
to be three supportive aspects. Those are position, people and process. These aspects are
presented below.
5.5. Position of Internal Audit
Position consists of six elements, such as the Internal Audit Charter, independence,
the scope of activities, alignment purposes between internal audit and PT. NS,
organisation and reporting as well as policy and procedures. Each of them will be
presented in the next subsection as follows:
5.5.1. The Internal Audit Charter
PT. NS’ Internal Audit Charter (2012) prescribes that it is important to officially
authorise the internal auditors to perform their functions in a professional manner, so
they can be accepted as well as supported by other units. The Charter is an official
guideline for internal auditors to generate work that meets certain quality standards and
supports the activities of the company. One interviewee described the way the Charter
has to be approved 27:
We propose an Internal Audit Charter to the president director and Audit
Committee. The Charter is signed by both parties.
A participant explained which parties were responsible for composing the Charter
as follows 28:
The preparation of the Internal Audit Charter will be done by involving
several parties, the Chief of the Planning and Development of Internal
Audit Bureau, Chief of the Accounting and Finance Audit Bureau, Chief of
the Commercial Audit Bureau, Chief of the Information and
Communication Technology (ICT) Audit Bureau, Chief of the Engineering
Audit Bureau, Chief of the Internal Audit Unit and Audit Committee.
27
28

Interview with J, a manager-level auditor , at 3 September 2014
Interview with E, a senior-level auditor, at 22 September 2014

183

An interviewee mentioned the Charter’s content as follows 29:
An Internal Audit Charter basically contains the authority of the auditor to
audit all business units, and the auditor is responsible to the Board of
Directors and Audit Committee. Also, the position of the internal audit unit
was under the president director. Only these three things that I remember.
The NS Internal Audit Charter (2012) consists of four parts. The first part covers
the background, goal, vision and mission. The second part comprises the definition and
purpose of internal audit, the scope of assignments of internal audit, the authority of the
internal auditor, the status of internal audit, the organisational structure of the internal
audit unit, communication and responsibilities of internal audit. The third section
contains

performance

standards.

The

standards

encompass

professionalism,

independence and objectivity, competence, the internal control, management of internal
audit, execution of activities as well as follow-up monitoring. The fourth part is an
ethics code that includes standards of conduct.
The definition of internal auditing which is written in the Charter is taken from the
Professional Standards of Internal Audit (SPAI) in Indonesia. The definition contained
in SPAI is adopted from the International Professional Practices Framework (IPPF)
issued by the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA). The definition is as follows 30:
[a]n internal auditing is an independent assurance and consulting activity and is
objective in nature, designed to add value and improve an organisation's
operations. Internal audit activity helps an organisation accomplish its objectives
by conducting a systematic disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the
effectiveness of risk management, control and governance processes.
In addition, the Charter also includes the purpose of internal audit in NS and helps
management and other units to achieve their goals and objectives. Therefore, the
internal audit provides assistance in the form of analysis, assessment, recommendation,
consultation and follow-up monitoring of other units’ activities.
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The Internal Audit Charter 2012 also states that the internal auditors coordinate
with working partners, the audit committee and external auditors when conducting
internal audit duties. The coordination aims to obtain an appropriate scope of audit and
reduces duplication of activities and is conducted by having meetings with these parties.
Periodic meetings with the audit committee are held every once every three months to
discuss important issues in internal audit activities. Meetings of internal auditors with
the audit committee, external auditors, accounting and finance department cover
discussion of the audit plan, finding solutions for problems found in the audit activities,
sharing the audit procedure and working papers, and distributing the audit reports
among the internal and external auditors.
However, a participant gave a contrasting comment about the Charter regarding
sharing the audit report as follows 31:
Our relationship with an external auditor is as partners. In terms of
internal audit reports, we will give the report to the external auditor if the
head of internal audit unit give us permission to do so. In fact, for strict
confidential documents the external auditor must first have an approval
from the CEO. But, so far, it is prohibited to provide internal audit reports
to an external auditor since it is very confidential. The internal audit
report is strictly for the organisation’s internal interest. The external
auditor has never asked us to provide such report. They only ask for data.
This provision is applied to all external auditors, the public accounting
firms, BPK and BPKP.
Another argument is given by an interviewee below 32;
This company is not only listed at the Indonesian Stock Exchange, but it is
also a public company. A public company in terms of giving information is
a company opened for stakeholders. But as a company, we must select the
information that is going to be publicly consumed. If we meet the demand
of the related BPK by providing access to a very detailed data, we also
had to so to such similar requests from other parties, such as minority
shareholders. And this is very risky for the company because the minority
shareholders are actually be the company’s competitor.
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In NS, the internal auditors have unrestricted access authority in performing their
duties and this is included in the Internal Audit Charter 2012. This access covers 33:
[a]ll information at all levels of management and employees; every decision that
is generated by all levels of management; all rules that apply within the company;
all information, data, and relevant documents required; every place and activities
should be examined.
[t]he internal auditor’s authority includes also by asking independent experts to
assist the internal auditor; holding and incidental regular meetings with top
management, Board of Directors and or Audit Committee.
[f]or special cases, such as if the internal auditor found an indication of fraud
during audit, this said fraud will be discussed with the Managing Director or the
Audit Committee to be followed up.
[f]or internal operation under the Board of Directors will be investigated by the
internal auditor who is assisted by an external auditor, while for the level of or
above the Board of Directors and will be examined by an external auditor.
Accordingly, one of the participants described the authority of internal auditors as
follows: 34
The authority of internal auditor covers an unlimited access as described
in the Internal Audit Charter. Other than that, also an authority in
providing audit recommendation, where such recommendation must be
followed up by auditee.
Besides, the Internal Audit Charter 2012 states that the responsibility of internal
auditors is to provide analyses, assessments, recommendations and consultations and to
submit a report on all activities undertaken in accordance with Professional Standards of
Internal Audit, International Standards for the Professional Practice Framework (IPPF),
Standards and other professional behaviour demanded by the code of ethics, other rules
that bind the company such as the management system (SMSG), decisions of the board
of directors, manuals and Standards Operating Procedures (SOP), as well as laws,
regulations and legislation in force.
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Internal Audit Charter 2012, p. 5-6
Interview with L, a middle-level auditor, at 20 October 2014
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Accordingly, the internal audit responsibilities are in line with the objectives of
internal audit as mentioned by an interviewee as follows 35:
An internal auditor's responsibility is to make sure that the main internal
controls have been implemented properly. An internal auditor is
responsible for reviewing all the controls associated with business
processes carried out by all units in the company. Auditors then make
reports on the results of the revision of the internal controls to the
President Director. Evaluate whether the working unit SOP is adequate or
not. In this case, we serve as a consultant. However, basically the most
important task of an internal audit is to conduct audit in order to make
sure that everything runs well.
It is written in the charter that internal audit charter can be updated every year.
However, the charter document indicated that it was last updated in 2012. In 2014, the
charter had not yet been revised since it was considered that there had been no
significant changes that called for adjustments. The Internal Audit Charter 2012 is an
improvement on the Internal Audit Charter of 2010. The Charter of 2010 must be
adapted as an organisation changes, and business processes and governance of the
internal audit unit are adjusted The amendments in the Internal Audit Charter 2012
encompass the name of departments, a modification in accordance with the regulation
of Capital Market (Bapepam-LK/OJK) and investigation authorities in the case of fraud.
The adaptations to the Bapepam-LK/OJK regulation encompass a number of points; the
effectiveness of an implementation of risks mitigation and internal control, the
application of Control Self-Assessment (CSA), providing a consultation service to
management, which includes formulating the working plan and budgeting of the
company, identifying risks and controls, developing the business strategy of the
company, and the prohibition of having double position as the internal auditor and
operational staff concurrently.
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Interview with J, a manager-level auditor, at 3 September 2014
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The Charter used to be reviewed periodically to accommodate the need of change.
However, the current charter has not been changed for a while as mentioned in an
interview as follows 36:
It has been running for two years but still no change in the internal audit
charter, because we feel there is no need for it. Typically, after two years
we will develop the internal audit charter. One of the things that we need
to develop in the internal audit charter is to establish internal audit unit in
the subsidiary in Hanoi, Vietnam, but there is still no permit to do it.
Another participant explained the changes made from the prior charter 37:
Although it is not too principle there is still a little bit of change in the
internal audit charter. For example, the insertion of the change from using
the old method of auditing to the new audit method, i.e risk-based audit.
A Code of Conduct for internal auditors is also contained in the Internal Audit
Charter 2012. This Code of Conduct sets out basic principles of behaviour, and in
practice requires careful consideration of every internal auditor. Violations of the code
of conduct may result in questioning and being given a warning, being dismissed from
auditing duty or from the company. The Code of Conduct must be obeyed by the
internal auditors in NS and consists of:
− To behave and be honest, objective and careful in carrying out the task.
− To have high integrity and loyalty to the profession, company and internal audit unit.
− To avoid activities or actions that harm or it is suspected may harm the internal audit
profession or company.
− To avoid activities that conflict with the interests of the company or that resulting in
cannot do duty objectively.
− To work based on expertise, knowledge and experience, as well as the existing
professional standards and legislation in force and continue to develop expertise,
effectiveness and quality of work.
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Interview with J, a manager-level auditor, at 3 September 2014
Interview with E, a senior-level auditor, at 22 September 2014

188

− Do not accept gifts of any kind and from anyone, either directly or indirectly,
including from the auditee, clients, customers, suppliers, and partners and or
stakeholders that interfere with or it is suspected may interfere with the professional
judgment of auditors.
− To maintain morale and dignity as the internal auditor.
− To keep the confidential information of the company which are entrusted to him / her
and do not use information obtained for the personal benefit.
− To report all audit results by revealing the truth, as existing facts and by not hiding
things that could damage the company funds or violate the law.
It is written in the Charter that the formation of the Charter refers to two
regulations: one that the Ministry of SOE issued in 2002 concerning good corporate
governance implementation, and the Bapepam-LK/OJK regulation published in 2008
regarding the Internal Audit Charter Guideline. The Charter also used the Profession
Standards of Internal Audit as the guideline in composing the Charter.
In terms of the Internal Audit Charter, the internal audit unit has been following
the Standards issued by the IIA in all aspects, such as the existence of a formal written
Charter, the content of the Charter, the parties who approve the Charter and the
requirement of periodic assessment.
5.5.2. The Independence of Internal Audit
As stated in the Charter the activities of internal audit must be independent and
the internal auditors must be objective in conducting their functions. Since the adoption
of the new paradigm, the internal auditor has multiple functions, namely audit,
consulting and catalyst. Providing these functions are challenges for internal auditors,
particularly in terms of maintaining the independence as a unit organisation and
objectivity of internal auditor.
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5.5.2.1. The Organisational Independence
In order to ensure the independence of the internal audit unit, NS places rules and
regulations in the Internal Audit Charter 2012. The position of the internal audit unit
within the organisational structure of the company is at a certain level that ensures the
internal audit unit is free from interference and able to implement its authority.
Therefore, the internal audit unit is under and directly responsible to the president
director of the company. Moreover, the head of internal audit unit is appointed and
dismissed by the president director with the approval of the board of directors. On this
matter, an interviewee explained as follows 38:
Candidate for the head of the internal audit is appointed by a president
director who then proposed it to the audit committee for their approval.
And if the audit committee reject such nomination, then the CEO will
appoint someone else for the position of head of internal audit unit and do
the same procedure again. The appointed head of internal audit then
approved by the audit committee is reported to Bapepam-LK/OJK.
Additionally, as described in the Charter, the head of the internal audit unit should
periodically deliver the report of internal audit activities to the president director as well
as to the audit committee of the board of directors. The following finding from an
interview also indicates a similar situation39:
The ICoFR result of review and Analytical Review are delivered to the
President Director, audit committee, financial director and the related
units.
Besides the reporting line, the existence of interference from the CEO in audit
activities may impair the independence of internal audit. Comments on the
independence of internal audit unit were found to vary. The independence of audit unit
was indicated by the following comments 40:
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Interview with B, a senior-level auditor, at 15 September 2014
Interview with D, a middle-level auditor, at 21 October 2014
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Interview with D, a middle-level auditor, at 21 October 2014
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The president director never interferes in making the audit plan. Normally,
we propose the internal audit plan through a mechanism of discussion. If
there is a revision, then the president director will review it. But, so far, a
president director never deletes anything that we want to audit. He gave us
freedom.
However, another auditor's comments are contrary to this view of the
independence of the internal audit unit: 41:
The president director always interfere during the internal audit, but still
in a positive way. Like giving us some questions, for example, why the
examination is not deep enough, and why an audit on control is
inadequate. Usually these questions arise if there are new cases and
existing controls are not strong enough.
Another comment which seems to suggest dissatisfaction with top management
was made by an interviewee 42:
So far, I think the president director is not completely supporting the
internal audit. Forms of support are limited to the establishment of an
internal audit unit. However, the president director has not given support
to the evaluation or analysis of the findings of the audit report.
The support of top management is reflected in approval of the Internal Audit
Charter 2012 by the president director and independent board of director who also acts
as the head of the audit committee. Similarly, an endorsement of the Internal Audit Plan
(RKIA) 2014 is conducted by the president director and the head of audit committee.
Additionally, another form of top management support is the meetings between top
management and the internal auditors at least once a month to discuss issues that are
considered important or need to be followed up, or need to be raised at the board of
directors' meeting.
In the Internal Audit Charter 2012, it is stated that the internal auditors should
build coordination and work together with the audit committee. A cooperation practice
between auditors and the audit committee is described by an interviewee below 43:
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Interview with D, a middle-level auditor, at 21 October 2014
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Audit Committee responds the internal audit report. When there is serious
case, we are asked to meet.
The Charter also states that the internal auditors should hold periodic meetings
with the audit committee, either with or without the presence of directors at least once
every three months to discuss problems, issues and important developments surrounding
the internal audit activity. In this case, the interviewees gave detailed explanations about
the meetings with the audit committee as follow 44:
We have a routine meeting with the audit committee every three months.
Meaning the meetings are held four times in one year.
In terms of independency of the internal auditor in undertaking audit activities, an
interview demonstrated the management support to the auditors as follow 45:
There is no limitation from the president director in performing audit.
However, other participant provided a contrasting comment on the independence
of an internal auditor as below 46:
No interference from the president director in the internal audit
independency. However, independence is still a big question. Please judge
it yourself.
An auditor described responses of the auditee and the top management toward the
audit reports as follows 47:
As for me, an audit recommendation is the largest contribution of the
internal auditor for the company because recommendation will be
followed up by the auditee and also read by the president director.
Sometimes there an internal audit report was directly put into the drawer
by the president director. This is indicated by the absence of a response
from the president director and suddenly we received another assignment.
Usually a president director will respond the internal audit report in a
period of two weeks, followed by replying the report together with us,
asking our recommendation. I do not know how many internal audit
reports are ignored by the president director, but obviously, it happened.
Usually the president director will ignore any report concerning himself. I
was annoyed because I worked hard but there was no response to the audit
report I made. What a waste!
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The position of internal audit unit under the CEO in the organisation has a
negative impact on the independence of the internal audit which is reflected in the
interview below 48:
We are the President Director subordinate, so we cannot force him. If a
president director would not accept the findings of an audit reported to
him and ordered us to throw some of audit findings, we will do like he
said. This is an instruction. It is the risk of being under the president
director. Our position is the same as the president and his ministers. But,
for the sake of professionalism of internal auditors, all audit records will
not be discarded. On the other hand we will keep the working sheet of our
audit safely. The Board of Directors will not get a complete set of audit
report because we have discarded some of our audit finds as instructed by
the president director. This is the principle we got at our course sessions.
The instruction of the president director was obeyed, but not in my field.
In terms of organisational independence, the internal audit unit has partly
followed the Internal Audit Standards issued by the IIA. As although the internal audit
unit delivered the audit reports to the CEO and the audit committee, there was
interference by senior management over the audit reporting. This condition
demonstrates that the CEO does not yet fully support the internal audit activity as
required by the Standards.
5.5.2.2. The Individual Non Subjective (Objective)
In addition, personal independence as the internal auditor has also attracted the
attention in NS. It is reflected by the expression of concern about the independence of
the internal auditor as an individual in the Internal Audit Charter 2012. Moreover, it is
also stated that the rules of such independence refers to Bapepam-LK/OJK regulation
published in 2008.
The Charter 2012 states that internal auditors should be independent and objective
when they perform their audit activities. They must be independent as a personal, so
that they can give an important opinion which is impartial and not prejudiced in the
48

Interview with N, a senior-level auditor, at 15 September 2014

193

implementation and reporting of the audit. Moreover, an internal auditor’s objective is
an independent mental attitude when conducting audit activities. The objectivity of
internal auditor cannot be defeated by other considerations.
The multiple functions of the internal auditor, as the assurance provider as well as
the consultant and the catalyst do not place the auditors in a difficult situation in terms
of maintaining their personal independence toward the auditee. This is reflected in an
interview as follows 49.
I have no problems maintaining my independency to the auditee. I only
give advices and auditee runs the operation. We give advices on several
aspects for their consideration in decision-making. When viewed from the
organisational structure, we indeed are under the control of the CEO. In
view of this position, however, independence is a dilemma, because we are
working for the company as well.
Additionally, the Charter 2012 also states that to be objective, requires that
internal auditors be honest to themselves and confident that their works are of high
quality, reliable, trustworthy and free from influence and pressure from outside parties.
Even though in the previous section, it was demonstrated that the internal auditors are
not free from pressure of top management. The auditors seem to be trying to be
objective by saying 50:
We maintain our independence usually by establishing a relationship with
the working units, but remain independent. This means that we follow the
rules when we do the audit. In addition, as a consultant, the internal
auditor will invite other units, such as the legal and accounting
department, and we will provide advice on the aspects of controlling.
However, we are only limited to providing advice, but the decision
remains in the hands of top management.
The Charter 2012 explains that in order to maintain the independence and
objectivity as specified in the Professional Standards, an internal auditor should avoid a
situation of conflict of interest. An auditor recruited internally is prohibited to audit his /
her former unit within a one year period. Similarly, internal auditors are not allowed to
49
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Interview with D, a middle-level auditor, at 21 October 2014
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have dual duties as the internal auditor involved concurrently in operational units in
both the public company and its subsidiaries. However, in practice, many of these rules
were violated as indicated from the following interview 51:
The internal auditor should not be involved in CSR activities. However,
some internal auditor engaged in sport activities as treasurer. And the
head of internal audit unit is rather loose. In such cases, the head of
internal audit unit only provides advice and does not require the auditor to
be involved in CSR activities. The negative impact of this dual role, as an
administrator and internal auditors, they will make the report look good;
not neutral because they audit a report they made themselves.
The violation was also done by a high rank official in the audit unit as mentioned
below 52:
A high rank official in the internal audit unit should also be independent.
Cannot have a dual position. However, this high official of the internal
audit unit is also the board of directors of the VU, a subsidiary company.
However, NS has only a small portion of shares in this subsidiary
company.
The auditors’ position above which may create a situation of conflict of interest
also had been reported in the QAR report 2011. It was stated in the report that such
positions potentially impaired the objectivity of internal auditors both in fact and in
appearance. Therefore, the independent assessor of the QAR recommended the audit
unit follow the Standards.
In terms of individual objectivity, the internal auditors seem to have not yet fully
followed the Standards, particularly since they also have placed some auditors within
operational activity. According to Standards, this condition should be avoided since it
could impair the objectivity of internal auditors.
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5.5.3. The Scope of Activities of Internal Audit
The new functions of audit, consultant and catalyst, alter the range of assignments
of the internal auditor and cause them to become more complex. These scopes of work
consist of all the existing business ranges in the holding company and the subsidiary.
The activities contained in the Internal Audit Charter of 2012 comprise evaluating,
testing and assessing the effectiveness of control, risk management and governance
processes. Regarding the audit tasks practiced by an auditor, it was mentioned that 53:
Up till now, at least I only give recommendations on risks and the applied
control. Other than that, there are other things that need adjustment. As
example, several procedures are ignored by the auditee, and we need to
remind him/her. There are activities that have no Standard Operational
Procedures (SOP), that we suggest to make later.
The evaluation and enhancement of effectiveness of risk management, controlling
and governance process are accomplished through conducting activities of assurance,
consulting and catalyst. In terms of assurance, it is attained by audit activities. In an
interview, it was mentioned 54;
There are two kinds of audits, operational audits and special audits.
Operational audit is a routine audit. Every year, we arrange the schedule,
time, theme of audit, the number of internal audit staff, and the cost to
conduct the audit and non-audit. Operational audit consists of accounting
audit and financial, commercial, engineering and projects, as well as IT.
Special audit was not routine because it depends on the demand of the
chief executive.
In terms of the scope of internal audit activity, the internal auditors have provided
assurance and consulting services related to the organisation’s governance, risk
management and control processes. This scope of work is in line with the standard's
recommendation.
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5.5.3.1. Operational Audit
The operational audit is regulated by the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)
for Audit of Operational and Management System 2011. This document was developed
to advocate the requirement various rules and regulations such as the Decree of Ministry
of SOE, Decree of the Board of Directors and Internal Audit Charter 2012.
The SOP for Audit of Operational and Management System 2011 regulates
operational audits as follows 55:
[a]uditing all processing activities at all level of production, marketing,
accounting and finance, general, human resources, supply of goods and services
and the implementation of project.
[m]ake sure that the company’s operation is done effectively and efficiently as
required and always be improved to enhance the company's performance.
[e]nsures that any discrepancies or irregularities found in the audit will be
followed up in accordance with the schedule and commitments that have been
determined so that it will not be repeated.
[m]ake sure that the applicable rules and policies are in accordance with the
operational standards usually applied in accordance with the principles of good
corporate governance, legislation and general provisions.
In terms of compliance to government legislation, the interviewee below revealed that 56:
From my point of view, the contribution of internal auditing in helping
SOEs in general and the working units in particular to observe the
legislation is not optimal, as there are some regulations that are not 100%
implemented. For example, the laws of human resource development
which stipulates that trade unions in the company should not be
intimidated by the management, but apparently that is not the case.
The operational audit involves four central points as in engineering, commercial,
accounting and financial, and IT audits which are performed by four audit bureaus each
with its own specialty. The internal document, the Internal Audit Plan 2014, defines
these specific audit activities.
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SOP for Audit of Operational and Management System, 2011, p.3
Interview with A, a middle-level auditor, at 12 November 2014
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5.5.3.1.1. Engineering Audit
The Internal Audit Plan (RKIA) of 2014 states that an engineering audit includes
the assessment of risk, control and efficiency in the business process of production,
which embraces the performance of production, utilisation of energy, raw materials,
auxiliary materials, substitution materials, operating supplies (such as grinding balls,
refractory stone, lubricating oil, etc.) and spare parts to ensure the achievement of Key
Performance Indicators (KPI) in the production unit. According to one participant, the
scope of engineering audit in practice consists of 57:
Engineering Audit includes the company operational audit, which covers
the production processes and its quality, and maintenance. We also audit
Project.
In conducting the engineering audit, the internal auditors will consider the level of
risks contained in the list of risks, as explained in the interview below 58:
Engineering Audit is done based on audit topics determined by the level of
risks listed in the risks list. High risks would be a top priority for auditing.
Therefore, the audit topics vary each year in line with the change of the
level of risks. However, the risks will not change as long as there is no
change in business processes. Nevertheless, the risks level may be changed
due to the condition of the cement plant.
In the RKIA 2014, it was shown that the Engineering Department had 17 risks, 56
internal controls and 31 risk mitigations.
In terms of the audit timing, the engineering audit needs longer time than others as
mentioned by the participant below 59.
We need three months to complete an audit.
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5.5.3.1.2. Commercial Audit
The Internal Audit Plan (RKIA) of 2014 states that the activity of commercial
audits includes a review of the effectiveness of risk mitigation implementation and
internal control across the entire transaction process in the procurement business
process, marketing, distribution and transportation. The procurement business process
comprises the activities of work units demands, inventory, purchasing and warehousing.
Moreover, the scope of the marketing business process consists of ordering, allotment,
selling, distribution, and sales receivable.
The information contained in the RKIA is supported by one interviewee who
explains the activity of commercial audit as follows 60:
Commercial audit evaluates the business processes of human resources,
marketing and supply and special audit by special assignment letter.
The interviewee explains the scope of commercial audit in detail as follows 61:
For marketing audit, we will check the sale policy, marketing area, and
debt for delivery costs. While for supply audit, we check the procedure to
buy material, spare parts and service. We know how auditee gets goods or
services, do they work according to the existing standard operational
process or not.
The guidance for conducting the commercial audit is explained through the
interview, as follows 62:
For guideline audit, we look at the job description, their standard
operating procedures, and also the relevant regulations, such as the
Decree of the Minister of SOEs. We check whether the procedures have
been updated or not.
In carrying out the commercial audit, the internal auditors use risk-based audit
method as explained by the participant below 63.
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The marketing process has many risks. For example, we send a cement
bag at a particular kilometre distance. An activity like this has many risks,
such as the outdoor humid temperatures can have an impact on the
formation of clumps of cement. This risk must be anticipated by covering
the cement with a waterproof tarpaulin.
The interview indicates that the risks within the marketing process are shared with
other parties who are involved in the processes, as mentioned below 64.
Therefore, risks must be described in detail to minimise the risks. It is one
of the methods of risk management. Another technique is to divide the risk
between cement manufacturers, shipping agents, and distributors. For
example, we send cement to the distributors by using a shipping agent. If
some cement were damaged on the way to a distributor, then the damaged
cement is the responsibility of the shipping agent. However, if the cement
was damaged while still kept in the distributor’s store house caused by
careless handling by their workers, then the distributor must be
responsible for it. Similarly, if the cement was already defected while still
in the factory, this will be the responsibility of the company.
All the risks from a number of departments that are included in the commercial
process are contained in the RKIA 2014, in which there were 47 risks in total. To
overcome the risks, the departments in the commercial process set 116 internal controls
and 100 risk mitigations.
Contrary to the broad scope of commercial audit, the commercial audit bureau has
few internal auditors, as stated by the participants 65.
I only have two staff of internal auditors, I should have 5-6 auditors for my
team to do commercial audit. I could ask for internal auditors help from
other audit bureaus, because we use matrix system in internal audit unit.
Usually it took two months to complete the commercial audit.
5.5.3.1.3. Accounting and Finance Audit
The scope of an accounting and finance audit comprises all actions or processes
that impact on the financial report, such as activities of marketing, human resources, and
procurement. The audit consists of number of processes that create costs and generate
incomes that have to be recorded as mentioned by the participant below 66.
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We check the transactions to make sure that the transactions were
presented correctly in the financial report. Reviewing is done using
several ICoFR controls, Internal Control over the Financial Reporting.
We evaluate whether such controls have been performed or not. This
review is likely to be an assurance service.
Basically, this activity focuses on the periodic review of the financial statements
(analytical review) and tests the implementation of Internal Control over Financial
Reporting (ICoFR), including an audit of the Partnership Program and Community
Development Program as mentioned by an interviewee 67;
We do analytical review and review on ICoFR. Analytical review is done
on interim financial statements and annual financial statements. The
interim financial report is published every three months.
5.5.3.1.3.1. Analytical Review
The Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) of Analytical Review for Financial
Statements 2010 is a guideline for internal auditors in PT. NS for conducting a review
over the financial statements. The document states that the procedures of analytical
review are prepared in line with the International Professional Practice Framework
(IPPF) - Practice Advisory 2320-1: analytical procedures, professional standards of
public accountants, Auditing Standards (SA) sections 722 and the Internal Audit
Charter 2012. The instruction is made with the assistance of an accounting firm and also
using a public SOE listed in NYSE as a benchmark as indicated by the following
comment 68.
References used when devising Analytical Review guidelines consisted of
two types, namely comparative study at PT Telkom in Bandung and
consultation with the public accounting firm EY. So, we saw how Telkom
has performed an analytical review which we imitated later. And EY
Public Accountant Firm gave solutions or the step by step way to carry out
the analytical review.
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The review is the implementation of inquiries and analytical procedures. This
activity aims to provide a limited assurance that there are no material modifications that
need to made to the financial statements to present the report in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles in Indonesia. The term 'materiality' is used to
express something that is considered to be reasonably known by users of financial
statements. Information is considered material if the omission or errors in the
information recording (misstatement) influence the decisions that should be taken. The
scope of such review covers arrangements regarding the procedures in the
implementation of the review and reporting of the review’s results of the financial
statements. The financial statements consist of a balance sheet, income statement, and
statement of changes in equity, a cash flow statement, as well as notes of the financial
statements.
The participants stated that in PT. NS, normally the analytical review of the
financial report is conducted before the report is published. This review verifies the
figures in the financial statements. Such review is performed every three months with
the time needed to complete it is clarified by a participant below 69;
Usually we need 1 (one) month to finish the Analytical Review. And we do
this review once in three months. Thus, Analytical Review is done four
times in one year.
In conducting the financial audit activity, the internal auditors focused on specific
accounts as explained by an interviewee as follows 70;
We need only one week to complete a financial audit. This is because we
are only focus on significant accounts. So, we define what critical
accounts should be examined every year. And the important accounts must
be reviewed every three months.
The participant described which procedures are carried out with the audit
reporting as mentioned below 71;
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If there is a suggestion to do some revisions on the Analytical Review
report from the audit committee, we would do it, but in the next quarterly
period report. We will inform the matter to the accounting and finance
department to be checked again. Typically, the correction related to
Accounting Standards. After the report was revised, we report it to the
audit committee.
The internal auditor determines which important accounts each year need to be
checked including the accounts that are required to be assessed every three months.
Thus, the internal auditor only examines the significant accounts which focus on the
understated or overstated accounts.
5.5.3.1.3.2. Internal Control over Financial Reporting Review
An Internal Control over Financial Reporting (ICoFR) activity is to provide a
reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation
of financial statements to external parties, in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP). ICoFR is an internal control system referring to the
international standards of internal control (COSO Internal Control Framework).
The ICoFR is guided by the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for Testing and
Evaluate the Activity Level Controls over Financial Reporting 2010. The activity level
controls are the controls performed at each process of organisational activity, such as
authorisation, verification, reconciliation and other activities in order to prevent the
occurrence of an error / fraud and to safeguard assets. The test procedures for such
ICoFR are based on the Sarbanes Oxley section 404 and Auditing Standards (AS) No 5.
The scope of such procedures includes arrangements regarding the procedures to test the
activity level of controls on ICoFR and report results of the test.
The interviewees state that ICoFR’s Review is a relatively new activity in PT. NS
since the ICoFR review was applied in 2013. This application has not been
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implemented in all SOEs in Indonesia. The interviewee also mentioned his / her
motivation to implement the ICoFR review as follows 72;
We reviewed the ICoFR, because we are asked by the independent auditor
whether we have done it or not. Reviewing ICoFR is done once in a year.
Independent auditors are from the Big Four Group. They have the
standard form set by their head office. In relation to the questions asked by
the external auditor on the implementation of ICOFR, it is necessary for us
to pay attention on it.
Review of ICoFR aims to ensure that the figures recorded in the financial
statements are valid and correct. ICoFR concentrates on control, in order to make sure
that controls for each account have been implemented in order to prevent the
overstatement or understatement or a wrong recording. This control is performed on all
activities in each business process that generate figures as confirmed by an interview 73;
Internal Control over Financial Reporting includes various business
processes, such as marketing, procurement, production and IT.
In conducting the ICoFR Review, the internal auditors place their priorities as
described by the interviewee below 74;
We would like to focus on the high risks first and controls. After that, we
will review the mid-level risks and controls, if we still have time. But, we
hope that we can take all the risks and its controls for review.
A participant explained further regarding the guidance for ICoFR Review as follows 75:
We are assisted by our consultant in making a guideline to review ICoFR.
Our Consultant is Public Accountant AJJ. Consultant helps us for one year.
They make the blue print and we use it as a base to make Standard
Operational Procedure.
The AAJ is affiliated with the international Public Accounting Firm, namely
International RSM (www.republika.co.id, 2016).
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5.5.3.1.3.3. Audit of Partnership Program and Community Development
All SOEs in Indonesia are required by the Ministry of SOE to have social
responsibility by nurturing Small Medium Enterprises (SME) and engaging with
Community development. These programs are called PKBL. The PKBL Program
consists of two different programs, namely PK and BL. PK stands for Partnership
Program which is a partnership program of SOEs with SMEs. This program aims to
improve the ability of small businesses to be strong and independent through the use of
funds from the profit of SOEs. Small businesses are economic activities of the people
that are small-scale and meet the criteria of net worth or annual sales and ownership as
regulated in Decree of Ministry of SOEs No PER-05/MBU/2007. Partners are small
businesses that obtain loans from the Partnership Program.
BL stands for Community Development Program. This program improves the
social conditions of society by SOE through the utilisation of funds from the profit of
SOEs. BL Program is an implementation of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) such
as sport, competitions, marching bands, and reforestation activities. The BL program is
defined and implemented by the trustees of the SOEs in the region. Patrons’ SOE are
SOEs that participate in Partnership and BL Programs. In PT. NS, the PKBL Program is
managed by the Unit of PK and BL programs are directly under the supervision of the
CEO.
Audit of PKBL Programs is carried out once a year and needs a month to perform
the audit. A participant explained the PKBL audit as follows 76;
The scope of the PKBL audit includes assistance provided by the company
and the partnership program. For CSR audit, we examine the process of
procurement and the distribution of aid, whether targeted or not. For the
Partnership Program, there are two criteria set by the Ministry of SOEs,
namely the number of partners and the amount of money.
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The guidance used in performing the CSR audit is described by an interviewee below 77;
In doing CSR audit we are in compliance with the Decree of the Minister
of SOEs and Accounting Standards.
The auditors use the Decree of the Ministry as a guideline to undertake the audit.
The Decree of Ministry of SOE determines that only particular SMEs deserve financial
support. These SMEs must fulfil the criteria set by the Ministry of SOE, such as
possessing net assets of a maximum of AU$20,000 or an annual sales maximum of
AU$100,000 . However, one participant made a comment about the violation of the aim
of the decree by saying 78;
There was an Event Organisation (EO), that received a soft loan through
the Partnership Program. In addition, several key people in the community
who have power to influence the public, such as the board member of a
particular political party, as well as several wealthy businessmen also
received loans.
An example of the audit finding on the PK Program was mentioned by an
auditor 79;
An EO have a turnover of one million (1,000,000AU $), but EO owes
about fifty or two hundred million from the company. EO has not paid the
debt for a long time, stucked. The owner of this EO has a special
relationship with the chief executive. We've warned CSR unit about this
case. We have also sent audit reports on the said matter to the chief
executive.
In terms of SOP for undertaking audit of the PKBL Programs, one interview
revealed that 80;
There is no SOP to audit the PKBL programs. Because the audit is
conducted in turn with other audit bureau.
In performing audit of the CSR Program, the internal audit focuses on the
effectiveness of the implementation of the Program. The standard of effectiveness
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measurement is that the result of the program can be used by the community. The
participants stated that the application of such program has not been effective, which
means it has not yet achieved the expected goals. A participant explained an example of
an audit finding on the CSR Program, specifically on reforestation program 81:
There is a proposal to hold reforestation activities at a cost of hundreds of
millions of Rupiah, already approved by CSR unit. But the fact is instead
of reforestation activities as described in the proposal, they grow
marijuana. I submitted this matter to the CSR unit. But the response from
the CSR unit is that they never received the proposal. Things like this
makes me headache.
This is because some programs were not organised to meet the needs of society
since the company did not survey the people’s needs before running a program. Due to
several of the previous year's CSR’s programs being ineffective, in 2014, a guidebook
for the survey of community needs was published. However, such survey will be
conducted by consultants and based on these survey’s results the CSR unit will provide
training to the community. The auditors had different experiences in conducting PKBL
audit. One participant had difficulty with auditee which was reflected in the following
comment 82;
Repeated findings usually occur in the audit Partnership Program. To
minimize recurrent findings are difficult because of the head of PKBL unit
is a tough character. He has no respect to us. However, after he is
replaced by another person, their performance become better, and they
respect us. If we get the audit findings, they want all the cases can be
resolved, it is called "case closed". The performance of the working unit
depends on the attitude of their leader.
An auditor explained the approach in performing the PKBL audit 83;
As for the Partnership Program we have never visited our partners or
conduct a field audit. We did not have much time to do a survey to our
partners. The audit process we do is based on existing documents.
However, independent auditors do make observations on the partners and
we assist them.
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5.5.3.1.4. IT Audit
The information system between a holding company and its subsidiaries,
particularly cement manufacturers has been integrated using computer software named
SAP for the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP). The database is located in Jakarta.
The internal auditors in both PT. NS and its subsidiaries examine the system every three
months to ensure it works properly.
According to the participants, the IT audit is performed by the audit bureau of ICT.
The bureau was officially established in February 2014. One participant explained the
implementation of IT audit and its background for late application as follows 84;
IT audit has been conducted for two years. This is because we only
recently have experts. He moved to the internal audit unit two years ago,
and recently received a certificate CISA in January last year.
The reason to establish the ICT audit bureau is revealed in the interview below 85;
The company’s information technology systems are very large and
important. Data centre is accessed by the holding company and four
subsidiaries. If no examination on the information technology systems is
conducted, it would fail the holding company and its subsidiaries to enter
into those systems. If this occurs, it will cause huge losses for the company.
Thus, the needs of the company are the main reason for the company to
conduct an audit on the information technology systems.
Nowadays, only the head of the bureau has Certified Information System Auditor
(CISA). Moreover, the bureau only has two members of staff with expertise in database
servers and PC service desks. The bureau lacks internal audit staff who are qualified in
the application system, which forces the head of audit bureau to perform the audit on the
system.
In the Internal Audit Plan of 2014 (RKIA), it is explained that the audit of IT
includes a review of the effectiveness of risk mitigation and internal control in the
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business process of the IT department. The aims of IT audit are described by an
interviewee below 86.
An audit on information technology – based systems aims to provide
assurance to the top management that the information technology systems
built and managed by the information technology unit have been operated
correctly or not. If the information technology systems need to be
improved, the internal auditor will provide advices to the information
technology unit to materialize the management's expectations.
The auditors also examine 87:
I audited several risks and controls associated in information technology
unit. I checked on the field whether internal controls that aim to address
the risks have been done. Internal controls are the responsibility of the
operating unit of information technology.
If such control is not effective, the residual risk will still exist. So the auditees
have to mitigate such risk. The participants explain further that the internal auditors set
the audit plan and carry out the audit based on the list of risks. This list of risk is
compiled by Governance, Risk and Compliance (GRC) unit.
The RKIA 2014 shows that the IT unit has eight risks and fifteen internal controls
to overcome the risks as well as eleven risk mitigations. The internal auditors use
COBIT, ITIL, Project Management and Good Corporate Governance as the framework
for working guidelines. It requires two months to conduct the IT audit. Ideally, the IT
audit activity should be conducted by the internal auditor before the external auditors.
Overall, the internal auditors examine the system to ensure that the system is
working properly. Furthermore, the internal auditor will report whether or not the IT
unit has worked very well, so they can guarantee that the system will be running well.
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5.5.3.2. Capex Audit
The Working Plan of Internal Audit 2014 clarifies that the capital expenditure
(Capex) audit is a review of the effectiveness and efficiency of an implementation of
risk mitigation and internal control in some Capex / strategic projects that are conducted
by the government.
The Capex audit is regulated in the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) of
Project Audit 2010. This document is developed to advocate the requirements of various
rules and regulations such as the Decree of Ministry of SOE, Decree of the Board of
Directors and Internal Audit Charter 2012.
The scopes of a Capex audit as stated in this document includes accounting and
finance, project control, engineering, procurement, construction and support activities.
One participant explained the reason for conducting the Capex audit as follow 88;
We have many projects and investments. Sometimes, after making an
investment, they do not do anything. So, we checked out the investments
and policies. These checking are to ensure that the policy has been applied
correctly and meet its objectives.
Other participants explain the audit bureau that has responsibility to carrying out
the Capex audit 89;
Capex Audit includes all of the company's investments whether the
investment is running well or not. We at the engineering audit bureau do
the reviewing on such investment. It took us three months to complete the
Capex audit.
It is stated in the SOP document that the project activities are conducted within
specified commencement and completion dates and then the audit execution is adjusted
to this time period. In general, it refers to one of these periods: six-month period,
appropriate stages of the project as prescribed by the board of directors, or as the
working plan of the internal audit. The audit team for conducting a Capex audit consists
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of internal auditors from four audit bureaus, such as accounting and finance,
engineering, commercial and ICT, as mentioned by a participant from accounting and
finance audit bureau below 90;
I have ever been involved in a project audit. I examine the business supply
process and sales.
5.5.3.3. Special Audit
Undertaking special audit is regulated by the internal audit charter. The charter
states that it relates to the investigation of irregularities of regulations. The Internal
Audit Plan (RKIA) 2014 allocates the number of man-days anticipated to be required to
complete a sudden assignment from top management without interrupting routine
activities. The assignment of special audits can be made by the president director or the
audit committee of the subsidiaries by conveying a special audit request to the president
director and the audit committee of the holding company as described by the following
comment 91.
If there is a request for a special audit, we will do it. For example, there is
an indication of fraud. Usually such request is based on a report, which is
later decided whether to be followed up or just drop it. We have a whistleblower system. This could be a flag-carrier for internal control.
The interviewee explains the stages of conducting the fraud audit as follows 92:
An instruction to conduct an audit on a fraud comes directly from the top
management to the chief of the internal audit unit. Then, the chief of the
internal audit unit forms a special team conduct fraud audit. The Special
Team investigate the auditee directly and the report of fraud audit shall be
given straight forward to the top management without any clarification
with auditee. In doing fraud audit, special team focuses to the problem.
The application of a special audit is guided by the Standard Operating Procedures
(SOP) of Fraud Audit 2011. The SOP states that the objectives of a special audit are to
assist the management to carry out his/her responsibility by providing an analysis,
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assessment, suggestions and comments over the activity which may involve fraud. The
special audit comprises three actions: prevention, detection and investigation of fraud.
− Prevention of Fraud
At this stage, the internal auditor attempts to eliminate the causes of the emergence of
fraud by maintaining a good internal control system and effective control activities as
well as by improving the organisational culture through implementing good corporate
governance and effective internal audit function.
− Detection of Fraud
Each type of fraud has its own characteristics, so discovering fraud needs a good
understanding of the different kinds of fraud that may arise within a company. The
feature of most supporting evidences of fraud may not be tangible. In general, an
indication of fraud is by the appearance of symptoms such as changes of lifestyle or
behaviour of a person, suspicious documentation, complaints from customers, and
suspicion of colleagues.
− Investigation of Fraud
There is no further explanation concerning the fraud investigation in the internal
document.
The special audit is not merely about fraud. Another type of special audit
assignment could be the investigation of the deviation from as well as disobedience of
the regulations.
The role of auditors principally is from an early stage. The internal auditor has to
provide consultancy at the planning stage and to play the role of catalyst during the
operation, then to provide an audit recommendation after the report has been audited.
According to the participants, to be a consultant is not easy as they have to be more
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knowledgeable than the auditee in operational matters so they can provide solutions to
the problem they dealt with.
The internal audit activities cover three kinds of audit: operational audit, capital
expenditure audit and special audit. Operating audit includes engineering audit,
commercial audit, accounting and finance audit, and IT audit. These activities are in line
with the Standards which require audit activities in areas of financial, operational,
information technology, regulatory and strategic risks.
5.5.4. An Alignment of Purposes between Internal Audit and the Company
The internal audit unit of PT. NS has a Road Map included in the Annual Audit
Plan (RKIA) 2014 to encompass the development of the internal audit function from
2009 to 2014. The roadmap is adjusted to the condition, need and the policy of the
company. This is a process of integration between business processes and auditing. It is
reflected in the usage of a List of Risks by the internal auditor as a guideline to do the
audit by putting a priority on high risks of business process. The list is provided by each
business unit and is coordinated by the bureau of Risk Management in Governance,
Risk and Compliance. Nevertheless, the list does not guarantee that all risks in the
business processes are covered. Normally, the internal auditors may find additional risks
from various sources, such as observations in the field, interviews with the auditee,
notification from other internal auditors from other audit bureaus, or from others.
These risks are divided into three categories of risks as explained by the
participant below 93;
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There are three kinds of risks in a company. First, the enterprise’s risks
arranged by the whole working units. We ask the working units to
understand their business processes and then consider all the risks that
could cause the business processes stopped, the frequency of risks
occurrence and the impact of such risks is it large or small? The second
risk is the risk of ICoFR. ICoFR risk is the risks map and controls related
to the financial statements. The third is health and safety risks specifically
intended for the factory workers.
The interviewee provides an example of enterprise risks as follow 94;
So far we see that there is no problem in complying the rule. We comply
all regulations, such as the regulation of Bapepam-LK/OJK, Corporate
Law, Law of SOEs, capital market regulations, for violating regulations
will cause high risks that will endanger the company. For example, we
follow the regulations on the procurement of transportation, because if we
break the rules, then the company will receive the sanction from the
government. In this case, the top management is responsible for adopting
any regulation by issuing Decree (SK) of the Managing Director and other
Directors. In addition, we also have a legal department that is responsible
to make all regulations are obeyed.
The interviewee clarified that the risks were important to be understood in order
to determine their controls as reflected in this statement below 95;
Our task is to help the chief executive supervise the company to run
effectively and efficiently. To that end, the company's activities must be
controlled. Each activity has risks that must be controlled. We use risk list
provided by the bureau of risk management and risk identified through
field of audit. Then, we check whether those risks have been controlled or
not.
In this case, the internal audit is an integral part of the company as mentioned by
one participant as follows 96;
We hope that internal auditor could be partner of a working unit achieving
the goal. This is the aim of our auditing activities. Other than that, also to
achieve the goal of the company, such as increase the company’s profit
and “go international”.
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5.5.5. Organisation and Reporting
As stated in the Charter, the internal audit unit in PT. NS is responsible to
undertake audit activities on the operational expenditure within PT. NS and capital
expenditures within the PT. NS group. Audits of the operational expenditure of the
cement maker subsidiaries are conducted by their own internal audit units, and
coordination among these units and the internal audit unit in PT. NS has been declared
in the Charter. In practice, the participant explains this condition by saying 97;
The scope of the audit for internal auditors at PT NS, a holding company,
include NS and subsidiary G. G is a cement manufacturer in Indonesia
that does not have internal audit unit. Other subsidiaries PT ST and PT SP
are also cement manufacturers, they already have internal audit unit. Thus,
auditing in PT ST and PT SP are done by their own internal auditors. PT
ST and PT SP Internal Auditors sent their audit reports to their president
director and also to their audit committee.
Another participant illustrated the position of internal auditor of PT. NS toward
the internal auditor of subsidiaries as follows 98;
For example, holding company’s internal auditors conduct an audit of the
project. This project is owned by a subsidiary, particularly cement
manufacturer located close to the subsidiary’s office. But, we did not act
as an auditor, but we act as a supervisor. We supervise the internal
auditors in the subsidiary as they would generate audit reports. We know
the issues that are there and we brought the issue to the holding company
here. Later, we will discuss the issue with the board of directors.
5.5.6. Policy and Procedure
In the Internal Audit Charter 2012, it is declared that the head of the internal audit
unit has to create written policies and procedures including the Audit Manuals as
guidelines for carrying out the tasks of internal auditors.
Review of the internal documents indicated that the company has possessed
certain documents in relation to internal audit activities. They are the Guidance of
Internal Audit 2014, the Procedures of Internal Audit 2014, and a number of Standard
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Operating Procedures (SOP) that contain directions for conducting the activities of
internal audit. However, the audit unit had not yet made SOPs for conducting the CSR
audit as revealed in the subsection of audit of partnership and CSR program.
The hierarchy of such documents was described by an informant through an
interview as follows 99;
The hierarchy are consecutively policy, procedure, and standard operation
procedure (SOP). Policy is prepared by the chief executive and certain
directors which is then specified in the procedure. The procedure is made
through discussions between working units. Details are contained in SOP
procedures made by each working unit. For example, the Internal Audit
Charter is a policy for the internal audit unit, while the audit procedures
related to other working units. In case of SOP to conduct an audit, they
will be regulated by their respective audit bureau.
Accordingly, it is declared by the informants that all internal documents are
developed in reference to the International Professional Practices Framework (IPPF)
issued by the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), Professional Standards for Internal
Audit published by Consortium of Internal Audit Profession Organisations, Professional
Standards of Public Accountants, Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, Law No. 19 of 2003, Law
No. 8 of 1997, Decree of Ministry of SOE 2002, the Internal Audit Charter 2012, and
Decree of the President Director and the Directors of particular fields.
In terms of having the written policies and procedures, the audit unit has follow
the Standard by establishing a number of policies and procedures as guidance of internal
audit activities, except for audit of the partnership and CSR programs.
5.6. People of Internal Audit
It is declared in the Internal Audit Charter 2012 that the head of internal audit unit
has to be involved in the selection process and the development of the staff. This means
that the head of the unit is responsible for appointing qualified auditors, providing
required training and continuing education. In addition, the head of the unit is
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responsible for assessing the performance of the internal auditor every year as well as
providing an opportunity to have a consultation about their performance and
professionalism development.
5.6.1. The Organisational Structure of Internal Audit Unit
The Internal Audit Charter 2012 states that the internal audit unit is positioned
under the president director in the organisation structure. Furthermore, the internal audit
unit is led by a head of the unit. The audit unit has three sub-units called bureaus.
However, the chart of organisation structure as well as the observation of the audit
bureaus in the internal audit department demonstrates the presence of four audit bureaus.
The different number of bureaus occurred since the Internal Audit Charter 2012 has still
not been up-dated with the establishment of the new ICT audit bureau in the audit
department. The bureaus are responsible for specific areas, such as accounting and
finance, commercial, production and projects, as well as information technology. Each
bureau is led by a head of bureau. The audit bureau of accounting and finance possesses
four internal audit members of staff, while the commercial audit bureau has two
members of staff of internal audit. The audit bureau of engineering has five internal
auditors and the ICT audit bureau has two members of staff of internal audit. The four
members of staff of internal audit are under the bureau of planning and development of
internal audit. In total, there are 22 internal auditors. Sufficiency of the number of
internal auditors in conducting their duties was revealed from the interview below 100;
I only have two auditor staffs. But, since we use matrix system, I can ask
for help to the auditor staff from other audit bureaus.
Other interviewee described internal audit duties and an available of the auditors
as follow 101;
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I ask all my auditors to review the ICOFR. I do not ask for help from other
audit bureaus because they are too busy. We actually need more auditors
to review the ICOFR because there are hundreds of controls that need to
be reviewed. So, we focus on high risks and key controls.
Nevertheless, another participant had a different standpoint relating to an
adequacy of internal auditors as mentioned below 102;
The matrix system is a solution to the lack of auditors. Auditors are limited,
and we have to do a lot internal audit activities. Internal audit activities
are carried out by some of the audit teams. An auditor can be a member of
some audit teams. This is also the way we manage the time to be more
efficient.
Figure 5.1. Matrix System
The Head of
Internal Audit

The Head of
Audit Bureau of
Accounting and
Finance

The Head of
Audit Bureau of
Commercial

The Head of
Audit Bureau of
Engineering

The Head of
Audit Bureau of
Information and
Technology

Internal Auditors

These four audit bureaus need internal auditors who have competence in their
specific field. In order to possess such auditors with professional proficiency, the head
of internal audit unit places attention on recruitment methods, trainings and certification,
professional development and career planning of the internal audit staff. Some of the
audit bureaus are struggling to apply the Professional Standards of Internal Audit which
are required by the Internal Audit Charter of 2012. This Standard states that the internal
audit unit needs to have personnel who collectively have the knowledge, skills and
discipline required to perform audit tasks.
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5.6.2. Recruitment Method of Internal Auditors
The internal audit charter states that the Professional Standards of Internal Audit
(SPAI) is used as guidance to recruit and assign internal auditors. It further states that
the assigned internal auditors have to fulfil technical competence and certain knowledge
criteria relating to the complexity of the audit.
According to the interviewees, basically, the recruitment is from internal sources
by giving opportunities for staff from other departments who want to be an internal
auditor, as mentioned by a participant below 103;
So far, internal auditors are recruited from other departments, especially
the downhearted staff or outcasts. They are not needed at the other place
and they are cast to the internal audit unit. I am both.
The knowledge and skills in the particular fields as required by the Charter is
essential since the functions of internal audit are related to a number of different
disciplines, such as production, commercial, finance and IT. Thus, the internal audit
team must comprise internal auditors who are capable and have experience in those
fields. This is the main reason to recruit employees from other units. Employees who
are recruited from other units have an understanding of the specific business processes
in their units, particularly the internal controls and inherent risks. Besides, they are also
able to identify weak points and problems in the business process so they are expected
to know how to provide appropriate solutions. Therefore, the experience in previous
departments will support their duties as an internal auditor. Nevertheless, the internal
audit unit also recruited staff from external sources, though not many.
The internal recruitment system offers benefits to the recruited auditors as
described by an interviewee below 104;

103
104

Interview with M, a middle-level auditor, at 3 September 2014
Interview with M, a middle-level of auditor, at 28 October 2014

219

The first time I moved to the internal audit unit of the IT unit, I felt there
was problem. Before, I was the person who was examined by the internal
auditor and now I am the internal auditor. I was confused with my new
duties as auditor. But later, I was included in the auditing team and learn
about the auditing process and got a training of Professional Internal
Auditors (PIA) as well. Now, I really feel that my previous experience in
the working unit really help me. Now, I feel confident to be an auditor as
well as consultant.
The using of internal recruitment system as a result from considers the
competence of internal auditor recommended by the Standards. For example, the
accounting principles and techniques expertise is required for auditors who deal with
the financial statement audit, whilst auditors who are expert in information technology
carry out audit the technology-based information systems. Internal recruitment is chosen
since the internal audit unit could have internal auditors who understand the business
processes and their risks as required by Standards.
5.6.3. Proficiency of Internal Auditor
The internal audit charter states that internal auditors have to obey the standards
and the code of ethics in the charter. Also, the auditors have to possess knowledge and
skills relevant to their auditing duties. These include capabilities in the application of
standards, procedures, audit techniques, management knowledge and sound business
practice. Also, the auditors are required to have abilities in oral and written
communication to work effectively with the auditee and company management. The
charter further states that the auditors have to participate in continuing professional
development programmes such as training, seminars and conferences in order to update
the development of internal auditing.
Through interviews with the participants, it is explained that the employees who
are recruited from other units usually will be assigned to audit their former units as well
as to handle consultancy and catalyst roles. In this case, the internal auditors should be
able to demonstrate to the auditee that they have the proficiency to carry out their
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functions, particularly the audit function, by showing a certification of professional
internal auditor as evidence. Such certificates can be obtained through training
organised by the unit. Moreover, the proficiency of internal auditors could be obtained
via other means, such as conferences, seminars, sharing knowledge, and comparative
study of the internal audit in other companies. Additionally, the internal auditor’s
experience in previous unit supports their function as a consultant for the auditees.
According to an interviewee, requirements of the competency of internal auditor
had changed 105;
With this change from a watchdog to consultant as a form of a new
internal audit paradigm, basically there is no change in demand in terms
of the competence of internal auditor. Demands for an internal auditor
competence at the application of the new paradigm are the same as the
application of the old paradigm internal auditor. Only now, the internal
auditor competence required to be more competent than the auditee. Why?
Previously, an internal auditor simply showed the auditee’s mistakes, but
now the internal auditor should recommend something, starting from
planning, implementation to evaluation. In the planning stage, internal
auditors need to think comprehensively about what will an Auditee do.
Auditors should provide something beyond Auditee’s thought.
Another participant mentioned the main change in competency requirement as
follows 106:
We are required to be one step ahead than the auditee, keep learning and
be sensitive to the issues that arise. The main change is that internal
auditor must get professional certification.
Besides competencies in knowledge and technical audit, the auditors are required
to have communication skills as mentioned by an interviewee as follow 107:
Internal auditors should have competence and communication skills.
Communication skills include oral and written communication.
A participant described communication experiences with the auditee below 108:
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I am facing various types of auditee. Some auditees are trauma to the style
of the watchdog auditor. This type of auditee usually receives us with a
negative mindset. Other auditee questioned my professional abilities, but
the rest are nice to me. Facing this variety of auditees, I tried to convince
them that I come to help them. I explain in a good way to the auditees that
I have a professional certificate and I have followed an appropriate
training. So, I tried to get closer to the auditee, but I keep myself
independent.
In terms of written communication, the interview discovered as follows 109:
We do not have a special standard to make an audit report. Before, we
have a special template for making an audit report, but then such template
would make the audit report inflexible. The audit report becomes too rigid
and uncomfortable to read. But now, we do not use that template again.
The audit report was compiled in a freestyle manner as long as the audit
report represents audit recommendations. Complaints from the auditor
relating to the freestyle audit report is a negative effect caused by the
applied matrix system. An auditor can be involved in more than one audit
team. Thus, the chairman of the audit team may have a different style of
audit reporting. This creates confuse among the staff auditors.
5.6.3.1. Training and Certification
The charter requires internal auditors to have abilities to communicate effectively
both orally and in writing to the auditees and also to management. They also must have
sufficient knowledge to identify the existence of fraud. The auditors have to maintain a
level of precision and alertness to the possibility of irregularities, inefficiency,
ineffectiveness, and the weaknesses of internal control by conducting adequate and
accountable testing and verification, although it is not necessary to be detailed in all
transactions.
Likewise, the charter requires the auditor to maintain proficiency and due
professional care. The competence are needed to define the level of materiality or
significance of the problem, the level of reliability and effectiveness of internal controls,
audit costs compared with the potential benefits and the existing of operating standards.
The charter also requires non-cognitive competences. These are a flawless track record
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and reliable integrity as well as an understanding of their role as internal auditor and
willingness to comply with the performance standard of duties and code of conduct.
As most staff are recruited from other units, therefore they have very little
auditing knowledge. The internal audit unit overcame this issue by providing relevant
training to the internal auditor. The auditing knowledge and skills are particularly
needed by auditors who are assigned to audit bureaus of commercial, engineering and
information technology. The auditors of the audit bureau of accounting and finance
mostly have an accounting and auditing background. However, they also need to
participate in training and obtain professional certification to prove their competence.
Particularly for the internal auditors in the accounting and finance bureau, the Internal
Audit Charter of 2012 has specified that they should have knowledge of the accounting
principles and business processes, information technology and finance, especially for
auditors who work extensively and in-depth with data and financial statements.
Training is a pre-requirement before an internal auditor obtains a certificate of
competence to carry out tasks as required. Basically, there are two kinds of trainings
provided by the internal audit unit. They consist of internal and external training. The
internal training is obtained through a variety of media provided by the company or unit.
The training provided by the head of internal audit unit is revealed through the
interview as follows 110:
The internal audit team comprises of accountant, production, IT and
commercial staffs. My principle is that everyone can be an auditor. If you
do not know about finance or production, let me teach you.
In contrast, other participants faced problems with training the recruited internal
auditors from other business units, as stated below 111:
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Most of the internal auditors in my bureau are recruited from other units.
Actually, I got headache teaching them. If they have a bachelor degree,
that makes it easier for me to teach them. But, if I get an internal auditor
from the factory worker who continues their education to get a bachelor
degree, it is rather hard for them to learn the theory. I have to tell them
logics and directions to them.
Some of internal auditors are very keen to undertake the training as indicated by
the following comment 112;
Sorry, the internal audit staff have different intention in participating the
training program. Some of them really want to learn, but some of them just
want to have fun. For me, rather than spending money to take a formal
study I rather get a training program.
International and national external training is organised by professional
institutions outside of the company that have their own schedule. This external training
is explained by the interview below 113;
The Internal Audit Education Foundation (YPIA) regularly performs
training. YPIA is in cooperation with IIA-Australia. The training covers
various areas, such as risk and fraud. The training aims to give auditor a
broader knowledge.
There was a company policy related to the trainings, as mentioned by a participant 114;
In a year, we often follow training programs. This is due to the company's
policy that each individual auditor has minimum forty hours training. If
less than forty hours of training, we are then considered as undeveloped.
In terms of international trainings, an interview revealed as follows 115:
I had followed training in Australia and Germany. I have also attended IIA
seminars and international conferences.
The interview also discovered problems faced by auditor staff in relation to
attending international training, conferences and seminars, as mentioned below 116;
Auditor staffs need experience and knowledge. However, we also evaluate
these auditor staffs. If they have the capability in knowledge, language and
analytical aspects, then we will ask them to follow training, attend
conferences and seminars at international level. Currently, there is no
auditor from my bureau who is qualified.
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Another problem is that some of auditors face a dilemma since they an overloaded
workload, which makes it difficult for the auditors to undertake training. This difficulty
has an impact on the completion of training and obtaining professional certification,
which in some cases has been taking many years.
Even though there is no explicit explanation regarding the professional
certification in the Internal Audit Charter, the internal audit unit was really concerned
about this matter. A participant mentioned the professional certificate as follows 117:
I have a PIA Certificate and I should also have certificate for other
profession, such as CISA, CIA and CRM. For me, certificates will enhance
our knowledge and internal audit performance.
On the other hand, the interview also uncovered the struggle of auditors to obtain
the certification as follows 118;
It is not easy to get CIA Certificate. Our chief audit bureaus and the head
of internal audit unit failed the test for CIA Certificate. I am asking myself
can I pass the CIA test or not.
Another participant mentioned that 119;
The chief of the internal audit unit should have a CIA Certificate. At least,
a CIA certificate. I had once taken a CIA test and I failed. I failed in
obtaining CIA certificate because in one other test field I scored less than
required. The minimum score required is 75 and my test result was 74,
though I got more than 80 for the other subjects.
This situation is also proved by the Annual Audit Plan (RKIA) of 2014 which
accommodated the requirement of Bapepam-LK/OJK No. IX.1.7. and the IIA
recommendation in relation to the proficiency of internal auditors. Planning to improve
the internal auditor’s competence was based on the gap between the real competences of
the auditors and the competences expected by standards and the Bapepam-LK/OJK
requirement. Therefore, the Annual Audit Plan 2014 set training materials which
included Internal Audit Control Self-Assessment, Information System Assessment,
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Enterprise Risk Management, Fraud Examination, Value Chain Management,
Psychology and Audit Communication, Finance and Taxation as well as Effective
Report Writing. Targeted certification was also part of the Annual Audit Plan 2014.
They comprised one Certified Control Self-Assessment (CCSA), two Certified System
Information Auditor (CISA), four Certified Risk Management Professional (CRMP),
one Certified Ethical Hacking (CEH), one Certified Internal Auditor (CIA), four
Qualified Internal Auditor (QIA), and four Professional Internal Auditor (PIA).
Currently, internal auditors have some of the following certification: four PIAs,
five QIA, one CRMP, and one CISA. The certifications that are still being worked for
comprise four PIAs, three QIA and two CISA. Additionally, two internal auditors have
not yet been certified. The Assessment Report of GCG Implementation in 2012 issued
by BPKP also reported that many internal auditors possessed the professional
certifications; PIA, QIA, CRM, CISA, and ISO. The report also stated that the head of
internal audit unit has participated in the CIA Review Course.
5.6.3.2. Seminars
Seminars are intended to augment insight and knowledge through exchange of
information including in the area of Accounting Management, Ethics & Fraud,
Information Technology, Auditing and Industry Knowledge. There are many types of
seminars: one of them is called the Communication Forum of the Internal Auditors
(FKSPI) from all SOEs in the East Java Region. This is a knowledge sharing event for
all internal auditors and is held once a year. According to one of the participants in an
interview, the attendance of staff at the seminar depends on the permission of the head
of the audit bureau. None of the internal audit staff in the audit bureau of engineering
attended the seminar nor do the internal auditors in the finance and accounting usually
go to the seminar. The internal audit staff in the accounting and finance audit bureau
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who are involved in the management of FKSPI became inactive since the head of the
audit bureau did not give permission to the staff to be more active in FKSPI. This is
indicated by the following comment 120,
The chief of the previous audit bureau give some attention to the FKSPI
organisation and its activities. Other than that, he is the vice chairman of
that organisation. But the new chief of the Audit Bureau has a
contradiction attitude to the previous audit bureau chief. The new bureau
leader did not give me permission to participate in any FKSPI activities.
The Chief said to me "what’s the use for you to be active in FKSPI?" And I
do not want to argue and I obey my audit bureau chief, although in fact I
get insights and knowledge from other state-owned enterprises through
sharing knowledge in FKSPI. Currently, I only focus on work, work and
work. Only that.
Another type of seminar is knowledge sharing and can be held by the internal
company. This event aims to share knowledge among all internal auditors in the PT. NS.
The seminars present some speakers from internal and external organisations, such as
independent consultants, the head of the internal audit unit, and the audit committee.
The speakers explain the recent knowledge, such as the internal control-integrated
framework of COSO, International Professional Practices Framework (IPPF) of the IIA,
and also how regulations have changed.
The interviewee mentioned the motivation to follow the COSO, IPPF and obey
the regulations as follows 121:
We use COSO, IPPF and obey all regulations because all these things are
our guidelines for conducting internal audits. If auditee ask what is the
basic of our audit, we can explain all of these guidelines to the auditee. So,
we point auditee’s mistake by definite basis, as well as our audit
recommendations to them.
The annual report 2014 states that the Control-Integrated Framework issued by
COSO has been implemented in the company.
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5.6.3.3. Conferences
Conferences are needed to recognise the development of internal audit function,
audit scope, technology for auditing, latest audit issues, means of benchmarking with
companies that are better in a specific area. The conferences are held by a number of
institutions in Indonesia and overseas, such as the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) –
Indonesia, Educational Foundation of Internal Audit (YPIA), and the IIA – International.
There is a comparative study program within the activities of the conference. This
program is a visitation of internal auditors to internal audit units in other SOEs in
Indonesia or SOEs overseas as well as in private or public companies as expressed by
the following comment 122;.
We conducted a comparative study organised by the Education
Foundations of Internal Audit (YPIA). We have visited the Siam Cement
Group and Oil Company in Bangkok, Thailand. The positive thing in their
place that we cannot apply it here is their internal audit unit were under
the board of directors. Thus, their internal audit unit are much more
independent. The relationship between internal audit and management in
their place is like the relation of parliament and the president.
Another participant has different experience as follows 123;
We visited Telkom and also some overseas companies, such as companies
in Melbourne, Australia, and oil companies in Malaysia. We learned how
they control them, and how they perform their functions as assurance
provider and consultants in accordance with the IPPF. We also learn
about information technology and how to review the information
technology-based data
An interviewee explained the effort of the internal audit unit to improve quality by
saying 124;
We make an Indonesian SOE listed on the NYSE and other companies as
our benchmarks. We visited them and learn from these companies how to
improve our company. We discussed these companies used as benchmark
with the chief of internal audit unit.
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Besides attending international conferences of the IIA, some of the internal
auditors also became members of the IIA as mentioned by a participant below 125;
All Chief of the audit bureau are members of IIA.
The membership of the IIA is funded by the company. The internal audit unit
seriously attempted to keep in line with proficiency criteria required by the Standards by
obliging the auditors to attend training and acquire professional certification, and has
sent a number of auditors to seminars and conferences in order to maintain and enhance
their professional skills. However, some problems emerged during these efforts. The
work overload created difficulty for auditors to manage their time to attend the trainings,
and approval of the head of audit bureaus to attend the seminars was hardly ever
obtained for some auditors. The internal audit unit also hired a competent consultant to
assist them to set the SOP for ICoFR audit.
5.6.4. Career Development
The career of an auditor in the internal audit unit is measured by several levels or
rank, such as the manager or the head of internal audit unit, senior auditor, auditor, and
junior auditor. Generally, the career level of the majority of internal audit staff is auditor.
There are four junior auditors, twelve auditors and five senior auditors in the unit. The
junior auditor is equal to the team leader position at the careers level in the company,
whilst the auditor is similar to the lowest manager level, and the senior auditor is
equivalent to a head of bureau. There is a fit and proper test for promotion from the
junior auditor to the auditor and so forth. The working experience of auditors ranges
from very beginning to ten years, but only four auditors have experience of more than
ten years.

125

Interview with J, a manager-level auditor, at 3 September 2014

229

Recently, the participants said, the head of internal audit unit required human
resources development (HRM) to give internal auditor candidates at least a the lowest
manager level. This is because internal auditors encounter auditees of various ranks,
from the lowest level to the top level. In order to ease the internal auditors in conducting
their duties, they need to be respected by the auditee. Normally, the auditees particularly
who have high position in the company, will ignore the internal auditors who are team
leaders. On the other hand, the auditee respects the internal auditor with position of head
of section. The mind-set of the auditee towards the internal auditors is a concern to the
head of the internal audit unit, which then requested the Human Resource Department
that any staff transferred from other units to the internal audit unit must have at least
have a position as head of section. Likewise, it is planned to promote all those in team
leaders’ positions to head of sections. The reason behind this minimum career policy is
explained by a participant as follows 126;
As I know, the human resources unit played a big role in my career. Also,
the technique of my boss. My manager understands that the needs of a
company for an internal audit is huge, so that the internal audit unit need
of individuals who are not just a team leader level or junior auditors, but
an audit unit requires a lot of qualified auditors. That is the reason why
my career is increasing fast because the minimum requirement for an
internal auditor is at the level of the chief of section or middle level
auditor.
In addition, the head of internal audit unit also required that any internal auditors
that to be transferred to other units should be promoted to a minimum one level or
higher.
However, not all participants have the same point of view concerning career
planning. This was indicated in the interview that follows 127;
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Career program is not clear here. I do not know how my career will be
any further. I observe that employees who do not have an accounting
background are placed in the accounting and financing unit as well. In
addition, many of employees from the production unit are placed on
marketing department. It seems that the company has no definite
guidelines on this matter.
In addition, there is a qualification required to reach the position of head of audit
bureau. The requirement encompasses expertise in technical science, such as IT for the
position of the head of audit bureau of ICT, mastering auditing knowledge,
understanding of the professional character of the internal auditor and knowing the
culture of the company. Similarly, the criteria for the head of internal audit position
encompasses having experience of a minimum of fifteen years in units of organisations
in order to understand the existing business process, and not all of this as an accountant.
In PT. NS, the head of internal audit unit has an accounting background, thirty years of
experience in units of organisation and five years in an internal audit unit. Also he has
undertaken the CIA Review course though he has not received the certification yet.
5.7. Process of Internal Audit
According to the Audit Charter 2012, the audit process must conform to the
following processes: preparing an Audit Plan, Executing the Audit, Reporting the result,
and Monitoring the operations that follow up the recommendation.
5.7.1. The Audit Plan
The Internal Audit Charter 2012 states that the internal audit plan is a basis for
conducting all activities of internal audit departments. Before conducting an audit, the
internal auditors have to compose a risk-based internal audit plan (RKIA) that focuses
on the business process and internal control. Also, such a plan has to be approved by the
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head of the unit, then needs to be documented. It is illustrated by the following
comment 128;
Each year, we make an action plan based on risk. All business processes
in each unit has risks and controls. Risks and controls were then compiled
by the unit in the form of risk list. Then, working units ask an approval
from the directors of their fields based on the risk list. The next step is the
working unit send the list of risks to the GRC unit. We receive the risk list
from GRC unit and we look the level of risk. We received from the unit and
we look the level of risk. It is impossible for us to take all the risk level as
the material for our audit. So, we choose the risk at middle and high level
as the object of the audit and our review.
In conducting the research, the auditor should also collaborate with other units as
mentioned in the following comment 129;
Internal auditors use the list of the risks submitted by the GRC unit and
also the risks of ICOFR compiled by the Bureau of Financial Management.
Based on the risk list, we conduct a review of its control. Practically we
consider all the risks that are not mapped yet. So, we use the criteria from
other sources, such as from Procedure. If we find a risk that has not been
listed in the list of risk, we will inform the risks to the GRC unit and
auditee as well.
In terms of the accounting and finance audit, the internal auditors also consider
other aspects in determining the focus of audit activities of the analytical review besides
the given list of risk, as mentioned by a participant below 130:
In conducting the analytical review of the financial statements, the focus of
the analysis in every three months can be different. The difference arises
because we consider the condition of the company. For example, we
compare the financial statements of a certain period with the of previous
year financial statement of the same period, and we concentrate on the
significant differences, both increases and decreases reported figures.
It should be noted that the internal audit unit maintains its Manual of Internal
Audit Procedure 2014 that explains the Internal Audit Plan, Conducting Audit, and the
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Procedure of Special Audit. According to a participant, the audit plan should not be
static, but needs alteration from time to time as indicated by the following statement 131;
In suggesting an internal audit activity program, we consider on many
things such as internal auditor advance study, time for group, time for
operation, time to change or improve system and time to share knowledges
with all internal auditors of all subsidiaries. Those activities must be
balance.
The process of making an annual audit plan is initiated by each audit bureau in the
internal audit unit. In composing the audit plan, every head of the audit bureau
considers matters which encompass the list of risk and corporate risk profile, and the
audit results from the previous year. The list of risks is released by the unit of
Governance, Risk and Compliance (GRC). By using this list of risks and the additional
information, the head of the audit bureau determines the focus of auditing through
selecting high risks and their controls to be checked as well as deciding the amount of
working time for conducting the audit and the number of the internal auditors.
The Charter (2012) indicated that the head of the audit unit has to obtain approval
from top management and the board of director concerning the internal audit plan. The
approval is a way to maintain the quality of the plan. In terms of this matter, the
interviews demonstrated that the provision of an audit plan is crucial as it has to reach a
high management level as indicated by the following interview 132;
We present audit plan before the CEO and audit committee in a separate
occasion. We have done this because we want to give the CEO a chance to
add or erase something he possible has as an additional consideration.
However, all this time, the CEO always approve the internal audit plan.
But we always set some spare time in a year anticipating for a special
audit request in that year.
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In generating the plan, the availability of resources should also be considered as
mentioned by the following participant 133;
From our perspective on the audit plan, we should consider the materiality
level of an activity and also the risks arising from those activities
associated with the company. For example, is the production quite
important? Yes, it's important, because if production stops or inefficient,
then the company cannot sell the products. If the company does not
produce anything, then the company does not get any profits. Therefore, in
conducting an audit of production, we focus on equipment, systems and
people involved in the production process.
The Charter states the content of the annual audit plan which covers goals and
objectives that have to be accomplished; scope of activities; working schedule;
indicators of activities performance; a number of assigned internal auditors; necessary
external experts; the budget of internal audit activities; and the reports of activities. This
was confirmed by the annual audit plan 2014 which contained an internal audit road
map, an organisational structure of internal audit, the audit and consulting activities,
non-audit activities, the schedule of internal audit activities, the budget of internal audit,
the KPI of internal audit, the flowchart of internal auditing and its appendix which
includes training need analysis and list of risks. Furthermore, the Assessment Report of
GCG Implementation in 2012 issued by BPKP presented that the human resources
department cooperated with the internal audit unit have been made a necessity analysis
of internal auditor.
In terms of the accomplishment of the internal audit plan, the interview indicated
as follow 134;
Annual Audit Plan must be done completely because its approved by 3
parties, the audit committee, the president director and the chief of
internal audit unit. If its performance is not 100 percent reached, then
questions will be raised by an external auditor.
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The interview results are supported by an internal document, the Annual Audit
Plan 2014, which contained ten business processes: marketing, procurement,
information technology system, manufacturing and its efficiency, capital expenditure;
cement factory projects and packing plant, ICoFR, Analytical Review, and CSR. All
these business processes have 61 risks and 395 controls that need to be audited. Also,
there is scope to conduct special audits.
Once the plan is approved, the unit needs to develop an audit program guided by a
document named Procedure of Internal Audit 2011. Again, the audit program needs to
be checked and approved by the head of internal audit unit.
The internal audit unit has been using a risk-based audit plan which was in
conformity with the Standards. This plan demands internal auditors to put priority on
high risks and their controls. Besides, the audit plan was approved by the CEO and the
audit committee as required by Standards.
5.7.2. Performing the Audit
As presented in the Charter 2012, the internal auditors must collect, analyse,
interpret and document the information to support an audit assignment. In practice, the
internal auditors need to meet the auditee when conducting the audit process, as
mentioned by the participant below 135.
We must interview the auditee, ask them to provide documents or give us
reason for all they have done.
The audit activity is guided by the Guidance of Internal Audit 2014. In performing
the audit, the internal auditors will compare the criteria and the real condition as
explained by a participant 136;
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In conducting the audit, we have criteria and real conditions. Criteria
consist of legislation, regulation, decision of the Director, Procedures,
Standard Operating Procedures, best practices, such as COBIT and riskbased matrix control published by the GRC unit. The matrix control
includes overall control in the company. In addition, we also use a special
risk-based matrix control for ICOFR issued by a financial management
unit. Auditors compare criteria and conditions. If there are any
discrepancies, they should be reported to the auditee, Unit GRC and the
financial management unit shall also to be improved.
In terms of guidance in carrying out the audit process, an auditor explained below 137:
We use COSO, IPPF and comply all regulations because all these things
are our guidelines for conducting internal audits. If the auditee questions
on what basis we make our audit recommendations, then we can explain it
to them. So, we remind auditee on auditee’s mistake on a definite basis,
likewise with our audit recommendations.
In more detail, the interviewee illustrates the auditing process from setting an
audit plan to writing a preliminary audit report as follow 138;
Our audit process is already standardised. So our audit approach is riskbased audit. At the time we made the internal audit work plan (RKIA), we
gather all of the risks and controls. For example, we collect 2,000
controls, and then we consider our resources, including staff of internal
auditors. If human resources are not adequate to check the 2000 controls,
then we will select 1000 controls of high risk only. Further, risks and 1000
controls that have been selected are distributed to the respective audit
bureaus. For example, commercial audit bureau must audit the 200
controls of the procurement process. The next process is that we sent a
control self-assessment (CSA) questionnaire to each unit and we requested
the working unit (auditee) to do a CSA based on their risk list. Auditee
would make a check-list of the controls that have been made to address the
risks with proofs. The check-list and also proofs should be returned to us
for our review. The two items will become our evaluation and
consideration in auditing in the field. For example, the controls are not
implemented by the auditee or applied but not enough proof as the object
of our audit. Furthermore, we conduct a field audit to gather evidence
through observation or collection of documents. Then, each of the internal
auditors will record the results of observations, review the documents and
evidences in a Working Paper Examination (Audit Working Papers) as
basis for preparing the preliminary audit report.
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An outline for a complete auditing process from setting the audit plan to writing a
final audit report is demonstrated through interview below 139;
Outline of the audit process is that we have the internal audit plan. This is
the basis to establish an audit program and audit schedules. Then, we
make the audit procedures. After that, we sent the CSA questionnaire to
auditee. Auditees do CSA and fill out the CSA questionnaires. CSA
questionnaire are then returned to us for our review. The next step, we
conduct a field audit, preliminary audit report writing and request an
auditee’s response. The last stage, we held a meeting for clarification with
the auditee that produces a number of audit recommendations, and then
prepare a final audit report.
Before undertaking the auditing process, internal auditors analysed the adequacy
of the internal control system through the CSA questionnaire before testing its
effectiveness, as required by Standards. Moreover, during the process, there were
meetings among junior and senior auditors and the head of audit bureau to discuss the
findings or any issues emerging in the process as suggested by the Standards. In
performing auditing, the internal audit team consists of a number of auditors who are
expert in the areas being audited, such as information technology, accounting, and
business process, as suggested by the Standards. As the auditors are recruited internally
from other business units they have sufficient experiences to understand business
operations including risks and its control. This understanding supports the auditors in
conducting risk-based audit activities as well as in consulting by giving the applicable
audit recommendations.
5.7.3. Reporting the Results of the Audit Assignment
The Internal Audit Charter 2012 requires that internal auditors should report the
results of their assignments. The final audit report should contain objective findings,
conclusions and applicable recommendations as agreed to with the auditee to be
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followed up and approved by the head of internal audit unit. The content of a
preliminary audit report was explained through the interview below 140;
The audit report must contain at least observations, implications and
recommendations. Observations include the real conditions and we have
to find the root cause of the problems that arise. The real conditions and
then we compare it with the criteria. Thus, the condition is the result of our
observation, while the cause is something that makes these conditions
occur, and criteria are guidelines or standards. Conditions should be in
accordance with the criteria; if not, then the condition is the audit
findings. The implication is the result. Thus, the condition creates results.
The latter is the audit recommendations. So, these three aspects are the
content of the preliminary audit report. This report was sent to the auditee,
then, we held a meeting for clarification with the auditee to discuss the
preliminary audit report. The meeting will produce an audit
recommendations agreed by auditees and internal auditors. Based on the
results of this meeting, we produce the final audit report with audit
recommendations as an additional component.
The Charter specified criteria of audit recommendations, such as being rational,
complete, accurate and on time. An auditor commented on the audit recommendations
below 141;
It is important to give an audit recommendation that could be applied
rather than a theoretical audit recommendation. We must introspect
ourselves that when audit recommendations are not followed up by the
auditee could be because such recommendations cannot be implemented.
Sometimes, auditors only ask auditee to follow up the audit
recommendation without considering the difficulties faced by auditee in
implementing it. Because we sell our recommendations to the auditee, we
have to understand their condition.
After the final audit report is published, the interviewee explained the next
procedure as follows 142;
After the final audit report is approved by auditee, the report is then
signed by the chief of the internal audit unit and we return it to the auditee.
In terms of distribution of the internal audit reports, the Internal Audit Charter
2012 states that the audit reports have to be delivered to the CEO and also the
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independent board of directors or the audit committee. For this matter, an interviewee
described the reporting line as follows 143;
According to the Internal Audit Charter, audit report simultaneously
delivered to the Audit Committee and the CEO.
The head of the internal audit unit delivered the final audit report to the auditee,
the senior management and the audit committee. The reports to CEO and the audit
committee are described in the organisational independence section. The CEO received
complete information, while the audit committee received information which had
already filtered down from the CEO. This mechanism is opposite to the Standard's
suggestion that the audit committee should be informed of all audit findings raised by
the internal auditors.
5.7.4. Follow-up Monitoring
The Internal Audit Charter 2012 explains that internal auditors should monitor the
follow-up actions which are conducted by the auditee based on the recommendations of
the audit report. If the auditees do not follow-up the audit suggestions due to certain
considerations, then they should be reported to the related directors. Regarding the
action taken by the auditee, it was mentioned that 144;
Most of the auditee follow up the internal audit recommendation. Some of
them have difficulties to solve their problem but that is especially caused
by something beyond their control. We have to check case by case.
Another issue relating to monitoring follow up audit recommendations is
explained by an interviewee as follow 145;
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I did a Partnership (PKBL) program audit and found sixteen findings.
From these findings, only one audit recommendations are followed up by
the auditee, and obviously it did not become a problem. Auditee’s attitude
will depend on the attitude of the leaders, especially if middle managers
get the support of the top management. Audit findings related to top
management will only become mere findings. So, our contribution as an
internal auditor is vague.
In terms of follow up of audit recommendations from top management, an auditor
stated that 146;
The duty of an internal auditor is to be a catalyst and convey information.
So, will the chief executive follow up the information being submitted or
not, it's up to him. This is true. Our job is simply to provide information
In addition, there are three purposes of activity of follow-up monitoring that are
contained in the internal document, the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) of
Follow-up Monitoring 2011. Firstly, ensuring follow-up measure carried out by the
auditee are well documented. Secondly, making sure that the findings of audit are
followed up in accordance with the schedule and commitment that has been set so it
does not happen again. Thirdly, report and communicate the monitoring results to the
auditee, top management or audit committee, consistent with the internal audit charter.
Additionally, the procedures for conducting the follow up monitoring that are
included in a SOP consist of several steps. Firstly, the audit findings are abstracted into
a monitoring report format with the title information, date of follow-up plan and the
current status. Secondly, monitoring is performed by auditors for at least 3 months by
reminding the auditees by phone, email, and formal letters with a copy to each relevant
high ranking manager. Thirdly, the monitoring results are reported to the interested
parties no more than 6 months later and specifically reported to the relevant
management if there is no appropriate follow up by the auditee.
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The participant illustrated the detail of the procedures for the practice of follow up
monitoring, as follows 147;
To monitor the follow-up made by the auditee/working unit on our audit
recommendations, we make a record based on the audit findings. So, one
observation is one point. Observations include a brief description of who
is the Person in Charge (PIC) of the auditee, any follow-up action
conducted by the auditee, when is the due date of such follow-up, and what
is the evidence of the follow-up. We made a note on the data. After auditee
gave proof to us, then we change the auditee status to “Closed” meaning
that the audit recommendation has been done good by the auditee. We put
all the information to the website, until everyone can see whether the audit
findings are followed or “closed” or not. Our website is Key Performance
Indicator – Follow up Monitoring (KPI-MTL). This is the internal audit
website that monitor the followups of auditee. If auditee does not
implement the audit recommendations of internal auditors, it will give an
impact on their KPI. The KPI will be linked to incentives for auditee. Thus,
the system will force the unit to follow up the audit recommendations.
In terms of monitoring follow up audit recommendations, the audit unit set it in
the audit charter and put it in the SOP and applied it in the practice as revealed through
the interview. This situation indicates that the audit unit has kept in line with the
recommendations of the Standards.
5.7.5. Quality Assurance Review
The Internal Audit Charter 2012 declares that the head of the internal audit unit
has to establish and implement a quality assurance system to evaluate the performance
of the unit, in order to obtain reasonable assurance that the performance of internal audit
has been in accordance with auditing standards, the charter and other provisions. For
that purpose, it must be done as follows:
− External review is conducted at least once every three years by the experts and
capable parties / institutions, independent of the company, who have no conflicts of
interest to assess and provide an opinion on compliance of internal audit to the
auditing standards and other applicable requirements.
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− Periodically internal review by management to assess the effectiveness of the audit
and compliance of the auditors to audit standards, codes of conduct, policies and
other applicable regulations.
− Continuous supervision from the planning, implementation, evaluation and reporting
until follow-up audit recommendations.
Further description of these Quality Assurance Reviews is presented below:
5.7.5.1. External Quality Assurance Review
The internal audit unit has completed an external Quality Assurance Review
(QAR) periodically by using an independent and competent assessor, as mentioned by a
participant below 148;
Nobody has done an audit on internal audit. Therefore, we asked external
parties that are PwC and BAI to do the Quality Assurance Review (QAR).
So far we have twice done the QAR. The lack of certified internal auditor
is the result of QAR, the next QAR should be done this year, but because of
a general audit, it will be done earlier in this year by an external auditor,
then the next QAR will be postponed, that is next year.
Another participant mentioned that the external QAR is required by the IPPF as
follows 149;
The external QAR was done about 3 years ago by Bina Audita Indonesia.
As far as I know, the external QAR is only done twice. The International
internal auditing rules set out in the IPPF, stipulates that the external
QAR is carried out at least three and a half years and it was later revised
to five years.
The focus of each QAR was described by the participant below 150;
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PwC assessed the Audit upon Procedures. It relates whether these
procedures have been applied or not. After that, in 2011, BAI did the QAR
covering all aspects of the IPPF. Similarly, the Audit Board of the
Republic of Indonesia (BPK) conducted tests on the company's internal
control and the score we get is 95 of 100. BPK assesses designs, the
existence and implementation of control and its flexibility. In addition,
BPK also observe how the internal auditor conducts tests on control and
whether the auditor followed the Standard Operating Procedures for
testing.
The external QAR was last conducted in 2011 by PT Bina Audita Indonesia (BAI)
before SG transformed to PT. NS. An internal document of the QAR’s Report explains
that QAR activity is a review of the internal audit function and all of internal audit
activities at SG. The review which is conducted by BAI includes activities during the
period after the previous QAR, in 2008, to 2011, with an emphasis on activities and
conditions during the past year. The Report of QAR explains further that there are four
aims of QAR activity in PT. NS. Firstly, it evaluates the effectiveness of internal audit
in providing assurance and consulting services to the board of directors, and top
management. It identifies internal audit opportunities to improve performance and add
value to the organisation. It improves the image, perception and credibility of internal
audit. It establishes the suitability of internal audit work with the International
Professional Practices Framework (IPPF) Standards from the Institute of Internal
Auditors (IIA) and best practices. This QAR uses the IPPF as an evaluation basis. If the
BAI focused on all aspects of internal auditing contained within the IPPF in undertaking
the QAR; an accounting firm, PwC, and The Supreme Financial Audit (BPK) focused
on certain valuation, namely Audit upon Procedures.
BPK as the independent auditor of government does not have a routine schedule
to audit PT. NS as the State-owned Enterprise. In addition, the Financial and
Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP) for East Java Provincial Representatives
carried out an assessment towards the implementation of Good Corporate Governance
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(GCG) of PT. NS in 2012. The period of review is January to December 2012. BPKP
assessed six aspects of GCG: continuous application of corporate governance, the
Annual General Meeting (AGM), the board of director, the top management, and
disclosure of information and transparency.
In this GCG’s review, the internal auditing is also evaluated since it is under the
responsibility of the CEO. As stated in the GCG Report, some aspects of internal
auditing were evaluated: the internal audit charter, the position of internal audit in an
organisation structure, a recruitment mechanism for and qualification of the head of
internal audit unit, direct access to the audit committee, the reporting line, management
of internal audit staff, the competence of internal auditors, the guidelines for audit
activities, a program of Quality Assurance Review.
5.7.5.2. Internal Quality Assurance Review
According to the Internal Audit Charter 2012, the internal QAR should be
conducted by management through performing supervision toward the auditing process,
from planning to following-up audit recommendations. However, there are diverse
understandings among the participants on the internal QAR, and most stated that there
was no internal QAR, as follows 151;
There is no evaluation from the internal party regarding the internal audit.
But there is a review from the external party toward the internal audit.
Besides, the CEO is believed by other participants to be another appropriate
internal party to conduct an evaluation of internal audit. Nevertheless, the president
director never performed the internal QAR upon the internal audit unit, as mentioned by
a participant below 152;
The director never evaluate the internal audit.
151
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The internal audit unit has been partly following the Standards, in terms of
performing quality assurance and implementing an improvement program for internal
audit activity. In this case, the unit has been conducting an external review of quality
assurance periodically using independent and competent institutions, but the internal
review of quality assurance has not yet been carried out.
5.8. Summary
The findings of the case present the practice of internal audit in PT. NS. The
interview and relevant documents indicate that the Indonesian auditing standards are
used as a basic reference in undertaking the practice. The International Professional
Practices Framework (IPPF) issued by the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) is also
employed as the guideline in auditing practice. Interestingly, the Indonesian auditing
standards were adopted from the standards issued by the IIA.
The findings from the case indicate that the auditing practice follows the global
development of internal auditing which is brought about by the IIA. This is reflected in
the alteration of the internal audit functions. The functions changed from watchdog into
three main functions: audit function, consulting and catalyst. The new functions require
significant changes to some aspects of auditing such as the understanding of the auditor
of their new functions, competences of the auditors, and the way of performing audits.
However, the new functions may put the independence of auditors at risk.
The interview and the documents point out the struggle of the internal audit unit to
undertake the new functions and the important aspects mentioned above. In this case,
the auditors attempt to follow the recommendations from the IIA by adopting those that
are in the Internal Audit Charter and implementing those in practice. However, there are
a number of violations from the auditing standards of the IIA. First, there is an
interference from management in the audit report. Second, some of auditors also work
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as operational staff, particularly as treasurer for CSR activities. Third, there is no SOP
to audit the CSR program. Fourth, the recruited auditors lack knowledge and experience
in the auditing field. Fifth, obstacles emerged in implementing the professional
development program. Sixth, the auditors have no support from the CEO in conducting
follow up monitoring for certain cases. Seventh, there is no internal QAR undertaken to
assess the quality of the internal audit activity.
Thus, the findings from the case indicate that the practice of internal auditing in
PT. NS is still partly in line with the standards of the IIA.
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Chapter 6
The Effect of Institutional Pressures to the Internal Audit Practice

6.1. Introduction
The previous chapter presented a case study of the practice of internal audit in the
context of a public State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) in Indonesia. This chapter uses
institutional theory to analyse the changes revealed in the previous chapter and to assess
the firm’s commitment to change.
Institutional theory suggests that to obtain legitimation, an institution may have to
change in response to a range of pressures. As suggested by DiMaggio and Powell
(1983), there are three mechanisms of institutional isomorphism that encourage an
institution to change: coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphism. There are different
pressures resulting from each of the above that require an institution to change
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 1991). An institution may respond strategically to the
pressure when moving toward change. Oliver (1991) offered five ranges of strategic
responses

to

pressure:

acquiescence,

compromise,

avoidance,

defiance,

and

manipulation. Each strategy has at least three different tactics.
This chapter contains identification and analysis of the pressure experienced by
the SOE from each source and examines the strategy used by the SOE to respond and
change. Analysis of how and why the SOE unit under study responded will also be
discussed in this chapter using the five ranges of strategic responses as suggested by
Oliver (1991).
This chapter consists of five sections: introduction, coercive isomorphism and the
practice of internal auditing, normative isomorphism and the practice of internal
auditing, mimetic isomorphism and the practice of internal auditing, and a summary.

6.2. Coercive Isomorphism and the Practice of Internal Auditing
Institutional theory suggests that to obtain legitimation, an institution may have to
change. There are three mechanisms of institutional isomorphism that encourage an
institution to change (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983): coercive, normative and mimetic
isomorphism. Regarding coercive isomorphism, the pressure may come formally or
informally (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 1991). Accordingly, formal source of
pressures stem from legal sources and other standards which may include: the
government mandate, law, legitimated rules and structures, and Standard Operating
Procedures (SOP). Similarly, Arena et al., (2006) pointed out examples of Italian
companies listed on the NYSE which had to respond to formal pressures from laws such
as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Informal pressure may come from outside organisations
which the institution relies upon administratively and culturally (DiMaggio and Powell,
1983; 1991). A number of scholars have classified the source of coercive pressure in to
different categories such as international, national and industry levels of pressure
(Paauwe and Boselie, 2003); industry and listing pressures (Arena and Azzone, 2007),
and pressure from a profession (Fogarty, 1996). However, this study uses the formal
and informal category developed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). The study is
conducted on an internal audit unit of a public state-owned enterprise in Indonesia. The
ownership of the company is 51% government and 49% private. There are two sources
of coercive pressures experienced by the unit internal audit unit examined and these are,
formally, from government mandates, and informally, from private requirements and
expectations, such as from the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act 2002 (SOX), the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations (COSO), and the
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) 26000.
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This study executes two levels of investigation on how and what actions are taken
by the unit in response to coercive pressures. In order to identify the response, the first
stage of examination is conducted by investigates a media that accommodates the
requirements of the pressure. This study will use various facts from the data collection.
The documentation of the audit charter is used as the first level of investigation to
explore the response of the audit unit to the institutional pressure by accommodating or
not accommodating the regulations in the Internal Audit Charter. The Audit Charter is
an appropriate starting point because it is a formal written document that defines the
purpose, authority, and responsibility of the internal audit unit. The second level of
examination is to investigate the practice of the audit by interviewing various members
of the audit staff in relation to the relevant regulations. This will demonstrate the
importance of investigating the issues documented by the Charter and showing what
was really practiced by the internal audit unit as suggested by Fogarty (1996). Fogarty
(1996) emphasises the distinction between the formal organisational structure
demonstrated to the external environment they should accomplish and actual
organisational practice. The model of investigation used by this study is presented in
figure 6.1 below.
Figure 6.1. Coercive Pressures towards Internal Audit Practice.
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Figure 6.1. depicts two main sources of coercive pressure dealt with by the unit:
government mandates and the public. The government mandates consist of four
regulations set by the Capital Market Regulatory Body and Financial Institution
(Bapepam-LK) and the Indonesia Financial Services Authority (OJK), the Ministry of
State-Owned Enterprise, the Supreme Financial Audit of Indonesian Government
(BPK), the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP) and the Indonesian
Stock Exchange (IDX). These regulations are directly and indirectly imposed upon the
internal auditing practice. There are four sources of informal pressure from the public as
presented in figure 6.1 above. Firstly, the Institute of Internal Auditor (IIA) and the
Indonesian internal audit association expect the auditor to comply with the code of
conduct of internal auditors. Secondly, the external auditors (international affiliated
public accountants) recommended the internal auditor comply with SOX 2002 by
undertaking an audit on Internal Control over Financial Reporting (ICOFR). This was to
ensure that the company practiced good corporate governance. Thirdly, the external
consultant recommended the internal auditors review the internal control system using
guidance issued by COSO. Fourthly, ISO 26000 also puts pressure on the internal
auditors to monitor the charity program conducted by the company.
Having described the possible pressure from formal and informal structures, this
study will investigate the firm's response using five ranges of organisational strategic
responses developed by Oliver (1991). Each pressure will be discussed in the
subsections below.
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6.2.1. Pressure from Formal Structure
As a hybrid entity which operates as a public company as well as being owned by
the government, the unit under study may experience pressure from various sources.
The pressures investigated by this study from formal structures are the stock market
regulator (Bapepam-LK/OJK), Ministry of SOEs, Government Audit Unit of BPK and
BPKP.
6.2.1.1 The Bapepam-LK/OJK Regulation and the Responses of Internal
Auditors
Bapepam-LK is a government institution which is similar to ASIC (Australian
Securities and Investment Commission) in Australia. In 2011 Bapepam-LK, the stock
market regulator was replaced by a new institution, namely OJK, which has a function
like that of Bapepam-LK but also supervises the Indonesian Financial Transaction
Reports and Analysis Centre (PPATK), an institution that monitors the flow of money
in the country that is similar to Austrac in Australia. In 2008 Bapepam-LK issued
regulation No: KEP-496/BL/2008 that details the requirements of the role of internal
auditor in public companies. This regulation is considered to bring pressure on the
internal audit of public companies. Investigation of the Internal Audit Charter of the
company indicates that almost all requirements of the regulations are listed in the Audit
Charter, except some small items not presented in the charter but practiced by the
auditors. This means that the unit investigated complies officially with all items of the
regulation. In order to understand how and why the unit responded to pressure from this
regulation, further investigation was undertaken using the interview data, observation,
relevant internal documents and reports from external institutions. This revealed the
implementation of the charter in practice and investigated the audit practice using five
strategic responses developed by Oliver (1991).
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The result from documentation and interviews as presented in chapter 5 indicated
that the unit being investigated uses four strategies to respond to pressure: acquiescence,
compromise, avoidance and defiance. These four strategies were used with different
tactics in regard to different items of the regulations as presented from table 6.1 to table
6.4.
Table 6.1. Items responded to using Acquiescence strategy and Comply tactic
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

7.

8.

Regulation of Bapepam-LK/OJK
The public company is required to have an internal audit unit
The public company must own the Internal Audit Charter set by top management and approved by
the board of directors.
The Charter has to state the definition of internal auditing and describe the functions of internal
audit, the assurance provider and the consulting functions.
Code of Ethics of internal audit refers to the national or international Code of Ethics of Internal
Audit.
The structure and position of internal audit unit in public company:
a. The internal audit unit is led by the head of internal audit.
b. The head of internal audit is appointed and dismissed by the CEO and approved by the
board of directors.
The duties and responsibilities of internal audit unit:
a. Set an annual internal audit plan.
b. Examine and asses the efficiency and effectiveness of financial, accounting, operational,
human resources, marketing, information technology and other activities.
c. Recommend improvement and objective information on the activities being audited to all
levels of management.
d. Cooperate with the audit committee.
e. Perform special audits if necessary.
The authority of the internal audit unit consists of:
a. Access to all relevant information of the company.
b. Regular and incidental meetings with the company.
Qualifications of the internal auditor:
a. To have communication skills.
b. To keep confidential information and company’s data related to the internal audit duties,
except as it is required by legislation or court.

6.2.1.1.1. Strategic Response of Acquiescence to Bapepam-LK/OJK’s Regulation
According to Oliver (1991), acquiescence means compliance with institutional
pressures and may appear as three tactics namely comply, imitate, or habit. The comply
tactic means obeying regulations and rules consciously, while imitation means
mimicking a successful organisation, and habit means unconsciously following invisible
and taken-for-granted norms. There are sixteen requirements listed in the BapepamLK/OJK regulations. The analyses of these requirements are presented in table 6.1 to
6.4 in this chapter. From the documentation, it was found that nine of the requirements
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have been accommodated in the audit charter. In addition, the interview data as
presented in chapter 5 also indicated that the items listed in the audit charter are actually
and consciously practiced by the auditors. With such findings, it could be argued,
therefore, that the audit unit is using the acquiescence strategy and comply tactic in
response to the requirements of the Bapepam-LK/OJK regulations. Two reasons for
such a response were given in the interviews. Firstly, as a state-owned entity, the unit
has to comply with government regulations. Secondly, as a public company, the unit
investigated has to comply with Bapepam-LK/OJK’s regulation as a stock market
regulator.
6.2.1.1.2. Compromise Strategic Response to Bapepam-LK/OJK Regulation
The compromise strategy is defined by Oliver (1991) as a strategy to respond to a
situation when there is a conflict between internal and external demands in relation to
efficiency. This strategy may be applied in three different ways or tactics such as
balance, pacify, and bargain. The balance tactic is used to balance demands of multiple
constituents. The pacify tactic is used to please and it contains a variety of institutional
elements. The bargain tactic is used to negotiate with institutional stakeholders.
Two Bapepam-LK/OJK regulations from table 6.2 were represented in the
Internal Audit Charter. However, from the interviews it was revealed that these
requirements were only partially followed by the internal audit unit. Therefore, it could
be said that the internal audit unit is using the compromise strategy and pacify tactic.
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Table 6.2. Items responded to using Compromise strategy and Pacify tactic
The Regulation Bapepam-LK/OJK
1. The duties and responsibilities of internal audit unit:
a. Set the program to evaluate the quality of internal audit activities.
2. Qualification of internal auditor:
a. Must have integrity, professional behaviour, independence, and be honest and objective in
performing their duties.
b. Has knowledge and experience in the audit with both technical and other relevant knowledge.
c. Understands the capital market regulations and other legislation.
d. Obeys professional Standards issued by the Internal Audit Association.
e. Understands the GCG principles and risk management.
f. Is willing to increase their professional knowledge, skill, and capabilities continuously.

Such strategy and tactic may be based on good reasons. The legislation requires
the internal audit unit to set the program to evaluate the quality of internal audit
activities. However, it is not clear whether this should be done by an external or internal
party as indicated by an internal audit standard issued by IIA (IIA, 2013). In response to
this requirement, three evaluation activities are presented in the Audit Charter. Firstly,
an evaluation is to be made of supervision from the stage of the audit plan to the audit
recommendations. Secondly, there should be an internal quality assurance review,
which is a review of audit activities conducted by a unit external to the internal audit
unit, and thirdly an external review is to be made by a body external to the company.
The interviews revealed that supervision was well implemented for some stages;
audit planning, and audit execution. However, the review of the audit recommendation
was not fully implemented as some items that were considered to be sensitive were
interfered with by top management. The interviews also revealed that there was no
internal QAR performed upon the audit activities. Since it was the head of the unit who
was asked to do this, no explanation was obtained. In terms of external evaluation, an
interview revealed that the audit unit is reviewed by external, independent and
professional institutions every three years. The external institutions are Bina Audita
Indonesia, the accounting firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers and BPK. The interviews
indicated that the response of the unit toward the pressure of such regulation is to use
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the compromise strategy and the pacify tactic. The findings on the QAR practiced by
the unit under study brings new aspects to the institutional theory in relation to internal
audits as an addition to previous studies by Al-Twaijry et al. (2003), Arena and Azzone
(2007), Arena et al. (2006), and Mihret et al. (2012). By doing so, it highlights the
importance of investigating the differences between what was documented by the Audit
Charter and what was really practiced by the internal audit unit as suggested by Fogarty
(1996). Fogarty (1996) emphasises the distinction between the formal organisational
structure demonstrated to the external environment they should accomplish and the
actual organisational practice.
In relation to the qualifications of the internal auditor, there are six criteria. Firstly,
the internal auditors are required to have good character, which should include integrity,
professional behaviour, independence, honesty, and objectivity in performing their
duties. This requirement is included in the Audit Charter. However, the fact that
management may still interfere with the audit function indicates that the auditors could
not apply absolute standards of independence. They may be independent with regard to
the auditee but not to the management when asked to cover sensitive matters that may
impact on management. Failure to maintain objectivity and independence will put their
integrity and professional behaviour in question and violate the standards of a
profession. The auditors have to retain independence (Chun, 1997; Hughes, 2004;
Messier and Schneider, 1988; Rittenberg and Purdy, 1978), including independence
from management interference (Bou-Raad, 2000; Chun, 1997; Courtemanche, 1986),
and be objective (Bailey et al., 2003; Carmichael et al., 1986; Courtemanche, 1986).
But the internal auditor cannot be totally independent from central management as they
are part of the management control structure of the company. Therefore, it could be
argued that the unit under study used the compromise strategy and pacify tactic in
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response to pressure from the Bapepam-LK/OJK on the independence of internal
auditor. According to Oliver (1991, p. 153) the pacify tactic constitutes “partial
conformity with the expectations of one or more constituents.”
There are some studies conducted on the violation of the independence of internal
auditors using institutional theory (Al-Twaijry et al., 2003; Arena et al., 2006; Mihret et
al., 2012). Since most of those previous studies investigated independence in terms of
who received the audit report in the manner approved by IIA, this study added a
contribution by investigating the independent and objective norms by looking at the
accommodation of the standards and regulations into the Audit Charter and actual
implementation of the charter, as suggested by Fogarty (1996). Fogarty (1996)
emphasises the distinction between the formal organisational structure demonstrated to
the external environment they should accomplish and actual organisational practice.
The second criterion required by the regulation is “to have knowledge and
experience on the audit techniques and other relevant knowledge” and it has also been
adopted by the Audit Charter. However, the interviews indicated that it was partly
complied with in practice. In recruiting the auditor, the head of internal audit faces a
dilemma to comply with the requirement. Some auditors have accounting and auditing
backgrounds and are assigned to the Accounting and Finance Audit Bureau. However,
some auditors were transferred and recruited from other units and these mostly do not
have a formal education in accounting and auditing. The educational backgrounds of
these auditors are marketing, engineering, economics, and information technology.
Since the auditors are mostly recruited from other units, they have no experience in
audit techniques. Therefore, it can be said that the audit unit is using the compromise
strategy and pacify tactic to deal with this pressure. The reason to recruit auditors from
other units is to have auditors that have understanding and experience of the nature of
256

the business units where they came from. This capacity is needed to identify business
risks and to establish a control system for the unit.
Understanding business processes is critical to the auditors as they implement a
risk-based audit. Knowledge in audit techniques also can be acquired from training,
evidenced by professional certificates such as Professional Internal Auditor (PIA),
Qualified Internal Auditor (QIA), Certified Information System Auditor (CISA), and
Certified Internal Auditor (CIA). These professional certificates are compulsory for the
auditors and required by the head of the internal audit unit, although at this stage, the
head of the unit has not yet obtained the CIA certificate.
The response of the internal audit unit toward pressure from Bapepam-LK/OJK
regulations makes a contribution to the understanding of the internal audit practice. This
study uses a different approach from previous studies (Al-Twaijry et al., 2003; Arena et
al.,2006; Arena and Azzone, 2007; and Mihret et al., 2012). This study tests pressure
from government regulation (Bapepam-LK/OJK), which requires qualifications
specifically in accounting and auditing. A study by Al-Twaijry et al. (2003) only
focused on the educational level without going into detail on the relevant discipline such
as accounting and auditing. The study of Arena et al. (2006) focused on the requirement
of SOX Act 2002 and Italian legislation concerning the qualification of internal auditors
who assist in internal control of financial reporting. This study takes a different
approach by investigating the practice of internal audit in a broader sense and by not
being limited to the role of internal auditors to assist internal control over financial
reporting.
Arena and Azzone (2007) discovered that the response to the recommendation of
the Italian chapter of IIA on the qualification of auditors was to provide training and
certification such as Certified Internal Auditor (CIA) and Certified Accountant (CA).
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However, that study did not describe clearly the educational background of the auditors
nor their experiences. In contrast, the current study examines educational background.
Furthermore, this study differs from the study of Mihret et al., (2012) that did not
describe the auditors’ qualifications, educational background or professional
certification, nor the experiences of auditors in auditing and the relevant knowledge.
The third criterion required by the regulation is to understand capital market
regulations and other legislation. This knowledge is expected to be used by the auditors
as guidance in their activities to audit the public company. It is found that this criterion
is accommodated in the Audit Charter. The interviews revealed that the majority of the
auditors are using the regulations as guidance in conducting the audit function. Since we
know that management interfered with the audit report, this seems to imply that the
regulation was not fully applied in practice when preparing the audit report. In relation
to CSR activity a similar situation also occurred. The auditors understand that in the
context of supporting small businesses with micro-finance a small business is one with a
maximum turnover of A$ 100,000. In practice, it was found that the company violates
this regulation by distributing funds to firms that have a turnover of more than
A$ 100,000. In an interview it was mentioned that the auditor who reported this finding
in the audit report did not receive feedback from management, and therefore the
auditors could not monitor the response and finally could not fully comply with the
regulation. All these cases are examples where the auditors use the compromise strategy
and pacify tactic that constitute partial conformity with the expectations of one or more
constituents.
This study contributes to an understanding of the response towards the
requirement concerning the qualifications of the auditors in terms of their knowledge
and understanding of stock market regulation and other regulations where the auditee
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operates as a public company. No previous study went in to such detail on the pressure
dealt with by the audit unit under investigation (Al-Twaijry et al., 2003; Arena et al.,
2006; Arena and Azzone, 2007; and Mihret et al., 2012). In addition, this study
investigates the difference between what is written in the Audit Charter and what really
is being done in practice as suggested by Fogarty (1996).
The fourth criterion is that the regulation requires the auditors to obey the
professional standards issued by the internal audit association. The audit unit responded
to this requirement by officially and explicitly pronouncing it in the Internal Audit
Charter. Again as indicated by interference of management in the provision of audit
reports, this requirement was not applied in practice. Other incompliance in practice is
also indicated by the absence of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) to audit CSR
project, as well as the absence of internal quality assurance reviews as discussed
previously. It could be argued that the internal audit unit under investigation uses the
compromise strategy and pacify tactic by not fully practising the requirements. Again,
this study contributes to an understanding of the difference between what is written in
the audit charter and what is practiced in carrying out the audit function as suggested by
Fogarty (1996). Fogarty (1996) emphasises the distinction between the formal
organisational structure demonstrated to the external environment they should
accomplish and an actual organisational practice. This type of investigation has never
been done by previous studies.
The fifth criterion is the requirement for the auditors to understand Good
Corporate Governance (GCG) principles and risk management. This requirement has
been adopted in the Audit Charter. The understanding of GCG leads to the area of risks
and controls which require the capability of internal auditors to assess the internal
controls over financial reporting (ICoFR). In the case of CSR regulations that were
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violated on in terms of the eligibility of small business to receive funds, management
did not comment on the audit finding and this kind of omission in the preparation of
audit reports may increase a company's risk toward irregularities. This condition
demonstrates that the internal audit unit carries out the compromise strategy by using
the pacify response that constitutes partial conformity with the expectations of one or
more constituents.
Previous studies such as by Al-Twaijry et al. (2003) and Mihret et al. (2012) did
not investigate the understanding of the GCG principle on the practice of internal
auditor to assess the ICoFR. Arena et al. (2006) examined the role of the GCG principle
on the practice of internal auditor however they only involved the first level of
organisation structure within the internal audit department and did not go in to detail for
middle and lower levels and therefore could not reveal the practice. Another study by
Arena and Azzone (2007) found the internal audit unit used the framework of COSO
and Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) to verify the effectiveness of the internal
control system. However, there was no further investigation of the application of risk
management or internal control in their study. Having described the case found by this
study, it can be said that this study brings a greater understanding of the response of the
institution to the pressure. Although the auditors have enough understanding of the
GCG principles and risk management, it may not be fully applied in practice.
The last item requires the auditors to increase their professional knowledge, skill,
and capabilities continuously. This requirement is responded to by adopting it in the
Audit Charter. From interviews it was interpreted that this item is met by attending
international and local seminars and conferences. However, in practice, not all of the
auditors had the opportunity to attend an event, particularly with international seminars
or conferences because of a language barrier. Furthermore, the interviews also
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uncovered that some internal auditors who are members of the Internal Audit Forum of
SOEs (FKSPI) were not allowed by the head of the audit bureau to attend a seminar of
FKSPI because it was considered 'useless'. This situation indicated that the unit partly
applied the requirement in practice and therefore the unit is using the compromise
strategy and pacify tactic.
6.2.1.1.3. Avoidance Strategic Response to Bapepam-LK/OJK’s Regulation
According to Oliver (1991, p. 154) the Avoidance strategy is related to “…the
organizational attempt to preclude the necessity of conformity.” This strategy involves
three ways: conceal, buffer and escape tactic. The conceal tactic is associated with the
response to disguise the fact that it does not intend to implement the requirement using
rational plan (Oliver, 1991, p.154). The buffering tactic refers to an “…attempt to
reduce the extent to which it is externally inspected, scrutinized, or evaluated by
partially detaching or decoupling its technical activities from external contacts” (Oliver,
1991, p.155). According to Oliver (1991, p.155) the escape tactic means “…an
organization may exit the domain within which pressure is exerted…or significantly
alter its own goals, activities, or domain to avoid its necessity of conformity altogether.”
As presented in table 6.3 below, there are four items of Bapepam-LK/OJK
regulation that are adopted in the Audit Charter. Regarding the number of auditors,
there is no specific number required by the regulation. From observation and
documentation it was found that the unit employs 22 staff that comprise one head of the
unit, four heads of audit bureaus, one employee at a similar level to the head of the audit
bureau, and 16 auditors. The auditors are spread across four audit bureaus: accounting
and finance, commercial, engineering and ICT. Among 16 auditors, only 4 staff possess
an accounting background and are placed in accounting and finance audit bureau.
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Table 6.3. Items responded to using Avoidance strategy and Conceal tactic
The Regulation Bapepam-LK/OJK
1. The numbers of internal auditors should be appropriate to the size and complexity of company.
2. The structure and position of internal audit units in public company:
a. The head of internal audit is responsible to the CEO.
3. The duties and responsibilities of the internal audit unit:
a. Test and evaluate the implementation of internal control, and risk management in accordance
with the company’s policy.
b. Compose the audit report and deliver it to the CEO and the board of director.
c. Monitor, analyse, and report the follow up to audit recommendations.
4. The internal audit unit has authorities to:
a. Communicate directly to top management, the board of directors, the audit committee, and their
members

Some interviewees mentioned that their unit lacks internal auditors. When this
condition was presented to the head of the unit, it was argued that the number of
auditors were appropriate as all of the jobs were handled effectively. The head of the
unit said that the unit was using a matrix system which means every bureau can use
auditors from other bureaus. The explanation given seems to be senseless since each
auditor is assigned to a bureau that is relevant to his or her expertise or background. An
auditor from the accounting and finance bureau will be incapable of helping a bureau to
undertake an engineering audit for example. In addition, some interviewees mentioned
that they were overworked. This condition demonstrates that the internal audit unit
actually has a shortage of auditors, but the head of the unit tried to hide it using a matrix
system. After this investigation, it can be said that the unit disguises the fact of not
implementing the practice and covers staff shortages with a rational argument about the
matrix system. It is undertaken by asking assistance from the audit bureau in conducting
the internal audit activities. Therefore it can be said that this unit is using the avoidance
strategy with conceal tactic. This finding contributes another example to the literature of
institutional theory of how the avoidance strategy and conceal tactic are used in practice.
The number of internal auditors in the internal audit unit essentially is not appropriate
with the size and complexity of the company, but the internal audit unit overcomes this
problem by implementing the matrix system rather than recruiting more auditors. The
262

number of auditors in appearance looks sufficient even though in fact there is a staff
shortage.
The second item is about the structure and position of the internal audit unit in a
public company being responsible to the CEO. This requirement is clearly adopted in
the Audit Charter. In practice, the response of the internal audit unit toward this
requirement can be traced to the internal document of organisational structure of the
company. However, this practice created an effect on reduces the level of independence
of auditors in which it is also a requirement of the auditors’ qualification (see table 6.2
above). Since the audit unit is under the CEO, the chance of interference of management
in preparation of the audit report and the conduct of the audit is likely. As indicated by
an interviewee, before an audit report is sent to the Board, it is seen by the CEO who
often requires changes to the items reported. Furthermore, Internal Audit Standard
number 1110.A1 (IIA, 2013, p.17) states that “the internal audit activity must be free
from interference in determining the scope of internal auditing, performing work, and
communicating the result.” Since the interference of management was asked in the
interview, it was argued that since the audit unit is under the CEO they have to obey
instructions from the CEO. Therefore, it is clearly shown that the response to this
pressure, the audit unit is using the avoidance strategy and conceal tactic to cover their
lack of independence by using the Bapepam-LK/OJK’s regulation as a rational
argument. This finding is a new contribution to the area of institutional theory as it
indicates a response of an audit unit toward institutional pressure using the avoidance
and conceal tactic.
As presented in table 6.3, the third item of the regulation is about the duties and
responsibilities of the internal audit unit in the public company that consist of three
components. This item is contained in the Audit Charter which states that the
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requirement is officially agreed upon to be applied by the unit. The first component is
the requirement to perform the test and evaluation of internal control and risk
management. However, due to lack of auditors, the head of the unit decided to perform
these tasks only within staff availability. The interviews also discovered that auditors
focused on high risks and their key controls and examined other controls if they still had
time. Furthermore, a problem also occurred in reviewing ICoFR in that auditors are
needed with accounting and auditing background but there are only four staff available
with this training. Using the argument of implementing the matrix strategy that allows
each bureau to use auditors from another bureau seems to be used as a rational argument
to disguise nonconformity as characterised by the conceal tactic. The second component
is that the auditors are required to compose the audit report and deliver it to the CEO
and the Board of Directors (BOD). Implicitly, the purpose of sending the report to the
Board is to keep the independence of internal auditors in presenting their opinion
(Courtemanche, 1986; Driessen and Molenkamp, 1993; Sarens, 2009). However, the
interviews revealed that the management had screened the audit report by eliminating
abnormalities before it was sent to the audit committee of the Board. In this case, the
reason for auditors to obey management instructions was that the position of the audit
unit was directly under the CEO in the organisational structure and responsible to the
CEO. This circumstance indicates that the internal audit unit responds to the pressure
from Bapepam-LK/OJK with the conceal tactic, using organisational structure and
attachment to CEO as a logical argument to cover non-compliance to the BapepamLK/OJK requirement.
The last component of this item requires internal auditors to monitor, analyse, and
report the follow up of audit recommendations. From an interview it was apparent there
were some Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) cases which had been reported to the
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CEO by the auditor, but the follow up of recommendations was never monitored. The
reason why auditors failed to monitor the CSR cases was that those cases related to the
CEO. The management interference meant audits were unsuccessful since internal
auditors could not undertake their duties, particularly in monitoring the follow up of
audit recommendations for some CSR cases. Thus, the interference of management
indicates that the response in practice of the audit unit to the Bapepam-LK/OJK
requirement is that it uses the conceal tactic. The response is categorised as the conceal
tactic as the auditors use the organisational structure and accountability to the CEO as a
logical argument to cover the non-compliance.
The fourth item of the regulation allows the internal auditors to communicate
directly with top management, the board of directors, the audit committee, and their
members. The direct interaction with the board is regulated by the internal audit
standard number 1111 (IIA, 2013, p. 17) as part of the independence and objectivity of
the internal auditor. This intention should also be the essence of the regulation of the
Bapepam-LK/OJK. However, the Audit Charter requires the communication to be
conducted through scheduled meetings so that the management can control the topic to
be discussed with the board. The interview revealed that a meeting with the audit
committee was scheduled every three months, and additional meetings were arranged if
necessary. The response to the requirement indicates a strategy of the avoidance and
using conceal tactic using the SOPs of scheduled meetings as the logical argument to
lessen the independence of internal auditors as well as widen the distance of
communication between the internal auditor and the board.
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6.2.1.1.4. Defiance Strategic Response to Bapepam-LK/OJK Regulation
According to Oliver (1991, p. 156), the defiance strategy is “…a more active
resistance to institutional processes”. This strategy may take three forms: dismiss,
challenge and attack courses of action. The dismiss course of action is characterised by
“ignoring institutional rules and values” (Oliver, 1991, p. 156). The challenge course of
action is described as “…offensive in defiance of these pressures and may indeed make
a virtue of their insurrection” (Oliver, 1991, p. 156). The last course is the attack course
of action which is indicated by “…the intensity and aggressiveness of the organization’s
active departure from institutional pressures and expectations” (Oliver, 1991, p. 156).
There are two items of Bapepam-LK/OJK’s regulation as presented in table 6.4 below
that were responded to by the unit under study using the defiance strategy and dismiss
tactic.
Table 6.4. Items responded to using Defiance strategy and Dismiss tactic
The Regulation OJK / Bapepam
1. It is forbidden for internal auditors to work as operational staff in holding and subsidiaries
companies.
2. The internal audit unit has authorities to:
a. Coordinate its activity with the external auditor’s activity.

Both items are listed as part of the requirements in the Audit Charter. The
objective of the first item clearly relates to the Internal Audit Standard No. 1120 in
relation to Individual Objectivity (IIA, 2013, p. 18), which states “Internal auditors must
have an impartial, unbiased attitude and avoid any conflict of interest”. The conflict of
interest is interpreted in the Internal Audit Standard as:
Conflict of interest is a situation in which an internal auditor, who is in a position
of trust, has a competing professional or personal interest. Such competing
interest can make it difficult to fulfil his or her duties impartially. A conflict of
interest exists even if no unethical or improper act results. A conflict of interest
can create an appearance of impropriety that can undermine confidence in the
internal auditor, the internal audit activity, and the profession. A conflict of
interest could impair an individual’s ability to perform his or her duties and
responsibilities objectively (IIA, 2013, p. 18).
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Interviews revealed the surprising situation that some auditors were holding
positions as treasurers for CSR programs. In addition, it was also mentioned that a high
ranking official in the internal audit unit held a position as a board member of a
subsidiary company. When the position as a board member was questioned further, it
was mentioned that the subsidiary was not significant in size. The violation had brought
concern from independent assessors who conducted the Quality Audit Review (QAR)
so that this issue had been reported in the QAR report 2011. Although it has been
reported, there was no effort by the audit unit to resolve the matter. Nevertheless, the
finding indicated that the practice of auditors had violated the first item of the regulation.
Since the Bapepam-LK/OJK’s regulation has been adopted in the Audit Charter, it
means that the Audit Charter becomes an applied regulation. The violation of this
regulation is clearly indicated to be a response of ‘ignoring institutional rules and
values,’ which is characterised by the dismiss tactic of the defiance strategy.
The second item of the regulation is stated in the regulation as part of the
authority of the internal auditor to coordinate its activities with the external auditor. The
objective of this regulation can be found in the Internal Audit Standard number 2050
about Coordination which stated that;
The chief audit executive should share information and coordinate activities with
other internal and external providers of assurance and consulting services to
ensure proper coverage and minimize duplication of efforts (IIA, 2013, p. 28)
This regulation has been narrowed down in the Charter as part of the scope of
work of the internal auditors to play their role as a counterpart to external auditor. The
external auditors for the unit under study are considered auditors from various
institutions. The external auditors can be from a public accounting firm who conduct the
audit and report it in the company’s annual report, from the Financial Development and
Supervisory Agency (BPKP), an internal auditor of the government that assess the
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implementation of good corporate governance, from the Supreme Financial Audit (BPK)
(a government external auditor institution that executes financial audit as required by
the Law of SOE 2003), or lastly from the independent assessors who undertake the
Quality Auditing Review (QAR).
The interviews revealed that there was no coordination of internal audit activity
between the internal and external auditors. There is no exchange of information between
internal and external auditors in relation to what has been done by internal auditors.
Rather, the internal auditors tend to protect information about their audit findings by
saying that the audit finding is confidential to external parties. The internal auditors
therefore, only perform their function as a counterpart by providing data excluding the
internal audit report, accompanying the external auditor to visit a site or providing staff
for conducting the audit. This practice is contrasts greatly with the code of conduct of
auditors stated in the Audit Charter number 429 (SI, 2012, p. 21) as;
To report all internal audit result by disclosing the truth that is based on the facts
and do not conceal any issue that may impair the company and/or breach the law
and regulation.
The practice of this item of regulation indicates that internal audit unit undertakes
the dismiss response to the legislation. Using internal audit charter and how it is
practiced (Fogarty, 1996) the study finds that the internal audit unit uses the defiance
strategy and dismiss tactic to respond to the requirement of coordination with external
auditors. Previous studies, Al-Twaijry et al. (2003) and Arena and Azzone (2007) did
not investigate this matter. Mihret et al. study (2012) did not explore in detail regarding
the coordination between the external and internal auditors of Ethiopia SOEs.
Arena et al. (2006) revealed relationships between internal and external auditors
in Italian companies. The first group of companies investigated was found not to have
regular collaboration, coordination or exchanges of information between the internal
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and external auditors. The second group was found to communicate with external
auditors but were limited to verbal communication without having a formal report. The
third group was found to exchange information between the two since external auditors
exploited the information collected and actively gave advice and recommendation to
internal auditors.
6.2.1.2 Decree of Ministry of SOE and Internal Auditing Practice
Another regulation that creates institutional pressure on the internal audit unit
under study comes from the Decrees of Ministry of SOE. One of the decrees
investigated by this study is the requirement to implement Good Corporate Governance
(GCG) which has to be assessed by an independent assessor. The independent assessor
for the company under study is the Financial Development and Supervisory Agency
(BPKP), an internal auditor of the government.
There are 32 items of the decree with detailed requirements for the internal audit
practice to comply with. When these items were traced to the Audit Charter all of the
items were recorded by the Audit Charter, but they were responded to differently in
practice. Using the strategic response of Oliver (1991), the response of the unit to this
particular pressure can be classified into three strategies: acquiescence, compromise and
avoidance strategy. Each of these strategies will be discussed in detail below.
6.2.1.2.1. Acquiescence Strategic Response to the Decree of Ministry of SOE
As mentioned by Oliver (1991) the acquiescence strategy means the institution
obeys the regulation by a tactic of: comply, imitation, or habit. The comply tactic is a
situation where the institution is obeying regulations and rules consciously. The
imitation tactic is where the institution is mimicking a successful organisation. The
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habit tactic is the response taken by obeying the regulation unconsciously following
invisible and taken-for-granted norms.
The first strategy of the acquiescence was found from interviews as presented in
chapter 5, that indicated that the auditors executed the twelve items of the regulation in
practice (Fogarty, 1996). These items are presented in table 6.5. Since these items are
accommodated by the Audit Charter as well as implemented in practice, it means that
the internal audit unit responded to these twelve items by using the acquiescence
strategy and comply tactic. It could be said that the practice of internal auditing for these
items are in line with the expectation of the regulator.
Table 6.5. Items responded to using Acquiescence strategy and Comply tactic
The Decree of Ministry of SOE
1. The SOE is required to have an internal audit unit.
2. The Charter is stipulated by the top management and approved by the board of directors.
3. The content of Internal Audit Charter must be:
a. In line with Bapepam-LK/OJK Regulation and Company Law.
4. The Charter has to be reviewed and up-dated if necessary.
5. The head of internal audit unit is appointed by the CEO and approved by the board of directors.
6. The internal audit unit has to make a plan for the necessity of its auditor staffs.
7. The qualities of internal auditors are appropriate to undertake internal audit activities.
a. The internal auditor staff possess knowledge, skills, and are required to have appropriate
professional certificates.
b. Having proper quality of internal auditor professionalism.
8. The internal audit unit has a quality assurance program in which the program is assessed by an
independent assessor every five years, who evaluates the compliance with the Charter, standards
and code of ethics, efficiency and effectiveness of internal audit functions to fulfil stakeholders’
needs.
9. The internal audit department sets annual internal audit plans and undertakes the audit activities as
it has been planned.
a. The annual internal audit plan takes a risk-based approach.
b. The annual internal audit plan is communicated to the audit committee to obtain
recommendations.
c. The audit plan has to be approved by the CEO and communicated to top management.
d. The accomplishment over the targets is in the annual audit plan.
10. The internal auditors report to the CEO and the audit committee.
a. The QAR’s report has also to be delivered to the audit committee.
11. The internal auditors give recommendations on the business strategy of the company.
a. The internal auditors evaluate whether goals of the programs and their operational activities are
in accordance with organisation’s goals.
12. The internal auditors monitor the follow up of internal and external audit recommendations.
a. The internal audit unit has guidelines for monitoring the following up of the internal and
external audit recommendations.
b. The internal auditors record the results of monitoring activities.
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6.2.1.2.2. Compromise Strategic Response to the Decree of Ministry of SOE
The second strategy of compromise was used for three items of the Decree of
Ministry of SOE as presented in table 6.6. From interviews as presented in chapter 5, it
was found that the auditors only partly implemented responses to these three items.
Table 6.6. Items responded to using Compromise strategy and Pacify tactic
The Decree of Ministry of SOE
1. The internal audit unit must have audit guidelines, SOP and supervisory roles in the internal audit
unit, and undertaking quality assurance program.
a. The head of internal audit unit sets the policy and procedures as an activity’s guidelines for the
internal auditor. Such policy and procedures should fit with the structure of the internal audit
unit, its size, and also complexity of the business activities of the company.
b. The head of internal audit carries out a quality assurance program which covers all aspects of
internal audit activities.
2. The internal audit functions contribute to corporate governance process, risk management and
internal control improvement.
3. The qualities of internal auditors are appropriate to perform internal audit activities.
a. The head of internal audit has capabilities that qualified as internal auditors that certified by the
professional association (Certified Internal Auditor / Qualified Internal Auditor).
b. There is continual professional development program for internal auditors which aims to
maintain their professional certification and provide education support for them.

In relation to the first item part a) most of the requirements had been done.
However, the interview revealed that there was no Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)
for CSR audit. In line with the interview, the QAR report 2011 also indicated that the
audit practiced has been a risk-based audit, while the existing SOP did not up-date to a
risk-based audit. Therefore, the existing SOPs were recommended to be up-dated. From
the documentation, it was also found that the current SOPs sighted have not been updated to satisfy the recommendation. This practice demonstrates that the internal audit
unit is using the compromise strategy and pacify tactic, which was indicated by Oliver
(1991,p 154) as to “…conform to at least the minimum standard…” If the investigation
was limited to looking at the Audit Charter it would have been concluded that the unit
was fully compliant with the requirement. Nevertheless, when it is followed in the
manner suggested by Fogarty (1996), it is found that not all the requirements are
complied with.
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Item 1 part b) of the regulation requires the unit to undertake Quality Assurance
Reviews (QAR). There are three reviews that should be made. Firstly, an evaluation is
to be made on supervision from the stage of audit planning to monitoring the audit
recommendations. Secondly, an internal quality assurance review, which is a review of
audit activities conducted by a unit external to the internal audit unit, and thirdly
external review to be made by parties external to the company. The interviews indicated
however, that there was no internal quality assurance review performed of the audit
activities. When the head of the internal audit unit was questioned, no reason was given
on why the audit unit did not undertake the internal review. This finding is in line with
the report of an external reviewer in 2011, which stated that the internal quality
assessment has not been fully implemented. Again, this finding indicated the usage of
the pacify tactic in response to the pressure. This analysis contributes to the area of
institutional theory as previous studies did not investigate this type of situation (AlTwaijry et al., 2003), Arena et al. (2006), Arena and Azzone (2007), and Mihret et al.
(2012).
The second item of the regulation requires the auditors to contribute to improve
the corporate governance process, risk management and internal control. The
contribution of the internal audit unit to risk management is indicated by implementing
a risk-based audit as documented in the Audit Plan 2014 as well as stated in the
interviews. In relation to the contribution to internal control and corporate governance,
the interview and the SOPs revealed that the internal audit unit performed audit on
Internal Control over Financial Reporting (ICoFR). However, before the audit report is
sent to the audit committee, it is screened by management who may omit issues that
sensitive to the governance function. This practice indicated that the auditors contribute
at the surface by undertaking risk-based audits as well as audits on ICoFR, however,
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interference of management on the report will reduce the quality of the assessment of
risk management that is communicated to the audit committee. In addition, the
interviews also reveal further violations of the regulation conducted by the unit of CSR
management that was left to happened by the auditors. The violations were related to
the execution of CSR programs. This indicates that the contribution of the internal audit
unit is not maximum, only partial. Therefore, it could be said that to this case, the unit
responded partially as described by Pacify tactic.
The third item part a) requires the head of internal audit to be qualified as an
internal auditor and certified by the professional association. There was no such
requirement presented in the Charter. The study investigated this matter through
documentation by looking at a Good Corporate Governance (GCG) report 2012, issued
by the BPKP indicating that the head of the unit was undertaking a course for the
preparation of the Certified Internal Auditor (CIA) examination. In an interview it was
mentioned that the head of the unit did attempt the Certified Internal Auditor (CIA)
examination, but has not yet passed the exam. Although the unit has not fulfilled the
requirement of this regulation, nevertheless it has made an effort to do so. This means
the audit unit has responded partly in line with the legislative expectation as indicated
by pacify tactic. This study presents another example of the use of the pacify tactic in an
attempt to respond to the pressure as suggested by Fogarty (1996). Fogarty (1996)
emphasises the distinction between the formal organisational structure demonstrated to
the external environment they should accomplish and actual organisational practice.
Regarding the third item part b) as indicated in the interviews, the management
did not allow audit staff to attend a seminar organised by FKSPI, an association of
internal auditors of SOEs by saying that it was useless. Again this indicates the unit is

273

partly in line with the legislative expectation, and therefore it could be said to respond
to the pressure by using the compromise strategy and pacify tactic.
6.2.1.2.3. Avoidance Strategic Response to the Decree of Ministry of SOE
The third strategy of avoidance is used for six items of the Decree of Ministry of
SOE as presented in table 6.7. The interviews as presented in chapter 5 discovered that
the unit employed the avoidance strategic response for six items of the Decree of
Ministry of SOE.
Table 6.7. Items responded to using Avoidance strategy and Conceal tactic
The Decree of Ministry of SOE
1. The Internal Audit Charter has to contain:
a. Consideration of using the Professional Standards of Internal Audit issued by Indonesian
Consortium of Internal Auditor or the International Professional Practices Framework of the
IIA.
b. Explanation of the position of the internal audit unit in an organisation, authorities of internal
audit function which includes having access to all recording, people and assets of company, and
also scope of the internal audit function.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Position of the internal audit unit is directly under the CEO in the organisational structure.
The numbers of internal auditors are appropriate to conducting the internal audit activities.
The internal audit recommendations can be applied and improve the operational activity.
The internal auditors monitor the following up of internal and external audit recommendations and
report the monitoring results to the CEO and the audit committee.
6. The head of internal audit has direct access to report to the audit committee.

The table 6.7 demonstrates that the six items were responded to by the unit using
the avoidance strategy and concealment tactic. Considering the first item part a) and the
second item, it was found that since the unit is under top management, the interference
of management in providing the audit report means the essence of the first item about
independence cannot be fulfilled. However, interviewees commented that this is the
consequence of being under top management. Similarly, it was also argued that
recommendations concerning item one part b) about the authority of the auditor, cannot
be fully implemented because the unit is under the top management. Item three has also
been discussed in the interviews and the use of concealment tactic was indicated in that
the unit will use a matrix strategy by allowing each bureau to use staff from other
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bureaus to undertake the audit. However, it was also clear that each bureau staff
member with a specific specialty will not be effective in a different audit capacity.
For item number four, the conceal tactic was illustrated by a case of an audit
report in which the auditee did not respond to the recommendation. When asked about
this matter, the auditor mentioned that the auditee did not respond to the
recommendation because it was related to management involvement. Item number five
requires the auditors to monitor the follow up of audit recommendations. In interviews
it was found that there were some cases in which the auditors faced difficulty in
monitoring the follow up of the audit recommendations. It was mentioned that the
auditee ignored the recommendations, as the auditee was protected by the middle and
top management. The conceal tactic used in this response is based on the protection of
the auditee by powerful individuals in the hierarchy, which made the audit unit unable
to respond fully to the requirement. Finally, item six which allows the auditor to have
direct access to the audit committee was also controlled by management by limiting the
communication between auditors and the audit committee to a scheduled meeting every
three months. This situation again indicated using the conceal tactic to respond to
institutional pressure.
6.2.1.3 The Supreme Financial Audit of Indonesian Government
The Indonesian Constitution 1945 provides that the Supreme Financial Audit
(BPK) is an external auditor of financial matters to audit all government units and SOEs.
This institution is responsible to the House of Representatives of the Republic of
Indonesia. The Law No. 15 of 2006 gives authority to BPK to audit SOEs. In addition,
verse 20 of the Law No. 15, 2004 requires that the auditee (SOEs) must respond to the
audit recommendations issued by BPK. Therefore, any audit recommendation issued by
BPK becomes a pressure on the SOE to comply with. In relation to the response of the
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audit unit to this requirement, the study investigates the practice of internal audit in
dealing with the role of BPK to audit the SOEs.
The Audit Charter states that the internal audit unit has to become a counterpart to
external auditors and other relevant audit institutions (Audit Charter, no. 2.2.14).
Furthermore, the charter also states that the internal audit must comply with rule and
regulation, standards and business ethics (Audit Charter, no. 2.2.6). It was found in an
interview that the audit unit did not give the internal audit reports to the BPK nor other
confidential data and documents. The reason given was that these documents were for
internal purposes only. Another argument used to withhold the documents from BPK
was hiding behind the status of a public company which has a right to maintain
confidential information. The study made further investigations in relation to an audit
undertaken by BPK in the SOE through the website of BPK. It was found that the Audit
Report of BPK 2012 shows that BPK conducted a special audit on the operations of
SOEs including the holding company and all subsidiaries. Audit findings were as
follows: 11 cases of internal control system irregularities and 15 cases of other
irregularities. For these findings, the BPK issued 24 audit recommendations. BPK then
monitored the follow up actions to the recommendations which were recorded in the
BPK’s Audit Report in 2013. The report stated 17 recommendations were followed up
by the company and 7 recommendations were still in progress. This practice clearly
indicates that the audit unit used the compromise strategy and pacify tactic by only
partially complying with the regulation.
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6.2.1.4 The Financial and Development Supervisory Agency
The Decree No 192 of 2014 of the President specifies the duties of the Financial
and Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP) as assisting the government in
conducting internal oversight towards national financial accountability in government
institutions, including at the SOEs. The BPKP is responsible to the President, which
means that BPKP is the coordinator of all internal audits of government units as well as
SOEs. The Decree further describes the scope of audit activities comprising the setting
of national policies on financial accountability in all government institutions,
undertaking an audit over financial accountability, providing consulting services on risk
management, internal control and good corporate governance. The Minister of SOE
through an official letter; SE-14/MBU/2010, instructed the boards of directors and the
CEOs of SOEs to assess the GCG implementation every two years using BPKP as
independent assessors.
In responding to this pressure, the internal audit unit under study accommodates
the requirement by including it in the Audit Charter and stating the unit has to assist
BPKP as a counterparty by providing relevant data to evaluate the implementation of
GCG. In the interviews it was mentioned that the audit unit assisted and provided data
needed by BPKP which evaluated the implementation of GCG regularly. This practice
was also confirmed by the Assessment Report of GCG Implementation in 2012 issued
by BPKP. The report did not mention any objection about the role of the internal audit
unit. This indicated that the internal audit did assist BPKP and provide relevant data to
undertake the GCG evaluation. Therefore, it could be said that the unit under study used
the acquiescence strategy and comply tactic to respond to the pressure from BPKP
which was stated by Oliver (1991) to be “conscious obedience to or incorporation of
values, norms, or institutional requirements”.
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6.2.1.5 The Indonesian Stock Exchange
The Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) is an institution under Bapepam-LK/OJK
that is responsible for carrying out trading of securities in Indonesia. This institution
was formed by a merger between the former Jakarta Stock Exchange and Surabaya
Stock Exchange. One of the regulations of the IDX that is related to role of internal
auditor is the regulation No Kep-306/BEJ/07-2004 that sets requirements for companies
to provide an audited annual report and interim report to the public.
In response to this requirement, the internal audit unit under study incorporated
this requirement in the Audit Charter. It is stated in the Charter that the internal auditor
should regularly undertake analytical reviews on the financial statements of the
company. As regards to the implementation of the Charter in practice, it was mentioned
in interviews that the auditors undertook analytical review over the financial statements
before sending the financial report to the IDX. These interview comments were also
supported by the Annual Audit Plan in 2014 which set the review activities to be
conducted three times in April, July and October 2014. Therefore it can be said that the
audit unit responded to the pressure by using the acquiescence strategy and comply
tactic.
6.2.2. Pressure from Informal Structure
Having discussed the pressure from formal sources, there is a need to see the
pressure that may come from informal sources. The informal sources of pressure may
come from outside organisations on which the institution relies administratively and
culturally and those expected by society (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 1991). This
study uses four sources of pressure prescribed in previous chapters: the Institute of
Internal Auditors (IIA), the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX), the Committee of
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Sponsoring Organisations (COSO), and International Organisation for Standardisation
(ISO) 26000.
6.2.2.1. Expectation of the Institute of Internal Auditor (IIA) / Indonesian
Professional Bodies
The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) is an international association of internal
audit professionals which was established in the US in 1941 with the aim of assisting
auditors in providing high quality audit practice. The IIA issues the International
Professional Practices Framework (IPPF). The framework consists of two guidance sets:
mandatory and strongly recommended guidance. Mandatory guidance encompasses
three elements: the Definition of Internal Auditing, the Code of Ethics, and the
International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (Standards).
The strongly recommended guidance contains three components; Position Papers,
Practice Advisories and Practice Guides. The pressure from IIA is supported by the
Consortium of Internal Audit Profession Organisations in Indonesia that has members
from various associations such as the IIA Indonesian Chapter, FKSPI an association of
internal auditors of SOEs, the Foundation of Internal Audit Education (YPIA), the
Certification Boards of Qualified Internal Auditors (DSQIA), and Association of
Indonesian Internal Auditors (PAII). All these bodies collaborated to issue an internal
audit professional standard called SPAI that covers Internal Audit Definition, the Code
of Ethics, the Professional Standards of Internal Audit and the Practice Advisories. This
standard is mainly adopted from the IIA’s internal audit standard. The SPAI standard
applies pressure by saying that it is compulsory to be followed by internal auditors.
However, as a professional body it does not have a formal rule or regulation to oblige
the implementation of the standards.
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The response of the audit unit toward this pressure was traced to the Internal
Audit Charter. It is found that the Charter accommodated this requirement by using
SPAI and the IPPF as reference to carry out internal audit practice. Although it was
mentioned in the interviews that the requirement of the standard has been applied, it was
clearly indicated in previous cases that some aspects have not been fully complied with.
For example, the independence of internal auditors was interfered with by management,
and the internal Quality Assurance Review (QAR) has not been implemented. This
situation indicated that the internal audit unit responded to the pressure using the
compromise strategy and pacify tactic as characterised by “partial conformity with the
expectations of one or more constituents” (Oliver, 1991, p. 153)
6.2.2.2. Expectation of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX Act) 2002
The Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX 2002) was issued by the US Congress in 2002 as a
response to the collapse of large corporations in the US in 2001-2002. This Act sets a
number of requirements for corporate responsibilities, particularly for financial reports
(section 302) and management assessment of internal controls (section 404). The SOX
2002 requires a more effective system of internal controls over financial reporting
(ICoFR) (Hass et al., 2006). The SOX 2002 was published in order to meet the public
demand for better corporate governance in the US. The implementation and assessment
of the ICoFR as one of key aspects of good corporate governance (GCG) spread
globally through the requirement of NYSE for all companies listed in the NYSE to
implement GCG principles. The legislation also indirectly affects internal audit
activities by extending its scope of work, especially in ensuring the effectiveness of
ICoFR.
The expectation of GCG implementation also spread to Indonesia. There are two
institutions in Indonesia in this regard. The ministry of SOE issued a GCG handbook for
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all SOEs that operate in Indonesia. Another independent institution called the National
Committee of Governance Policy (KNKG) issued a GCG handbook for all sectors
including non SOEs. Since the KNKG is an independent institution, the requirements in
the handbook will be complied with voluntarily. The requirement of the KNKG
handbook reflects the expectations of Indonesian society towards public and private
sectors in having ethical awareness in conducting business. The guidance also
recommends the companies establish the internal audit unit to assist top management in
maintaining the effectiveness of the risk control process.
The company under study is a public SOE that is only listed on the Indonesian
Stock Exchange (IDX). Though it is not listed in the US stock market, the internal audit
unit considers the GCG requirement as pressure from public expectations both domestic
and international. In response to this pressure, the internal audit unit has adapted the
requirement in the Audit Charter. It is stated in the Charter that the internal audit should
ensure that the GCG has been implemented. The Charter also specifically mentioned the
role of an internal auditor is to ensure that the internal control of the company as a
whole is effective where the ICoFR is a part of the internal control systems. As required
by Fogarty (1996), to investigate the implementation of the response in practice the
study follows it through interviews and documentation. The interview revealed that the
company under study was audited by a public accounting firm that was affiliated with
an international public accounting firm which issues recommendations to establish the
ICoFR system and suggests the internal audit review the ICoFR system regularly. From
documentation, it was found that the Annual Internal Audit Plan 2014 allocated the
internal audit activities to review the implementation of ICoFR.
This situation demonstrates that the internal audit unit used the acquiescence
strategy and imitate tactic toward the SOX expectation in which DiMaggio and Powel,
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1983 (cited in Oliver. 1991, p.152) gave an example of Imitate tactic as “…imitation of
successful organizations and the acceptance of advice from consulting firms or
professional associations.”
6.2.2.3. Expectation of the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations (COSO)
COSO is an independent body, also known as the Treadway Commission, that
was founded in the US in 1985 in response to increasing business failures related to
failure of the role of external audits in the US. The commission recommends all top
management of public companies to maintain appropriate internal controls and effective
internal audit functions to prevent and detect fraudulent financial reporting. In 1992,
COSO issued a framework named Internal Control-Integrated Framework that
comprises five components: control environment, risk assessment, control activities,
information and communication, and monitoring. The critical role of the internal audit
function is in the monitoring component in which the internal auditor should ensure
internal control objectives are achieved. These include: effectiveness and efficiency of
operations, reliability of financial reporting and compliance with laws and regulations.
Tracing this requirement to the Audit Charter, it was found that there is no
adoption of COSO requirement in the Audit Charter. However, the interviews revealed
that the internal audit unit used the COSO framework as guidance in their audit
activities. From documentation, it was found that Annual Audit Plan 2014 presented a
plan for a consultant to provide a training course on COSO for internal auditors. The
study also undertook observation by attending the training course which was organised
by a consulting firm. In that event, the trainer provided information about the latest
requirements of COSO. This finding indicated that the internal audit unit used
Acquiescence strategy and Imitate tactic to respond to the pressure from COSO.
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6.2.2.4. Expectations of Society
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 26000 provides
guidance for organisations to carry out their business activities in a socially responsible
way. For this purpose, the companies are recommended to perform their actions in an
ethical and transparent way that contributes to the health and welfare of society. In this
case, the society means people or groups who are affected by the actions of
organisations and they also have the ability to affect the entity (ISO 26000, 2010, clause
2.20- 2.21). ISO 26000 provides a number of indicators for ethical behaviour. One of
these is “[a]sk yourself: would you be comfortable if your actions were to become
public knowledge?” (2010, clause 2.7). Undertaking CSR programs is a critical
approach to maintaining a beneficial relationship between the companies and society as
well as the environment in which they operate. Therefore, it could be said that society's
expectations are represented by the ISO 26000.
Since Indonesia is a member of ISO, ISO 26000 is adopted by the National
Standardisation Agency of Indonesia (BSN) and is called SNI ISO 26000. Both
international and domestic standards of ISO 26000 are used as guidance in conducting
CSR programs by the SOE studied. According to the company policy, the
implementation of CSR programs covers the area surrounding the factories of the SOE
studied. The CSR programs comprise diverse programs such as Partnership Program
(PK) and the Environment Development Program (BL).
In terms of pressure from public expectations as represented by ISO standards, the
response of the audit unit to this pressure is by stating in the Audit Charter verse 2.2.6
that it requires the internal auditors to ensure the company comply with regulations, law,
standards, and business ethics. However, the interviews demonstrate that there were no
standard operating procedures (SOP) that should be followed by the auditors when
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assessing the operation of the CSR program. The interviews also uncovered some
irregularity performed by the CSR unit and reported in the audit report but there was no
feedback received from CEO so follow up of this matter was impossible. The
documentation of audit reports also supported this situation, but as a confidential
document, it cannot be further explained.
The response to this public pressure demonstrates that the auditors did not fully
comply with the business ethics and standards mentioned in the Charter. Therefore, it
can be said that the internal audit unit used the compromise strategy and pacify tactic to
respond to the expectation of ISO standards.
6.3. Normative Isomorphism and the Practice of Internal Auditing
Normative isomorphism is based on the idea that organisational change stems
primarily from professionalism and sustainable education (DiMaggio & Powell 1983).
According to DiMaggio & Powell (1983), the professionalisation comprises two
important aspects of isomorphism sources, namely formal education as well as
professional networks that share knowledge and technologies. DiMaggio and Powell
(1991) further claim that normative pressures are transferred via education, professional
standards, and inter-organisational networks.
In the case of the SOE under study, the investigation of how and what actions
were taken by the internal audit unit in response to normative pressure is presented in
figure 6.2., and the normative pressure refers to the professionalism and sustainable
education are presented in table 6.8.
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Figure 6.2. Normative Pressures towards Internal Audit Practice
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The normative pressures are derived from education requirements and also from
various relevant professional bodies. They are the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA)
and the Indonesian Consortium of Internal Audit Professional Organisations. The
consortium comprises five members of professional bodies. They are: the Indonesian
chapter of the IIA, Communication Forum of SOE’s Internal Auditors (FKSPI), the
Foundation of Internal Audit Education (YPIA), the Certification Boards of Qualified
Internal Auditors (DSQIA), and the Association of Indonesian Internal Auditors (PAII).
Both IIA as international bodies and Indonesian professional bodies issued Internal
Audit Standards. The standard issued by the Indonesian Professional bodies basically is
an adoption of the international standard issued by the IIA. These professional bodies
essentially aim to promote internal audit guidance and professional standards as well as
foster global adoption of internal audit best practices (http://www.theiia.org).
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Table 6.8. The Responses to Normative Institutional Pressures
Main Sources of Normative Pressures
1. Education and training system
− The IIA suggests the internal auditors to possess sufficient knowledge, skills, and other
competencies.
− The IIA encourages the internal auditor to possess appropriate certifications.
2. The IIA recommends the auditors to undertake their duties with due professional care.
3. The IIA encourages the internal auditors to enhance their competence through continuing
professional development.

Tracing the response of this particular pressure into the Audit Charter, it was
found that the internal audit unit responded to the normative pressures by presenting its
requirement in the Internal Audit Charter. This means that the unit investigated
complies officially with all items suggested by the professional bodies. Further
investigation sought to find out the implementation of the audit charter in practice as
suggested by Fogarty (1996).
The knowledge, skills and competencies of the internal auditors required in the
Audit Charter is rather detailed. The Charter describes the competencies as including
capabilities in internal auditing, information technology, accounting (limited to auditors
who audit financial aspects), good business practices, and knowledge to identify fraud.
Another requirement is communication skills, both verbal and written. In interviews it
was found that there was no problem with the requirement for verbal communication
skills used by the auditors to communicate to the auditee. However, many of the
auditors have problems with written communication skills, particularly in relation to
preparation of the audit report.
The result from interviews indicated that most of the auditors have a lack of
knowledge and experience in internal auditing. It was mentioned that many of the
auditors were recruited from a working unit that did not require internal auditing skills
or background. They were recruited to obtain staff with a sound understanding of the
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operation of their former unit. So they have more understanding of business operations
and it was assumed they would have more capability to assess business risk and control,
which is relevant to risk-based auditing. Therefore, the auditors have various
educational backgrounds other than accounting, economics and auditing such as: civil
engineering, chemistry, and information technology.
The interviews also revealed that the internal audit unit under study attempted to
comply with pressure by providing internal and external training to increase skills and
competencies that are required by professional certification. In line with findings from
interviews, the documentation of the Annual Audit Plan 2014 presented various
provisions for training. The training covered many areas such as auditing, risk
management and information technology, as well as training for professional
certification such as Professional Internal Auditor (PIA), Qualified Internal Auditor
(QIA), Certified Risk Management Professional (CRMP), and Certified Information
System Auditor (CISA). Regarding professional certification, it was found from
interviews that many auditors faced difficulty in obtaining the professional certificates
and even some of them took many years to get it.
Hence the response of the internal audit unit regarding proficiency is not perfect,
particularly as most of auditors recruited have no knowledge or experience in internal
auditing, which means in turn that the audit unit only partially complies with the
pressure. Nevertheless, the unit had shown its intention to comply with the pressure but
may take time for full compliance. It can be said therefore, the response made by the
audit unit is the compromise strategy and pacify tactic. The finding of this study
contributes to knowledge on institutional theory that the compromise strategy and
pacify tactic used by the unit was attempting to pursue the requirement, by providing
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internal and external training. However, some limitations still occur to full compliance
as it is part of the nature of the unit under investigation.
The second pressure is about requirements for internal auditors to undertake their
duty with due professional care. The Internal Audit Standard issued by IIA (2013, p. 20)
on this matter stated that “Internal Auditors must apply the care and skill expected of a
reasonably prudent and competent internal auditor.” This pressure was adopted in the
Audit Charter number 3.3.2 in point h) and in more detail in i). In the interviews it was
mentioned that the execution of the internal audit function has to comply with
regulations and standards. The compliance in this regard should include compliance
with the Audit Charter with regard to carrying out the task with due professional care.
Considering the lack of knowledge, skills and competencies of the internal auditors as
discussed previously, it is hard to say that the internal auditors are able to implement
this requirement in practice. Although the response of the internal audit unit could not
fully comply with the charter, adopting the standard into the Audit Charter and
attempting to provide training and professional certification indicates the unit used the
compromise strategy with pacify tactic.
The third pressure is sourced from the proposition to undertake continuing
professional development, which has been adopted in the audit charter. The charter
describes it as consisting of numerous activities such as attending training, seminars and
other events to gain understanding on the latest development of standards, procedures,
audit techniques and business environment. The interviews demonstrated that all
auditors wanted to improve and maintain their competency by attending international
and local seminars as well as conferences. However, as discussed earlier, not all
auditors had a chance to attend those events, particularly for international seminars or
conferences. Only selected auditors were chosen by the head of audit unit or the head of
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audit bureaus to attend those events. Although it is not mentioned in the charter that
membership of professional bodies is part of continuous professional development, as
suggested by IIA, in practice some of the auditors are members of the bodies and the
membership fees are paid by the company.
The condition above illustrated that the audit unit has responded positively to IIA
encouragement. However, the unit may not be able to fully satisfy the pressure, as
indicated by not all the auditors being able to be a member of a professional body or
attending seminars or conferences domestically and/or internationally. This situation
demonstrates that the internal audit unit used the compromise strategy and pacify tactic
to respond to pressure.
6.4. Mimetic Isomorphism and the Practice of Internal Auditing
Mimetic isomorphism is when organisations respond to uncertainty with imitation
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The uncertainty may arise from poor understanding of
organisational technologies, goal ambiguity and uncertain on environmental
expectations. The mimetic efforts may be followed intentionally or unintentionally. The
desire to copy intentionally may be based on observation of a successful organisation or
suggestions from a consulting firm or industry trade association (DiMaggio and Powell,
1983). In turn, the unintentional desire to copy may arise through transfer or turnover of
employees that bring their previous knowledge or practice (DiMaggio and Powell,
1983). The rationality to examine how the unit responded to the pressure is presented in
figure 6.3.
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Figure 6.3. Mimetic Pressures towards Internal Auditing Practice
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The result from interviews stated that the internal auditor perceived that the
activities of the company are complex, and therefore need a strong technological base
and internal control systems. At this stage the internal auditor was unsure how to
develop proper internal control systems. In interviews it was mentioned that a team
from the company went to visit a successful SOE in Bandung which is listed on the
NYSE. The team also went to visit some successful companies overseas. In addition, it
was mentioned that the company used a public accounting firm that undertook
assessment on the ICoFR and a consultant firm to assess the implementation of COSO
guidance. From those interviews it could be said that the internal audit unit may receive
mimetic pressure from three grounds as presented in table 6.9.
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Table 6.9. The Responses to Mimetic Institutional Pressures
Main Sources of Mimetic Forces
1. A formal visitation to other SOE and overseas corporations, which are perceived to be more
successful, in order to learn their technology-based internal control system. This learning visit was in
order to build an in-house control system with a technology basis.
2. Recommendation from the public accounting firm to implement and audit the Internal Control over
Financial Reporting (ICoFR) as one of the cores of SOX 2002
3. Recommendation from consultant to employ internal control system - integrated framework issued
by COSO as guidance in assessing the effectiveness of internal control.

An investigation of the Audit Charter, found no statement in the charter that
clearly links the content of the charter with this pressure. Nevertheless, it does not
preclude the possibility that some of items in the charter are the results of imitating a
successful company visited, or are recommendations from the public accounting or the
consulting firm. In relation to the first pressure listed above, an interview was found to
support that possibility. The head of the unit mentioned that the visit was followed up
by developing a technology-based internal control system assisted by a consulting firm
and involving information technology personnel of the company. Additionally, the head
of the unit also mentioned his intention to be similar to the visited SOE in the near
future. Therefore, it could be said that the internal audit unit under study uses the
acquiescence strategy and imitate tactic to respond to the mimetic pressure experienced
by the unit. In this case, the internal audit unit undertakes the imitate response to the
mimetic pressure by consciously adopting a technology-based internal control system.
Regarding the second item, the interviews revealed that this pressure stemmed
from the recommendation of the international affiliation of public accounting firm. The
Charter did not mention that the internal auditors have to follow up the external
auditor's recommendations. However, it was described in the Charter that the internal
auditors are the counterparty of external auditors in conducting the audit activities, and
may exchange their management letters of the audit report. This management letter
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contains all deficiencies found in the audit process, including the weaknesses of internal
control systems, which need to be improved. In interviews, it was mentioned that the
internal audit unit responded to the recommendation by implementing ICoFR and
creating accompanying guidelines. The analysis on this matter demonstrates that the
internal audit unit used the acquiescence strategy and conscious imitate tactic. This
tactic is clearly described by DiMaggio and Powel (1983, cited in Oliver, 1991, p.152)
as “…the acceptance of advice from consulting firms or professional organizations.”
As described in the audit charter the internal audit unit may use a consulting firm
if necessary. This matter was further investigated by the study through interviews as
part of the data collection technique. The interviews showed that the internal audit unit
hired a consulting firm to assess COSO implementation and propose recommendations.
From observations, it was found that the influence of the consulting firm was also
through provision of training and seminars using consultant and guest speakers to
update knowledge on COSO requirements. Finally, it was found in the annual report
2014 that the company had implemented an Internal Control-Integrated Framework
issued by COSO.
The findings above indicate that that the internal audit unit responded to mimetic
pressure by implementing an Internal Control-Integrated Framework issued by COSO
as recommended by the consulting firm. Therefore, it can be said that the response used
by the unit is the acquiescence strategy and conscious Imitate tactic. Since most of the
auditors were recruited from internal units within the company, the unintentional desire
to copy that arose through transfer or turnover of employee is unlikely to occur.
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6.5. Summary
The research questions of the study are to investigate the effect the institutional
pressures have on the practice of an internal audit unit of a public SOE in Indonesia.
This chapter presents some analysis of the response of this internal audit unit to
institutional pressures that arose from various sources. The study considers three types
of pressures developed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 1991) that comprise coercive,
normative and mimetic pressure. In relation to the response, the study uses five ranges
of strategies and tactics developed by Oliver (1996) to determine the type of responses
undertaken by the audit unit: acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and
manipulation strategies.
Since the internal audit unit under investigation is a public SOE in which the
majority interest is owned by the government of Indonesia, it is considered that
pressures may arise from sources which are different to those in a fully private company.
In terms of coercive pressures, there are two categories of pressure which arise: formal
and informal pressures. Formal pressures are the pressures from government mandates,
regulations and the standard operating pressures as indicated by the following
regulations issued by Bapepam/OJK, Ministry of SOE, BPK, BPKP, and IDX. The
informal pressures are the pressures from public expectations, that is, from the
IIA/Indonesian internal auditor association, SOX 2002, COSO, and society.
The first level of investigation indicates that the internal audit unit responded to
coercive pressures by accommodating all the requirements in the internal audit charter,
except for five aspects. First, the Audit Charter did not state that the head of internal
audit unit must have professional certification. Second, the requirement that the number
of internal auditors must be appropriate with the business complexity of company was
not present in the Charter. Third, the COSO requirement was not adopted in the Audit
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Charter. Fourth, learning technology-based internal control systems from other
successful SOEs was not included in the Charter. Finally, the implementation of an
ICoFR review based on the public accounting firm recommendations as well as the
updating of COSO guideline based on the consulting firm were not present in the
Charter.
The second stage of investigation indicates that there are various responses
performed by the audit unit. In terms of formal coercive pressures, the responses to the
pressure from Bapepam/OJK consist of four different strategies and tactics: the
acquiescence strategy with comply tactic, the compromise strategy with pacify tactic,
the avoidance strategy with conceal tactic and the defiance strategy with dismiss tactic.
For the regulations issued by Ministry of SOE, the audit unit responds to the pressures
by undertaking the acquiescence strategy with comply tactic, the compromise strategy
with pacify tactic, and the avoidance strategy with conceal tactic. In terms of the
pressures from BPK regulation, the internal audit unit undertakes the compromise
strategy and pacify tactic, while for the BPKP regulation, the acquiescence strategy and
comply tactic are practiced. The IDX regulations are responded to by the audit unit
using the acquiescence strategy and comply tactic. Furthermore, the informal coercive
pressures are responded to differently by the audit unit. They consist of the compromise
strategy and pacify tactic for response to the expectations of IIA/the Indonesian
professional bodies, and conducting the acquiescence strategy and imitate tactic for
SOX 2002 expectations. Regarding the expectations of COSO, the unit responded by
using the acquiescence strategy and imitate tactic; while the expectation of the society is
responded to by undertaking the compromise strategy and pacify tactic.
The normative pressures arising from professional bodies such as the
IIA/Indonesian internal auditor association encompass education and training systems,
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due professional care and continuing professional development. In terms of normative
pressures, the audit unit uses the compromise strategy and pacify tactic to respond to the
pressures. In turn, mimetic pressures stem from the technology-based internal control
system, and recommendations from a public accounting firm as well as an external
consultant. The response of the unit to mimetic pressure was indicated by using the
acquiescence strategy and imitate tactic.
It could be argued that the findings confirm that the three institutional pressures
do affect the practice of internal audit function. The adoption of the requirements in the
internal audit charter indicated the effect of the pressure on the operation of the internal
audit unit. Furthermore, the practice of the internal audit function was mostly in line
with the Audit Charter.
The findings contribute to the domain of internal audit and institutional theory,
particularly in regard to the organisational responses to institutional pressures suggested
by Oliver (1991). This study also provides additional contributions to previous studies
(Al-Twaijry et al., 2003; Arena et al., 2006; Arena and Azzone, 2007; Mihret et al.,
2012) since these were only undertaken at a single level of investigation, while this
study conducted two levels of examination as suggested by Fogarty (1996). Also, this
study examined formal and informal coercive pressures on the internal audit practice
and its responses, whereas prior studies only focused on formal coercive pressures on
the practice of internal audit and its responses. Therefore, this study draws a
comprehensive picture of internal audit as it involves all levels of auditors in the
organisational structure of the internal audit unit, while previous studies (Al-Twaijry et
al., 2003; Arena et al., 2006; Arena and Azzone, 2007; Mihret et al., 2012) only involve
the highest level of auditor as the participants.
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This study has a different institutional context to prior studies (Al-Twaijry et al.,
2003; Arena and Azzone, 2007, and Mihret et al., 2012). The democratic political
system in Indonesia creates the unique context of an institutional environment in
Indonesia. The colonial era may affect the political system in Indonesia by creating
massive regulations to control government institutions such as Bapepam/OJK, the
Ministry of SOE, BPK, BPKP, IDX. Since 1991, when the government allowed the
SOEs to go public, the country started to establish professional bodies that facilitated
and encouraged internal audit standards to be implemented. The development of
Indonesian professional bodies of internal audit is indicated by the existence of the
Indonesian chapter of the IIA, FKSPI, the Foundation of Internal Audit Education
(YPIA), the Certification Boards of Qualified Internal Auditors (DSQIA), and
Association of Indonesian Internal Auditors (PAII). Therefore, it can be concluded that
the results of investigation provide an understanding that the institutional pressures
(coercive, normative and mimetic) influence the practice of the internal audit function
of the SOE under study.
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Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusion

7.1. Introduction
Internal Audit is an important element in the assurance environment of both
public and private sector organisations, a valuable tool and a contributor to effective
management of risk associated with the operations of these organisations. It is a
particularity important function for State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in Indonesia given
the fact that a substantial amount of public money is spent in running these
organisations to achieve the significant economic contributions they make to the
country. However, a series of cases involving corruption and misappropriation of funds
in these organisations in recent years has raised doubts about the effectiveness of their
audit functions. The lack of research in the internal audit practice in the SOEs in
Indonesia, concerns over the effectiveness of internal audit practice and well
documented issues with the financial management of SOEs provided the background for
this study.
Given the above background, the major aim of this study is to investigate the
internal audit practice of a SOE in Indonesia through the lens of institutional theory and
to examine how coercive, normative and mimetic pressures affect the internal auditing
practice of the enterprise. It also considers the coercive pressures that arise from both
formal and informal sources. The formal sources considered are the legal and standards
requirements imposed by public institutions such as the Capital Market Regulatory
Body and Financial Institution (Bapepam-LK) or Indonesia Financial Services
Authority (OJK), the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprise, the Supreme Financial Audit
of Indonesian Government (BPK), the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency
(BPKP) and the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX). The informal sources considered

are the public pressures arising from the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the
Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 (SOX), the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations (COSO),
and the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) 26000. Accordingly, this
study aims to answer the following research question.
How does the practice of internal auditing in Indonesian SOE react to the coercive,
normative and mimetic pressures coming from the environment?
In summary, in attempting to answer the research question, this study first
provides a research background and highlights the significance, aims, scope, and
contributions of the study in chapter 1. It then critically reviews prior studies that have
examined the internal auditing function (chapter 2) giving an insight into previously
identified issues on internal auditing practice in both developed and developing
countries. The research design and the methods adopted in examining the underlying
issues are then discussed in chapter 3. The historical account of SOEs in Indonesia,
together with its legal and institutional framework applicable to internal auditing
practice are discussed in chapter 4, placing this study in the Indonesian context. On the
basis of data obtained from interviews in a public SOE, chapter 5 describes the internal
audit practice of the Indonesian public SOE chosen for the case study. Using the
information presented in chapter 5 and the theoretical lens provided by the institutional
theory, chapter 6 then examines the responses of the chosen SOE to institutional
pressures following two steps approach. In the first-step, the study examines the
strategic responses to processes made by the SOE to release the pressure. For this
purpose, the changes made by the SOE to the audit charter as a response to instructional
pressure are examined using the strategic response framework proposed by Oliver
(1991). In the second step, using a method proposed by Fogarty (1996), the study
compares the practice described in the audit charter with the practices described by the
interviewees to determine whether what is prescribed in the audit charter is actually
298

being practiced. Finally, this chapter provides findings and conclusions of the study and
highlights its contributions, implications and limitations.
7.2. The Findings and conclusions
The review of literature in chapter 2 indicates that studies of internal audit practice
in developing countries such as Indonesia using institutional theory are limited. This
situation highlights the needs for more research to be undertaken to understand the
internal auditing practices in Indonesia, which are largely influenced by the unique
social, political and economical characteristics that Indonesia has inherited from its
colonial masters. The literature review also reveals a number of areas that are seriously
under researched, requiring further investigation. First, there is no prior study
examining the internal audit practice of an Indonesian SOE. Second, studies that
examined the internal auditing practice were confined to examining formal coercive
pressures and neglected informal coercive pressures. Third, prior studies that examined
the responses of the internal audit unit towards institutional pressures have primarily
used interview and/or survey data for obtaining data and neglected the need to discover
such practices through an examination of the Internal Audit Charter. Fourth, prior
studies have primarily focused on the experiences and activities conducted by upper
management level for their examinations and have largely ignored those of the middle
and bottom levels of internal auditors in the internal audit unit.
As presented in chapter four, Indonesia has inherited many distinctive
administrative features from practices in a long colonial era. In addition to these
influences, the political system has created a massive regulatory framework to control
activities of government units. The regulatory system that continually issued regulations
governing the practices of business organisations consist of institutions including the
Capital Market Regulatory Body and Financial Institution (Bapepam-LK) which was
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then replaced by the Indonesia Financial Services Authority (OJK), the Ministry of
State-Owned Enterprises, the Supreme Financial Audit of Indonesian Government
(BPK), the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP) and the Indonesian
Stock Exchange (IDX). In addition, the Indonesian constitution also provided a legal
environment that supported the establishment of professional bodies that facilitate and
encourage internal audit standards to be developed and implemented.
The distinct institutional context in Indonesia and the gaps discovered in the
literature provided ground for using institutional theory to uncover the internal audit
practice of an Indonesian public SOE, which has not been a subject of prior research.
The examination was carried out using the institutional theory and primarily
investigated the effect of institutional pressures on the internal audit charter, and the
extent to which the charter has been put into practice by involving all levels of internal
auditors in the internal audit unit. As revealed in the previous chapter, the three
institutional pressures - coercive, normative and mimetic - were found to have a
significant impact on the internal audit practice of the internal audit unit which was
subject of the case study.
As indicated previously, this study investigates the responses to pressure in two
stages. The first stage is to investigate how institutional pressure impacted on the
internal audit practice in the form of amendments to the audit chapter. The second stage
is to investigate whether or not items in audit charter were really put into practice by the
internal audit unit of the company under the study. The examination in the first stage
revealed that the charter adopted almost all responses that were designed to release
institutional pressures. However, in five cases of formal coercive pressures the
responses were not adopted by the charter. As a public SOE, formal coercive pressure is
mandatory due to the fact that the government has more than 50% of the ownership of
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the business entities. The requirements not adopted by the charter are as follows: (1)
requirement for the professional certification of the head of internal audit unit, (2)
requirement to state the number of internal auditors in the audit charter, (3) requirement
to follow the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations (COSO), (4) requirement to
establish technology-based internal control systems that are learned from other
successful SOEs, and (5) the implementation of Internal Control over Financial
Reporting (ICoFR) reviews based on public accounting firm recommendations as well
as the updating of COSO guideline application based on the consulting firm’s
recommendations.
The examination in the second stage was carried out to investigate the extent to
which requirements of the internal audit charter are followed. This used data from
interviews, relevant internal documentation, and observations. This examination
revealed that the internal audit unit has taken various steps to ensure that the
requirements of the auditing charter are followed. In terms of formal coercive pressure
from Bapepam-LK/OJK, the responses of the audit unit consist of four different
strategies and tactics: acquiescence strategy with comply tactic; compromise strategy
with pacify tactic; avoidance strategy with conceal tactic; and defiance strategy with
dismiss tactic. An acquiescence strategy with comply tactic means that the internal audit
unit complies with the Bapepam-LK/OJK regulation consciously (Oliver 1991). As for
the rationality behind such a response, two reasons are provided by the interviewees.
First, as a state-owned entity, the unit has to comply with government regulation.
Second, as a public company, the unit investigated has to comply with BapepamLK/OJK’s regulation which acts as a stock market regulator.
The study found that the internal audit unit responded to two of the regulations of
Bapepam-LK/OJK - duties and responsibilities of internal audit and qualification of
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internal auditor - using compromise strategy with pacify tactic. Oliver (1991) defined
compromise strategy and pacify tactic as a ‘partial conformity with the expectations of
one or more constituents’ (Oliver, 1991, p. 153).
In the case of duties and responsibilities, the pacify tactic was used because of
management interference in the preparation of the audit report. In the case of
qualification, the pacify tactic was used because of the lack of qualified auditors with
auditing knowledge and experience in the unit. This is because the audit unit recruits
auditors from other units with no accounting or auditing background. The reason for
using an internal recruitment system to recruit auditors from internal divisions is
because the audit unit considers that people who have gained knowledge of the business
operations in other divisions of the organisation are in a better position to function as
auditors than someone hired from outside with auditing knowledge. The audit unit is of
the opinion that internally recruited people are able to assess the risk and controls of the
business organisation better than people hired from outside and they can obtain the
auditing knowledge over time through internal and external training, professional
certification and professional development programs.
The avoidance strategy and conceal tactic was also found to be used to respond to
four items of Bapepam-LK/OJK regulation. Conceal tactic is associated with the
response to disguise the fact that it does not intend to implement the requirement using a
rational plan (Oliver, 1991). This tactic was used to avoid recruitment of auditors by
assuming that the use of a matrix system is enough to execute the audit plan. The
practice of not reporting any issues that implicate top management's involvement with
an issue is influenced by the belief that reporting such issues is a futile exercise given
the fact that the audit unit is under the management of CEO and his/her approval is
required for submitting a report to the audit committee. The limited number of auditors
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in the unit has also had an impact on the unit’s use of the tactic of refusing to assess all
activities in the organisation. In conclusion, it was found that the audit unit is using the
avoidance strategy and conceal tactic in relation to issues that implicate top
management because of the practical reality of not being able to report such issues to
the audit committee directly without the prior approval of the CEO - who would
naturally be reluctant to approve a report that implicates top management.
The defiance strategy and dismiss tactic were found to be used by the audit unit in
relation to two items of Bapepam-LK/OJK regulations. According to Oliver (1991), the
dismiss tactic refers to “ignoring institutional rules and values” (p.156). This was
evident by the finding that a high rank official in the internal audit unit was also found
to be functioning as a board member of a subsidiary company. This is direct violation of
the requirement of Bapepam-LK/OJK regulations. The relatively small size of the
subsidiary was found to be the reason for unit’s using the dismiss tactic in this instance.
For the regulations issued by the Ministry of SOEs, the audit unit responded to
pressures by using various strategies and tactics such as acquiescence strategy with
comply tactic, compromise strategy with pacify tactic, and avoidance strategy with
conceal tactic. The study found that the audit unit responded to three items of the
Decree of Ministry of SOE using compromise strategy and pacify tactic. The reason for
using this strategy and tactic is the interference of management in preparing the audit
report. Furthermore, the audit unit responded to six items of the Decree of Ministry of
SOE by using avoidance strategy and conceal tactic. The use of this strategy and tactic
was also found to be due to the interference of management in the preparation of the
audit report.
In terms of pressures from BPK regulations, the internal audit unit undertook a
compromise strategy and pacify tactic. The response was revealed by the decision of the
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internal audit unit to not provide the internal audit reports to BPK. The unit justified this
action on the ground that these reports contained confidential data and were prepared
for internal managerial purposes only. The unit also sighted the right of a public
company to keep confidential and sensitive information out of the public domain as
another reason for not releasing these reports to BPK.
The acquiescence strategy and comply tactic was found to be used by the internal
audit unit in response to BPKP and IDX regulations. In the case of BPKP regulation,
this tactic was evident from the assistance provided by the audit unit to the BPKP in
providing data for the assessment of good corporate governance (GCG) which is a
compulsory requirement of the Ministry of SOEs. The reason for adopting the comply
tactic was that it is incumbent on the company, as an SOE, to provide this assessment to
the Ministry of SOE. In the case of IDX regulations, this tactic was evident from the
thorough analytical review undertaken by the company of the financial statements of the
company three times a year. The reason for adopting a comply tactic was that in order to
keep the company listed on IDX, it is necessary to comply with the IDX requirement of
providing reliable financial statements.
The study also found that evidence of the audit unit responding to less formal
coercive pressures. In this regard, the unit adopted the compromise strategy and pacify
tactic to respond to the expectations of the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA)/the
Indonesian internal auditor associations. The response to the professional bodies'
recommendations was categorised as pacify tactic as the internal audit unit has not
undertaken all of the requirements of the internal audit standards. A number of factors
such as the existence of limited number of auditors, lack of audit knowledge, conflict of
interest and management interference are considered to be the reasons for this response.
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SOX 2002 focused on the implementation of Internal Control over Financial
Reporting (ICoFR) as one of the aspects of a good corporate governance process. The
internal audit unit adopted an acquiescence strategy and imitate tactic in responding to
expectations of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) 2002. The decision was influenced by
the recommendation of a public accounting firm affiliated with international public
accounting firm.
Regarding the expectations of the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations
(COSO), the unit responded by using acquiescence strategy and imitate tactic. Again,
this response was a result of the implementation of one of the recommendations made
by the company’s consulting firm.
In the case of requirements of ISO 26000, the audit unit adopted a compromise
strategy and pacify tactic. Particularly, with regard to the scheme to provide financial
aid and soft loans to the local community near the company factory, it appears that the
audit unit was undertaking a pacify tactic whereby requirements of ISO 26000 were not
followed fully. In fact, there were no Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for
conducting the CSR program. The reason for the activities of the CSR program not
coming under the full scrutiny of the audit unit was the involvement of top management
in the program and ambiguity over who was running the program. Although top
management is largely involved in the design of the CSR program, the audit unit, which
is supposed to audit activities of the program, is also involved in implementation of
some part of the CSR program.
Normative pressures arising from professional bodies such as the IIA/Indonesian
internal auditor association encompass education and training systems, due professional
care and continuing professional development. In responding to these normative
pressures, the audit unit uses Compromise Strategy and Pacify tactic. In contrast,
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Mimetic pressures stem from a technology-based internal control system, and
recommendations from a public accounting firm as well as from an external consultant.
The response of the unit to Mimetic pressure was to use acquiescence strategy and an
imitate tactic.
In conclusion, the investigation of the internal audit practice of a SOE in
Indonesia revealed the existence of the three institutional pressures and analysed their
impact on the Internal audit practice in SOE in Indonesia. The study also found that the
audit unit examined has responded to coercive, normative and memetic pressures
through changes to requirements stated in the internal audit charter which was found to
have a profound impact on the internal audit practice in the public SOE examined.
Furthermore, the practices of the internal audit function were found to be mostly in line
with the Audit Charter. The preceding chapter provided a detailed explanation of how
coercive, normative and memetic pressures affect the internal audit practice in the case
of an Indonesian public SOE, and answered the three specific research questions that
this study aimed to answer.
7.3. Research Contribution
This study used DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983; 1991), and Oliver’s (1991)
institutional frameworks to describe the institutional forces that affect the internal audit
practices. It also elaborates the concepts of institutional theory in relation to strategies
and tactics chosen by the internal audit unit to respond to institutional pressures.
Through an examination of strategies and tactical responses of an audit unit in relation
to various institutional pressures, this study makes a contribution to the auditing
literature by providing a rich description of internal audit practices of a publicly listed
SOE operating in Indonesia, which has not been a subject matter of a comprehensive
study previously. In this respect, this research contributes to the domain of internal
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auditing and confirms the validity of the application of institutional theory as a lens to
examine organisational responses toward various institutional pressures.
This study also broadened the level of examination by undertaking a two level
examination as suggested by Fogarty (1996). This is in contrast to previous studies in
this area (for example, Al-Twaijry et al., 2003; Arena et al., 2006; Arena and Azzone,
2007; Mihret et al., 2012) that have undertaken a single level of examination. Also,
while deviating from prior studies, which have confined their analysis to examine
formal coercive pressures on the internal audit practice, this study has broadened the
examination by looking at both formal and informal coercive pressures which have
resulted in responses affecting the internal audit practice. As a result, this study draws
up a comprehensive picture of internal audit by covering broader aspects of internal
auditing involving activities of all levels of auditors in the internal audit unit. This is in
contrast to previous studies (for example, Al-Twaijry et al., 2003; Arena et al., 2006;
Arena and Azzone, 2007; Mihret et al., 2012) which have only considered the activities
of auditors at the highest level and largely ignore the input from the middle and lower
level of auditors.
One of the major strengths of this study is that it has attempted to answer ‘how’
questions through an interpretative case study. This study also contributes to fill the gap
in the literature highlighted by Humphrey (2008) who argues that there is a lack of
qualitative research in examining internal audit issues. However, it must be mentioned
that a few other studies which have examined internal audit practice from the
institutional perspective have also gone beyond asking ‘what’ questions (for example,
Al-Twaijry et al. 2003; Arena et al. 2006; Arena and Azzone, 2007; Elbardan et al.
2016 and Mihret et al., 2012). The fact that this study adopts a qualitative case study
approach and takes into account the views of various levels of internal auditors and uses
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a variety of sources for data collection provides more validity to the findings of the
study.
7.4. Implications of the study
The findings from this study have potential implications for Indonesian policy
makers, including professional bodies, especially in the area of internal auditing as well
as the managers of SOE. The study indicated that government applied tight regulations
through various government units such as Bapepam-LK/OJK, Ministry of SOEs, BPK,
BPKP, and IDX to regulate the practice of internal audit in SOE in Indonesia. However,
the study found the effort to monitor and evaluate the practice of internal audit of SOEs
in relation to the requirement of the regulations is weak, suggesting the need for more
effective actions from these organisations to improve the status quo.
Some actions need to be taken to make the internal audit function more effective.
First, the government should consider making the internal audit unit report directly to
the board of directors rather than to the CEO. By doing so, it can discourage
interference from the top management on the internal audit practice and ensure that
internal auditors perform their tasks independently. Second, the government should pay
close attention to the report produced by external auditors including the assessments
made by the independent assessors that refer to the quality of internal audit activities.
These assessment reports can be used to identify problems and weaknesses faced by the
internal audit unit and to put forward policies to address the critical issues identified.
Third, the government should continuously update the recommendations published by
the IIA and adopt them into the regulations to ensure the practice of internal auditing is
in line with best standards. This is one of the ways to maintain and increase internal
auditing effectiveness. Fourth, the government should ensure that their monitoring
mechanisms are effective as this study identifies the absence of strong monitoring and
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inspection mechanisms as one of the main reasons for the internal audit unit’s failure to
comply with government policy requirements fully.
The finding of the study indicated that the manager of the SOE needs to improve
the qualifications of the auditors. This can be through formal education, professional
standards and professional networks. The standards of internal auditing recommend that
qualifications of internal auditors should be in line with the level of internal audit
activities. As the scope of internal auditing covers control, risk management and the
governance process as suggested in the standards, it is suggested that the internal
auditors should have competence in those areas. The study showed that the internal
audit unit attempts to follow the recommendations of the standards on internal audit
activities regarding relevant competence needed by the auditors. In the case examined,
the internal audit unit provides internal training, supports external training leading to the
completion of professional certification and encourages employees to participate in
continuous professional development programs. However, it was found that not all
auditors have opportunities to attend local or international conferences and seminars. In
this respect, the government should monitor and evaluate the qualifications of the
auditors in SOEs regularly and take appropriate actions to encourage SOEs to educate
their internal auditors when they are not doing enough to improve the qualifications of
their internal auditors. At the present, there is huge vacuum in the policy setting in
relation to this aspect.
In addition to the potential policy implications mentioned above, this study
highlights a number of managerial implications in the following areas: the institutional
environment in Indonesian public SOEs, managerial behaviour, the public perceptions
of internal auditors in SOEs, and the approach of the internal audit unit to managing
people. These potential managerial implications are briefly described below.
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First, as suggested by Meyer and Rowan (1977), adapting to the institutional
environment is important for organisations to achieve legitimacy and to be successful in
the long term. The finding of this study shows that the institutional environment is not
always a constraint but sometimes can be an enabling force.
Second, this study indicates that high ranking internal auditors prefer/are
compelled to obey the requests of the CEOs despite the fact such actions violate the
regulations and internal auditing standards. This attitude may impair the independence
and objectivity of an internal auditor in conducting the internal audit activities. However,
the results also indicated that the manager of the internal audit unit attempted to
improve the quality of internal audit services by trying to fully adopt and implement
internal auditing standards. This is a welcome development in the context of SOEs in
Indonesia and is a practice recommended by IIA which is of the view that the role of the
internal auditor is now being changed from watchdog to consultant. Following this
action, the internal audit unit altered the audit method from a controls-based audit to a
risk-based audit while making efforts to improve the proficiency of internal auditors. In
terms of competencies of the internal auditors, it is evident that internal auditors
recruited lacks knowledge, skill and experience in internal auditing areas. This problem
occurred because most internal auditors are recruited from other business units and have
no educational background in accounting and auditing. In this case, the manager has to
provide internal and external training to the internal auditors and to make them engage
in obtaining professional certification and participating in professional development
programs. However, not all internal auditors have a similar opportunity to participate in
a professional development program. Therefore, the manager needs to consider the
fairness of opportunities for all internal auditors. This is important since qualified
internal auditors are perceived to be auditors who are professionally qualified, have
310

completed a professional certificate and have experience in conducting internal audits
for a reasonable period of time. Also, the manager of the internal audit unit should
recruit a number of new internal auditors as the existing numbers of internal auditors are
not enough to tackle all the internal audit activities.
Third, the study points out that besides acquiescence strategy and comply tactic,
most of the responses of the internal audit unit towards coercive pressures are
compromise strategy and pacify tactic. Because of the compromise strategy and pacify
tactic, the internal audit unit has not yet been able to put all the items in the internal
audit charter fully into practice. This may be due to two reasons. First, some items have
been put into practice but failed to achieve the expected results. Second, the items have
been put into the chapter to gain legitimacy but not are strongly supported by the
auditors for implementation. Since the audit chapter functions as a mean of absorbing
institutional pressures, it is incumbent upon the head of the internal audit unit to comply
with the internal audit charter and make every effort to put all items in the charter into
practice. The items that need particular attention are: ensuring an appropriate number of
internal auditors with internal audit activities; maintaining the independence and
objectivity of internal auditors; providing a fair opportunity for all auditors to
participate in professional development programs; and conducting an internal quality
assurance review.
Fourth, as described in chapter 5, internal auditor’s roles now include the role of
assurer, consultant and catalyst. The changing roles and internal auditor’s engagement
in much broader business functions has generated an eagerness among internal auditors
to increase their professional competence. Therefore, it is essential that the manager of
the internal audit unit fully understands the changing role of internal auditors and makes
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an effort to provide them with opportunities to improve the competencies that are
demanded by the newer roles that they are expected to perform.
Fifth, as many recruited internal auditors have different educational backgrounds
and most of them have no experience in internal auditing before coming to the audit unit,
the manager of the internal audit unit needs to consider the perspectives from different
auditors when responding to institutional pressures.
7.5. Limitations and suggestion for further research
The findings of this study are subjected to a number of limitations. Since a single
case study has been conducted to examine the internal auditing practice in a public SOE
in Indonesia, the findings are subject to common criticisms of the single case study
method such as concerns about methodological rigour, researcher subjectivity, and
external validity. More specifically, the interpretations presented in this study are based
on the findings from a specific company in a particular sector in a specific institutional
environment. The institutional environment in an Indonesian public SOE context means
it is uncertain the extent to which the findings of this study can be applied to other
institutional contexts. Despite this weakness, single case study design is widely used in
higher degree research as this limitation can be offset by other benefits that a single case
study can offer in comparison to other viable methods that could have been used to
examine the underline research issues. As stated by Hamel et al. (1993) and Yin (1994),
parameter establishment and objective setting of the research are far more important in
case study method than a big sample size.
Similarly, as this study investigated the practice of internal audit which took place
in the context of a public SOE in Indonesia, the results of this study may not be relevant
to other internal audit units that operate under different contexts and institutional
environments. Yin (2014) stated that a common concern on a case study research is
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inability to generalise its findings. Therefore, to increase the collection of case studies in
the same area, future research should be conducted in other institutional environment
contexts. By doing so, these studies can enrich the body of knowledge in the area of
internal audit function practiced by different entities in different environmental settings.
The study focuses on a public SOE in Indonesia as a single case study. Future
study may undertake similar research using multiple case studies either in SOEs in
Indonesia or in other countries.
In summary, despite the limitations mentioned above, this study provides
empirically-rich, context-specific, holistic accounts of the institutional pressures faced
by an Indonesian SOE and describes how such pressures affect the internal audit
practice of the Indonesian public SOE examined.
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